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ABSTRACT 
Currently, there are 44.7 million Americans holding student loan debt 
collectively totaling over $1.5 trillion. This massive debt has a 
profound effect, not only on the lives of the debtors but also on the 
national economy because it prevents the debtors from buying homes 
and cars and creating new businesses. This debt is also speculated to 
be a likely trigger for the next housing bubble because student loans, 
like the subprime mortgage loans underlying the 2008 financial crisis, 
are securitized and sold to investors. But many of those with student 
loans struggle to find jobs that will enable them to pay off their debt. 
In some cases, they leave school without graduating because they 
perceive their debt as too overwhelming. When that happens, their 
lack of a degree exacerbates their struggle to find decent jobs. 
Moreover, fear of undertaking substantial debt leads some individuals 
to forego higher education altogether, thereby condemning them to a 
lifetime of low-paying jobs. This Article traces the development of 
federal student loans and examines the numerous problems 
comprising the student loan debt crisis, among them the high cost of 
postsecondary education, the crisis-level amount of debt undertaken 
by students, the difficulties of repayment, and the fraud and abuse 
perpetrated by proprietary institutions and predatory lenders. It 
attributes these problems to Congress, which it argues has at times 
both acted, and failed to act, due to misjudgments that at least on 
occasion have bordered on an animus to students in need. This Article 
also critiques proposed legislation to reform federal funding of higher 
 
  Ernest P. Rogers, Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of 
Law. I am indebted to Margaret V. Sachs and Alan Watson for comments on an earlier 
draft of this Article. I also am indebted to T.J. Striepe and Hamed Roodposhti for 
technical and editorial assistance. Any errors or omissions are my own. 
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education and questions whether the mistakes of the past will soon be 
repeated in the pending reauthorization of the Higher Education Act 
of 1965.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In today’s global economy, education and access to education 
are more important than ever before, not only for individual workers 
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but also for the national economy.1 But nearly three-quarters of a 
century after the enactment of the original GI Bill,2 five decades after 
the initial establishment of a federal student loan program,3 and more 
than four decades after the creation of a national basic grant program 
for low-income students,4 “the central commitment to federal support 
for higher education and the [mechanics] of [that] support are under 
attack.”5 This attack has been fomented, in part, by the level of 
outstanding student loan debt that has reached such crisis proportions6 
 
 1. Education facilitates social inclusion and mobility, improves socio-
economic outcomes, and increases productivity, which in turn lead to greater tax 
revenues, lower social burdens on the government, and greater social contributions. 
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], EDUCATION AT A GLANCE 2017: 
OECD INDICATORS, 76, 118 (2017), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2017eag-2017-en [https://perma.cc/ 
7XC9-TZUN] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). As then Treasury Secretary, Timothy 
Geithner, stated,  
The moral case for doing a better job of giving Americans the opportunity 
to succeed is very compelling. The economic case is just as strong. If more 
Americans are educated, more will be employed, their collective earnings 
will be greater, and the overall productivity of the American workforce will 
be higher. 
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE ECONOMICS OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION 13 (2012). This would mean higher tax revenues, greater consumption, 
and reduced reliance on financial support from the government. See Anne Johnson & 
Tobin Van Ostern, It’s Our Interest: The Need to Reduce Student Loan Interest Rates, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 13, 2013, 9:47 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/reports/2013/02/13/53061/its-
our-interest-the-need-to-reduce-student-loan-interest-rates [https://perma.cc/6S6A-
K7A6]. 
 2. See discussion infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 3. See discussion infra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra note 71. 
 5. Lawrence E. Gladieux, Federal Student Aid Policy: A History and an 
Assessment, FINANCING POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: THE FEDERAL ROLE (October 
1995), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OPE/PPI/FinPostSecEd/gladieux.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8NUC-286X] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019); see, e.g., Roger Yu, Millions of 
Student Loans Could Be Headed for a Shakeup in Coming Months, USA TODAY (July 
5, 2017, 7:04 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/07/05/proposals-
change-student-loan-rules-could-upend-industry/99594768 [https://perma.cc/R6HE-
TU8A].  
 6. See, e.g., Randi Weingarten, Public Service Debt Relief is Broken, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/opinion/public-
service-loans-education.html [https://perma.cc/CY77-CSCM] (noting that as of 
summer 2018, student loan debt has reached $1.5 trillion); see also Zack Friedman, 
Student Loan Debt in 2017: A $1.3 Trillion Crisis, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2017, 7:45 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2017/02/21/student-loan-debt-statistics-
2017/#665c0b0f5dab [https://perma.cc/E4K2-UA8H]; Mark Kantrowitz, Why the 
Student Loan Crisis Is Even Worse Than People Think, MONEY (Jan. 11, 2016), 
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that it serves as a disincentive for many to pursue higher education.7 
For those already mired in this debt, the burden affects their physical 
and mental health, as well as their important life decisions, such as 
whether to open a business, buy a house, or start a family.8  
Most federal funding for higher education is authorized and 
regulated by the Higher Education Act of 1965 (the HEA), which is 
subject to reauthorization, usually occurring every five to seven years.9 
The last reauthorization was in 2008, however, so the next one is long 
overdue.10 Before the 2018 elections, Congress considered a 
reauthorization of the HEA,11 but the proposed legislation showed no 
signs of bipartisan cooperation.12 This failure to reach an agreement 
was counterproductive because a reauthorization has the potential to 
radically affect current and future borrowers, which in turn also has 
the potential to affect the future American workforce and 
 
https://www.time.com/money/4168510/why-student-loan-crisis-is-worse-than-
people-think [https://perma.cc/R98X-HLLH]. 
 7. See Neil Swidey, The College Debt Crisis Is Even Worse Than You Think, 
BOS. GLOBE (May 18, 2016, 9:02 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/ 
2016/05/18/hopes-dreams-debt/fR60cKakwUlGok0jTlONTN/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/M3WS-SJNX] (stating that the numbers no longer add up to pursue 
a bachelor’s degree). 
 8. See, e.g., David Jolley, Student Debt Is Killing Entrepreneurship, 
QUARTZ AT WORK (June 22, 2018), https://quartz.com/work/1311712/student-debt-
is-killing-entrepreneurship; Bill Fay, The Emotional Effects of Debt, DEBT.ORG. (May 
1, 2017), https://www.debt. org/advice/emotional-effects [https://perma.cc/DGV6-
FG4F]; see also Cat Alford, 3 Major Reasons Why Student Loan Debt Is Preventing 
Millennials from Having Kids, STUDENT LOAN HERO (Dec. 21, 2015), 
https://studentloanhero.com/featured/student-loan-debt-preventing-millennials-
having-kids/[https://perma.cc/443E-B8PT]; Borrowers Shift to Student Loan Debt 
Impacting Home Ownership, FINANCE SOLUTIONS (June 13, 2017), https://finance 
solutions.org/borrowers-shift-to-student-loan-debt-impacting-home-ownership 
[https://perma.cc/67B6-JJTZ].  
 9. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965). 
 10. See Higher Education Act, AM. ASS’N OF COLLEGIATE REGISTRARS & 
ADMISSIONS OFFICERS, https://www.aacrao.org/advocacy/issues/higher-education-act 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
 11. See infra Part III (discussing Congress’ interest in re-authorizing the 
HEA). 
 12. See Jared Polis, A Call for Bipartisanship in Higher Education, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED. (July 25, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2018/07/25/aim-
higher-act-offers-opportunity-bipartisan-support-students-and-their-families 
[https://perma.cc/CGD4-5BUY] (noting bipartisan “games” being played by 
chairwoman, Virginia Foxx, and Republican members of the House Committee on 
Education and the Workforce in shutting Democrats, as well as some Republican 
members of the committee, out of the process). 
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consequently the national economy.13 Since Congress will likely 
consider a reauthorization of the HEA once again in the near future, 
now is an opportune time to examine federal policies for higher 
education to understand how they have evolved over time, what they 
have accomplished, why student loan debt has reached such epic 
proportions, and what, if anything, can or should be done about it. 
While an investment in education is a crucial investment in the 
future, this Article maintains that in the past, the federal government 
has made poor choices in funding higher education. These choices 
have been made partly from inactions, partly from mistakes stemming 
from good intentions, and partly from an enmity to “free rides” for 
students.14 Regardless of the rationale, the result has been that the 
federal government has treated student borrowers unfairly in multiple 
ways and, at present, all indications are that this unfair treatment will 
continue, if not worsen.15 If so, it would be counterproductive because 
it ultimately could have devastating effects, both on society and on the 
economy. 
Part I of this Article traces the evolution and expansion of 
student loans and the consequent growth of student loan debt;16 Part II 
discusses the mistakes made by the federal government during the 
evolution of its funding for higher education;17 and Part III discusses 
the pending legislation (from both sides of the political aisle) and 
critiques the likely effect of each on the current broken system of 
funding higher education.18  
 
 13. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 1.  
 14. See infra Part II (discussing prior mistakes in funding higher education). 
 15. See Yu, supra note 5; infra Subsection I.C.6 (detailing Betsy DeVos’ 
actions in favor of proprietary institutions); infra Section III.A (discussing PROSPER 
bill and its attempt to enact Trump’s higher education agenda); see also Ryan Brown, 
Trump DeVos to Eliminate Public Service Loan Forgiveness, STUDENT DEBT RELIEF, 
https://www.studentdebtrelief.us/news/trump-devos-to-eliminate-public-service-
loan-forgiveness [https://perma.cc/RCH7-V9JU] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
 16. See infra Part I (detailing the evolution of federal student loans). 
 17. See infra Part II (discussing prior mistakes made in federal funding of 
higher education). In addition to student loans offered by the federal government, 
there are also loans offered by private lenders, states, and educational institutions. 
However, the largest lender is the federal government. See Courtney Miller, How 
Uncle Sam Became the Largest Student Lender, NERD WALLET (Dec. 21, 2015, 5:46 
AM), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/studies/uncle-sam-biggest-student-lender 
[https://perma.cc/G3TR-PA8B]. 
 18. See infra Part III (discussing pending legislation to re-authorize the 
HEA). 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS 
While it has been termed a “fundamental interest,”19 education is 
not a guaranteed right under the U.S. Constitution.20 Indeed, until the 
1960s, it was regarded primarily as the responsibility of the state and 
local governments.21 But because of its importance, the federal 
government assumed a significant role in education from very early 
on.22 At first that role encompassed a narrow, coherent rationale: to 
promote the building of schools through land grants and to assimilate 
into society emancipated slaves and, later, those who had served the 
 
 19. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1972) 
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); Serrano v. Priest, 487 
P.2d 1241, 1249 (Cal. 1971). 
 20. See Federal Education Policy and the States, 1945-2009: A Brief 
Synopsis, in STATES’ IMPACT ON FED. EDUC. POL’Y PROJECT, N.Y. STATE ARCHIVES 5 
(Jan. 2006, rev. Nov. 2009) [hereinafter A Brief Synopsis] (noting that education has 
been regarded as one of the “unenumerated powers reserved ‘to the states . . . or to the 
people’” under the Tenth Amendment). While the U.S. Constitution makes no explicit 
mention of education, all state constitutions guarantee their citizens the right to 
education. See id. 
 21. Overview: The Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (last 
modified May 25, 2017), http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html 
[https://perma.cc/N3HP-VZTG] (“It is States and communities, as well as public and 
private organizations of all kinds, that establish schools and colleges, develop 
curricula, and determine requirements for enrollment and graduation. The structure of 
education finance in America reflects this predominant State and local role.”). 
 22. A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 5 (explaining that in 1785 and 1787, 
Congress enacted the Northwest Ordinances, reserving 1/36th of the land allocated to 
each western township “for the maintenance of public schools within the said 
township.”). The Morrill Land Grant Acts of 1862 and 1890 extended land grants to 
states for institutions of higher education. See generally Pub. L. No. 37-130, 12 Stat. 
503 (1862); 26 Stat. 417 (1890). After the end of the Civil War, the federal 
government appropriated money to the Freedman’s Bureau to help assimilate 
emancipated slaves into their new lives by, among other things, expanding educational 
opportunities. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 5. 
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country during wartime.23 But eventually, its role expanded far beyond 
that rationale.24 
A. The Initial Post-WWII Federal Role in Higher Education 
The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as 
the GI Bill, provided a myriad of benefits for veterans returning home 
from World War II.25 Among these benefits were payments of living 
expenses and tuition to attend high school, college, or 
vocational/technical school, as well as financial incentives to purchase 
a residence.26 The GI Bill has been regarded as a great social and 
economic success because it provided an education to many veterans, 
thereby stimulating the economy and more than paying for itself 
through increased federal income tax revenues and new home sales.27 
But the original GI Bill, which expired in 1956, was ad hoc legislation 
to help veterans readjust after the war. Education continued to be 
regarded as the primary responsibility of the states and, indeed, until 
the 1950s, the states resisted direct involvement by the federal 
 
 23. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 5. There was other education 
legislation as well. See Smith-Hughes National Vocational Education Act of 1917, 
Pub. L. No. 64-347, 39 Stat. 929 (promoting vocational education and training for 
those interested in agriculture); National Civilian Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 
1920 (the Smith-Fess Act), Pub. L. No. 66-21936, 41 Stat. 735 (repealed 1973, and 
reenacted in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973)) 
(providing vocational rehabilitation for workers disabled on the job and increased 
appropriations for the handicapped in the 1920s and 1930s); Social Security Act of 
1935, § 531, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (authorizing funding for a vocational 
rehabilitation program). The National Youth Administration (NYA) and Works 
Progress Administration (WPA) were agencies created under FDR’s New Deal in 
1935 to provide job training and skills development to young people and unemployed 
men and women. There were also several acts to provide school lunches and proper 
nourishment to school children. See, e.g., Richard B. Russell National School Lunch 
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-396, 60 Stat. 230 (1946). The Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 76-862, 
54 Stat. 1125 (1940), authorized the construction of infrastructure for the war effort. 
Under this Act, childcare facilities and school buildings were built, maintained, and 
operated in communities across the country so that mothers could work toward the 
war effort. 
 24. See discussion supra note 23. 
 25. Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284. 
 26. See id. at tit. II. 
 27. See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (1944), S.1767, 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=76. Between 1940 and 
1950, the number of postsecondary degrees awarded by U.S. colleges and universities 
more than doubled. Id. The Bill’s contribution to human capital was a major factor in 
the long-term economic growth that the United States enjoyed for the next generation. 
Id. 
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government.28 But the occurrence of two events during the Eisenhower 
Administration in the late 1950s fundamentally changed the way that 
education was regarded and kick-started a much broader federal role 
in education at all levels.29 During the Johnson Administration, the 
federal government further expanded that role.30 
Eisenhower and Johnson, although from different political 
parties, were both keenly attuned to education, albeit for different 
reasons. Both men also were in the right place at the right time to 
significantly influence education policy. Legislation enacted during 
their administrations not only expanded federal involvement in 
education but also ensured that the federal government would remain 
involved for generations to come. 
1. The Eisenhower Administration (1953–1961) 
When Eisenhower ran for office, he was then president of 
Columbia University, having accepted the position to “promote [the] 
basic concepts of education in a democracy.”31 When he took office as 
President of the United States in 1953, the country was in a period of 
relative peace and economic prosperity that continued for most of his 
presidency.32 This enabled Eisenhower, a moderate Republican, to 
focus on domestic policy, in particular building and strengthening the 
 
 28. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 7. 
 29. See infra Subsection I.A.1 (discussing the Eisenhower Administration). 
 30. See infra Subsection I.A.2 (discussing the Johnson Administration). 
 31. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER, VOLUME ONE: SOLDIER, GENERAL 
OF THE ARMY, PRESIDENT-ELECT, 1890-1952 471 (1983). 
 32. However, there were three recessions during Eisenhower’s presidency: 
1953–1954, 1957–1958, and 1960–1961. The first was attributable to the inflationary 
period following the Korean War, which began on June 27, 1950, and ended in July 
1953, six months after Eisenhower took office. This recession was described as 
“relatively mild and brief.” JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY: THE 
EISENHOWER, KENNEDY AND JOHNSON YEARS 431 (1968). The second was a more 
significant, world-wide recession attributable primarily to higher interest rates, which 
in turn led to a decline in housing construction and new car sales. Also, the 
Eisenhower Administration had cut the budget of the Department of Defense in 1957, 
leading to a drop in new orders of equipment and a decline in the expansion of 
manufacturing facilities. Because of the cut, this recession was known as “the 
Eisenhower Recession.” The third was caused by the Federal Reserve’s raising of 
interest rates, which slowed the economy. See DAN BARUFALDI, A Review of Past 
Recessions, Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/past-
recessions.asp [https://perma.cc/WP7U-MH94] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). This may 
have been a contributing factor to John F. Kennedy’s 1960 presidential victory. 
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country’s infrastructure.33 Shortly after taking office, he oversaw the 
creation of the cabinet-level Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW), established primarily to address the critical need for 
additional classrooms and teachers to accommodate the burgeoning 
baby boom.34 The considerable strain placed on local school districts 
by an additional four million children entering school each year was 
forcing these districts to turn to the federal government for help in 
constructing new classrooms and providing funding for additional 
teachers.35 Although Eisenhower was amenable to providing this help, 
the federal government had a major obstacle to overcome before such 
aid could be authorized. 
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka, Kansas, a seminal case in which it unanimously 
held that segregated schools did not provide equal educational 
opportunities; therefore, the public schools had to be desegregated.36 
In accordance with Brown, the Administration could not authorize 
federal funds to build segregated schools.37 The topic of school 
construction then became a contentious political issue that stymied 
Eisenhower from making much headway in providing aid for 
education to the states.38 
 
 33. Eisenhower’s Administration saw the enactment of the National Defense 
Education Act and the Atomic Energy Act as well as the creation of the National and 
Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) and the Interstate Highway System. His 
Administration also expanded Social Security and continued the New Deal programs. 
Because of his domestic programs, Eisenhower is widely regarded as one of the 
country’s ten best Presidents. See, e.g., Karen Tumulty, Lincoln, Washington and 
Roosevelt Remain History’s Best Presidents in Survey, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lincoln-washington-and-roosevelts-
remain-historys-best-presidents-in-survey/2017/02/16/42f0270a-f45f-11e6-8d72-
263470bf040_story.html [https://perma.cc/VHW2-XK6G] (ranking Eisenhower in 
top five). When Eisenhower took office, both houses of Congress were controlled by 
the Republicans. That ended in the 1955 elections, however, when the Democrats took 
control of both houses and held them until 1983. 
 34. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 8. Eisenhower’s focus was on 
primary and secondary education, although in 1954, Congress enacted § 117 of the 
tax code, which excludes from gross income the value of qualified scholarships and 
fellowships. I.R.C. § 117 (1954). This exclusion remains in the tax code today. See 
I.R.C. §§ 117(a), (b)(1) (2018).  
 35. A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 8. 
 36. See 347 U.S. 483, 495–96 (1954). 
 37. See id. 
 38. Eisenhower proposed a $1.6 billion package of federal aid for school 
construction in 1955. But there was fundamental disagreement among members of 
Congress over how to allocate the money. The northern members were adamant that 
the money be used “to upgrade the quality of southern schools—and, at the same time, 
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In 1957, however, two events occurring within a month of each 
other marked that year as a pivotal one for federal aid to education. 
The first event was the desegregation crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
in September.39 This pitted President Eisenhower against Arkansas 
Governor Orval Faubus in a dramatic stand-off to enroll nine black 
students in Little Rock’s formerly all-white Central High School.40 
The stand-off ended when Eisenhower called in the 101st Airborne 
division to protect the students and enforce the law.41 The incident was 
a defining moment in the civil rights movement because it “cast the 
federal government as the ultimate protector of racial equality and 
civil rights.”42 It also shifted the role of “guaranteeing equal 
educational opportunity to all students” from the states to the federal 
government.43 
The second event was the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik, “the 
world’s first orbiting satellite,” in October.44 This led to an 
unprecedented infusion of federal funds into the public schools under 
the “emergency” National Defense Education Act (NDEA), enacted 
in 1958, in the interests of national defense and international economic 
competition.45 Under the NDEA, particular emphasis was placed on 
science, mathematics, engineering, and foreign languages.46 Title IV 
of the Act established the graduate fellowship program, which 
awarded fellowships to a select number of graduate students who 
professed an interest in teaching at the postsecondary level.47 Title II 
established the National Defense Student Loan Program,48 the first 
 
to require desegregation.” Since the southern Democrats controlled Congress and 
were vehemently opposed to desegregation, the President’s bill failed to pass. See A 
Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 10. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. at 10; see DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK: A 
MEMOIR 219–25 (1962). 
 43. A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 11. 
 44. Id. 
 45. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 
1580, 1581–82 (1958). 
 46. See generally §§ 301–305. In an effort to maintain the dichotomy 
between the state and local governments on the one hand and the federal government 
on the other, the Act expressly forbade federal control of education. See § 102, 72 
Stat. at 1582. 
 47. See § 403, 72 Stat. at 1591. 
 48. See generally §§ 201–208. This Act  
appropriated $47,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959, 
$75,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1960, $82,500,000 for the 
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federal loan program for low-income students and the precursor to the 
Perkins Loan Program.49 It was also the first direct student loan 
program in which the federal government appropriated funds from the 
U.S. Treasury to educational institutions for low-interest loans to 
needy students.50 Initially, the bill provided for scholarships rather 
than loans, but some members of Congress thought it sent the wrong 
message to give students a “free ride” at the expense of taxpayers.51 
2. The Johnson Administration (1963–1969) 
Lyndon Johnson had a particular interest in education, having 
attended Southwest Texas State Teachers’ College in San Marcos, 
Texas, where he had interrupted his education to earn money by 
teaching poor Mexican children in a segregated school.52 He later said 
this experience had a profound influence on him when he realized that 
a college education was foreclosed to these children because they were 
too poor to afford any further education.53 Thus, they essentially were 
doomed to a life of poverty. 
 
fiscal year ending June 30, 1961, $90,000,000 for the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1962, and such sums for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1963, and 
each of the three succeeding fiscal years as may be necessary to enable 
students who have received a loan for any school year ending prior to July 
1, 1962, to continue or complete their education. 
§ 201, 72 Stat. at 1583. Title II also provided loan forgiveness of 10% per year of full-
time service, up to 50% of the loan, for teachers in public elementary or secondary 
schools. § 205(b)(3), 72 Stat. at 1585. 
 49. See infra notes 91, 15960, 2923 and accompanying text. 
 50. See Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 201, 72 Stat. at 1583. The educational 
institutions then loaned the money to full-time students. Id. 
 51. See Timothy J. Conlan, 6 THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: 
THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH, EVOLUTION OF A PROBLEMATIC PARTNERSHIP: THE FEDS 
AND HIGHER EDUCATION 18 (1981). A controversial provision in the Act was Title X, 
§ 1001(f), which provided that in order to receive funds under the Act, students were 
required to execute an affidavit stating that they were not members of and did not 
support any group that taught or believed in the overthrow of the Government by force 
or violence or by any other illegal means. Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 1001(f). It further 
required students to execute an oath of allegiance to the U.S. Government. Id. Many 
schools objected to this and refused to participate in the program. See Controversy of 
National Defense Education Act, K12 ACADEMICS, https://www.k12academics.com/ 
Federal%20Education%20Legislation/National%20Defense%20Education%20Act/c
ontroversy-national-defense-education-act. This provision was deleted from the Act 
in 1962. Id. 
 52. See PAT MURDOCK, T. CAY ROWE & SEAN BARNES, CONNECTIONS: 
LYNDON B. JOHNSON IN SAN MARCOS 17 (2009). 
 53. See id. 
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Within the first month after taking office, Johnson shepherded 
through Congress the Vocational Education Act54 in fulfillment of 
Kennedy’s promise to the American Vocational Association, which 
had supported his bid for the presidency, and the Higher Education 
Facilities Act of 1963,55 to accommodate the baby boomers entering 
college and graduate programs.56 Both Acts authorized greater federal 
expenditures for higher education.57 They were followed shortly by the 
landmark Civil Rights Act and the Economic Opportunity Act of 
1964, which established the college work-study program for needy 
students, the first program of its kind.58 Both were important pieces of 
anti-discrimination legislation and the cornerstone of Johnson’s 
“Great Society” agenda.59  
An important part of that agenda, with its “War on Poverty,” was 
a proposal for massive federal aid to education to help disadvantaged 
 
 54. See generally Vocational Education Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-210, 77 
Stat. 403 (1963). 
 55. See generally Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-
204, 77 Stat. 363 (1963). 
 56. 77 Stat. at 363. The preamble to this legislation states:  
The Congress hereby finds that the security and welfare of the United States 
require that this and future generations of American youth be assured ample 
opportunity for the fullest development of their intellectual capacities, and 
that this opportunity will be jeopardized unless the Nation’s colleges and 
universities are encouraged and assisted in their efforts to accommodate 
rapidly growing numbers of youth who aspire to a higher education. The 
Congress further finds and declares that these needs are so great and these 
steps so urgent that it is incumbent upon the Nation to take positive and 
immediate action to meet these needs through assistance to institutions of 
higher education, including graduate and undergraduate institutions, junior 
and community colleges, and technical institutes, in providing certain 
academic facilities. 
Id. at 363–64. 
 57. See Higher Education Facilities Act, 77 Stat. at 363 (authorizing 
“assistance to public and other nonprofit institutions of higher education in financing 
the construction, rehabilitation, or improvement of needed academic and related 
facilities in undergraduate and graduate institutions”); see generally Vocational 
Education Act, 77 Stat. 403 (amending the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 
64-347, 39 Stat. 929 (1917) to authorize a large increase in federal funding for 
vocational education to emphasize agriculture and home economics, in particular). 
 58. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 
(1964); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964). 
The Economic Opportunity Act also established the Job Corps and the Office of 
Economic Opportunity, which later launched the Head Start program. See Economic 
Opportunity Act, §§ 101–10, 78 Stat. 508–11; §§ 601–09, 78 Stat. 528–32.  
 59. See Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society”, U.S. HISTORY, 
https://www.ushistory.org/us/56e.asp [https://perma.cc/3QAC-NG6S] (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2019). 
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students at the primary and secondary levels and to strengthen colleges 
and make higher education more affordable.60 The Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) marked the most 
comprehensive federal education legislation ever enacted by 
Congress.61 It also marked the beginning of the federal government’s 
extensive involvement in education because prior to this Act, 
education and its funding had been controlled almost exclusively by 
the state and local governments. The Act sought to equalize 
educational opportunities through desegregation and through a 
redistribution of resources to students who had been deprived or 
discriminated against.62 Studies during this period showed a direct 
correlation among poverty, low academic achievement, and high 
dropout rates, which in turn resulted in a vicious cycle of continued 
poverty and unemployment.63 
In July 1965, Congress passed the Social Security Amendments 
Act,64 which expanded child dependents’ benefits to include full-time 
 
 60. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to Congress: Toward Full 
Educational Opportunity, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 13, 1965), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-toward-
full-educational-opportunity [https://perma.cc/2764-S8D7]. 
 61. See generally Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965). Johnson, a former teacher, employed great political 
skill in getting the legislation enacted. One of four presidents to have served in the 
Vice-Presidential position, as well as in both houses of Congress, Johnson was an 
astute observer of the political scene and knew how the game was played. He realized 
that if federal funds were given only to public schools, there would be an outcry from 
Catholic schools. But if the funds also were given to private schools as well as public 
schools, there would be an outcry from the National Education Association (NEA) 
and from liberals, who objected to federal aid to religious schools. Johnson finally 
decided that packaging his proposal as educational aid to poor children, rather than 
aid directly to educational institutions, would garner the strongest political support. 
He was correct because the ESEA was enacted with bipartisan support less than three 
months after it was introduced, although that support was not strong because four-
fifths of the Republican members of the House voted against it. See generally GARETH 
DAVIES, SEE GOVERNMENT GROW: EDUCATION POLITICS FROM JOHNSON TO REAGAN 
(2007). 
 62. See 79 Stat. at 27, 36, 47 (providing financial assistance to local education 
agencies in “areas affected by federal activity,” grants for the acquisition of “school 
library resources, textbooks and other instructional materials,” and to “strengthen state 
departments of education”). 
 63. See Robert Kiener, Are New Policies Needed to Keep More Teens in 
School?, CQ RESEARCHER (June 13, 2014) https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/ 
document.php?id=cqresrre2014061300 [https://perma.cc/X9ZA-HUNU] (discussing 
efforts by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to alleviate poverty). 
 64. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965). This was an extension of the 
Social Security Amendments Act of 1956, which provided benefits to dependent 
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students up to age twenty-two,65 in recognition of the fact that full-time 
students often are dependent on their parents for support beyond age 
18.66 By the end of that year, more than 205,000 students had received 
these benefits.67 
Seven months after the ESEA was signed into law, Johnson 
signed complementary legislation, the Higher Education Act of 1965 
(HEA).68 The HEA provided financial assistance for teacher 
preparation and training programs and low-interest loans with loan 
forgiveness for teachers who chose to serve in areas of national need.69 
In response to concerns over the rising costs of college and the 
relatively low rate of college enrollment by recent high school 
graduates,70 the HEA sought to encourage college enrollment by 
making post-secondary education more affordable for low- and 
middle-income individuals. To accomplish this goal, it authorized the 
appropriation of $804 million for scholarships, grants,71 and low 
 
children of disabled or deceased beneficiaries or of those who were eligible for Social 
Security benefits. It also provided benefits to disabled children of a person eligible for 
or receiving Social Security benefits or a deceased eligible person, provided the 
disability arose before the child turned age 18. 79 Stat. at 370–73. 
 65. 79 Stat. at 371. 
 66. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Research Note #11: The History of Social Security 
“Student” Benefits (Jan. 2001), https://www.ssa.gov/history/studentbenefit.html 
[https://perma.cc/XB85-ET5C]. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219. The Act initially was authorized for 
five years, through 1970, but it has been reauthorized eight times (in 1968, 1972, 1976, 
1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, 2008) to amend programs and change language and policies. 
 69. See generally id. (authorizing appropriation of funds for enhancement of 
libraries in Title II, authorizing aid for developing institutions that had not yet met the 
minimum requirements for accreditation in Title III, providing for student assistance, 
such as Educational Opportunity Grants (now Pell Grants) and merit-based 
scholarships in Title IV, authorizing aid for teacher quality enhancement in Title V, 
and authorizing funding to improve undergraduate programs in Title VI).  
 70. See NAT’L CTR. ON EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 
2017 tbl.302.10 (53d ed. 2019) [hereinafter NCES] (showing in 1965, almost 51% of 
recent high school graduates had enrolled in either two-year or four-year institutions 
of higher education by October of the year following their graduation). In raw 
numbers, around 1.4 million out of 2.7 million graduating high school students in 
1965 had enrolled in higher education. Id. 
 71. §§ 402–09, 79 Stat. at 1232–36. These were called Educational 
Opportunity Grants, the precursor to Pell grants. See Student Loan History, NEW 
AMERICA, https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/policy-explainers/higher-
ed-workforce/federal-student-aid/federal-student-loans/federal-student-loan-history 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2019); see also Robert L. Capt, Analysis of the Higher Education 
Act Reauthorizations: Financial Aid Policy Influencing College Access and Choice, 
U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., ED. RESOURCES INFO. CTR. 
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interest loans (the precursor of Stafford loans)72 and an extension of 
the work-study program,73 all to be administered by the Commissioner 
of Education.74 This marked an important transition from federal 
support for educational institutions to support for individual student 
aid. 
Another transition was that the student loans authorized by the 
HEA were not direct loans from the U.S. Treasury, as they had been 
under the NDEA, but instead were loans made by private lenders.75 To 
encourage participation by these lenders, the HEA anticipated that the 
loans would be guaranteed by the states, with a relatively small 
amount of seed money from the federal government.76 Not only did 
the federal government hope to save money by encouraging the states 
to assume their share of fiscal responsibility, but also budget rules at 
that time required direct loans to be posted as current losses, even 
 
 72. §§ 421–45, 79 Stat. at 1236–49. Without funding from the federal 
government, students would find it difficult to obtain loans because they generally 
have limited credit histories, few earnings (if any), and no collateral, and they would 
be unable to begin repayment until they have finished school. See JASON D. DELISLE, 
PRIVATE IN NAME ONLY: LESSONS FROM THE DEFUNCT GUARANTEED STUDENT LOAN 
PROGRAM 3 (2017). 
 73. §§ 441–42, 79 Stat. at 1249–51. The HEA was reauthorized in 1968 at 
the end of Johnson’s term in office. This reauthorization extended guaranteed student 
loans through 1971. See generally Higher Education Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. 
L. No. 90-575, 82 Stat. 1014. It also required the Secretary of the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare to submit a report to Congress prior to March 1, 1970, 
on whether there were any practices of lending institutions that discriminated against 
particular classes or categories of students. See id. 
 74. See generally Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219. To appease the state and 
local governments, the Act prohibited federal control of education. See § 804, 79 Stat. 
at 1270.  
 75. See § 421, 79 Stat. at 1236. 
 76. See §§ 421–35. The states were to establish “guaranty agencies” with the 
federal money plus their own money to insure against default, death, or disability of 
the borrower and to pay the subsidized interest on federal direct loans to low-income 
students. See §§ 421, 428, 430; see also DELISLE, supra note 72, at 3. The Act 
excluded proprietary schools from receiving funds under the loan guarantee program. 
See 79 Stat. at 1248. Instead, they received funding under a smaller program that 
provided loans to vocational schools. This program was merged with the federal loan 
guarantee program under the 1968 reauthorization, giving proprietary schools much 
broader access to federally guaranteed loans. See Spiros Protopsaltis & Libby Masiuk, 
Protecting Students and Taxpayers: Why the Trump Administration Should Heed 
History of Bipartisan Efforts, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 30, 2017), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/protecting-students-and-taxpayers 
[https://perma.cc/2A6K-GSAD]. 
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though the loans were to be repaid later with interest.77 Guaranteed 
loans, on the other hand, did not post as current losses because the 
liability for the guarantee would not be realized until some years later 
and thus there was no immediate outflow of funds.78 This meant that 
direct loans would be recorded as losses rather than loans, while 
guaranteed loans would not be recorded as liabilities at all, even 
though some would become liabilities later.79 At the time, there was 
concern among economists that “the government was making 
financial commitments without accounting for the ultimate costs.”80  
The state guaranteed loan program did not work as anticipated, 
however, because some states refused to participate and others found 
that demands for loans far outpaced both the available capital funding 
and their insurance funds.81 In order to encourage lenders to participate 
in the program, Congress provided for the guarantee of up to 80% of 
losses suffered by states’ guaranty agencies.82 Thus, the federal 
government assumed an even greater role in funding higher 
education.83 As an added incentive to private lenders and to keep 
student loan interest rates low, Congress later authorized the payment 
of a “special allowance” to lenders to compensate them for loss against 
increases in student loan interest rates.84 
 
 77. See Clare McCann, Fair Value Accounting, EDCENTRAL, 
www.edcentral.org/encyclopedia/fair-value-accounting (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) 
(explaining the concept of “cash basis accounting”). 
 78. See DELISLE, supra note 72, at 4. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See Student Loan History, supra note 71.  
 81. See DELISLE, supra note 72, at 4. 
 82. See Higher Education Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-575, 82 
Stat. 1014 (1968); Action on Higher Education Bills Deferred to 1968, CQ ALMANAC 
(1967).  
 83. See DELISLE, supra note 72, at 4 (explaining this provision was a 
reinsurance policy to reimburse the states’ insurance funds against loss). This 
provision also meant that states would assume responsibility for 20% of the losses, 
relegating the state “guaranty agencies to a risk-sharing role rather than one in which 
they fully backed loans.” Id. 
 84. See generally Emergency Insured Student Loan Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 
91-95, 83 Stat. 141 (1969). The interest rates were set by the government, and in order 
to avoid doing the unpopular thing and raising the student loan rate when the market 
rate increased, the government would simply compensate the lenders to the extent of 
the difference between the student loan rate and the higher market rate. See DELISLE, 
supra note 72, at 4. 
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B. Accelerating the Government’s Funding Role 
1. The Nixon Administration (1969–1974) 
The relative affluence and growth of the 1950s and 1960s 
devolved into a period of unrest, marked by distrust and dissatisfaction 
with the government over two contentious issues: the war in Vietnam 
and school busing to achieve racial equality in the schools.85 Military 
spending and other requirements of the war effort, combined with 
domestic spending, had produced budget deficits that fueled inflation. 
There had been a prolonged period of stagflation (high inflation and 
unemployment combined with a sluggish economy) followed by a 
recession. This led to the economic crisis of the 1970s,86 which caused 
Congress to question for the first time whether the unprecedented 
amounts being spent on education were worth the cost.87 
As a President, Richard Nixon has been vilified for his role in 
the Watergate scandal, but he had an ambitious education agenda that 
would further expand the federal role in education. Although the 
second reauthorization of the HEA in 1972 was weaker than the 
legislation Nixon initially proposed, it contained several significant 
 
 85. See e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5 
(1971). While busing was the hot issue, there were also other contentious issues 
relating to education. One was de facto segregation in the North, a sore point among 
Southerners. See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 435–
36 (1968). Another was that courts continued to struggle with the meaning of the term 
“equal education opportunities.” See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1241 (Cal. 
1971) (discussing property taxes and equal education). 
 86. See Vietnam War and the Economy, HIST. CENT., 
www.historycentral.com/sixty/Economics/Vietnam.html [https://perma.cc/NLR8-
MV2K] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). The Vietnam War affected the U.S. economy in 
several ways. See id. First, the war effort produced a strain on the nation’s production 
capacities, since factories that had been producing consumer goods were requisitioned 
to produce items for the military. See id. Funds were flowing overseas with few funds 
returning to the United States. See id. This created an inequality in the balance of 
payments, leading to a weakening of the dollar. See id. Second, government spending 
on the war effort combined with domestic spending was causing budget deficits that 
led to inflation. See id. Third, consumer confidence was low because of dissatisfaction 
with the government and unrest over the war. See id. Fourth, there was an increase in 
interest rates that restricted the available capital for both businesses and consumers. 
See id. 
 87. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 24–26, 40–44 (resulting in the 
advent of federal mandates to document the effectiveness of federal education 
expenditures and academic achievement). 
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provisions.88 First, it extended the guaranteed student loan program for 
four years, through June 30, 1975, and increased the amount of the 
available loan.89 Second, as a further incentive for private lenders, it 
also created the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) as 
a government-sponsored enterprise to serve as a “secondary market 
and warehousing facility” for guaranteed student loans and to provide 
liquidity for those loans.90 Third, it created the National Institute of 
Education and established a new category of low-interest loans to 
needy students, the Federal Direct Student Loan Program, in 
partnership with the schools.91 Although the funds for this program 
came directly from the U.S. Treasury, educational institutions also 
made capital contributions.92 Fourth, it provided loan forgiveness for 
those who chose to enter certain areas of public service,93 and fifth, it 
 
 88. See generally Education Amendments Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 
86 Stat. 235 (1972). Nixon had asked for an expansion of federal aid to students 
enrolled in post-secondary institutions so that eligible students would be able to 
receive enough federal assistance to “make up the difference between his college costs 
and what his family is able to contribute.” Richard Nixon, Statement on Signing the 
Education Amendments Act of 1972, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 23, 1972), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-signing-the-education-
amendments-1972 [https://perma.cc/L875-CTB2] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
 89. § 132. The available loan increased by $1,000 from $1,500 to $2,500. § 
132(a). 
 90. § 133 (adding new § 439 to the HEA). A government sponsored 
enterprise (GSE) is a hybrid between a government agency and a private company 
“established to enhance the flow of credit to specific sectors of the American 
economy.” See also Government-Sponsored Enterprise Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gse.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/Y7GQ-CL3F]. While GSE’s are not subsidized by the government, 
there is an “implicit guarantee” that the government will not allow such entities to fail 
or default on debt. Id. This gives GSEs significant advantages in the capital markets. 
See id. 
 91. See § 137, 86 Stat. at 272–77; § 301, 86 Stat. at 326–34 (amending Tit. 
IV of Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783). The purpose of the Institute was to 
seek to improve education, including career education, in the United States 
through (A) helping to solve or to alleviate the problems of, and achieve the 
objectives of American education; (B) advancing the practice of education, 
as an art, science, and profession; (C) the strengthening of the scientific and 
technological foundations of education; and (D) building an effective 
educational research and development system. 
§ 405(b)(2), 86 Stat. at 329. 
 92. 86 Stat. at 273–81 (adding new Part E to the HEA). The educational 
institutions were required to contribute one-ninth the amount of the federal 
contribution. § 463(a)(2)(B), 86 Stat. at 274. 
 93. § 465, 86 Stat. at 277–78. This included those teaching in elementary or 
secondary schools with a majority of low-income students, those teaching 
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established two new need-based grants, as well as remedial programs 
for disadvantaged students.94 
In retrospect, the two most significant aspects of the 1972 
reauthorization were the decisions to provide loans to students, rather 
than support to educational institutions, and to authorize federal funds 
for proprietary (i.e., for-profit) schools.95 There had been concern 
expressed over the authorization of funds for proprietary schools.96 In 
a prescient remark, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
Committee Report on the legislation expressed a reservation about 
allowing federal funding for such institutions for fear they might 
recruit students through “sophisticated advertising and unfulfillable 
promises” and that they might make misrepresentations about their 
quality of education.97 But at that time, the number of students enrolled 
in such institutions was negligible,98 so the concern was disregarded. 
The higher education community urged Congress to enact 
“formula-based, enrollment-driven federal aid to institutions” instead 
of aid to students.99 But instead, Congress decided the most effective 
way to remove barriers to education for lower-income students was 
 
handicapped students, and those who had served in the military in dangerous areas. 
Id. It also provided grants for law school clinical programs. § 191. 
 94. 86 Stat. at 251–58. The two new grants were under the Incentive Grant 
Program and the Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant Program. See 
§§ 415A–415D; §§ 413A–413D. The Student Incentive grants were to be 
administered by the states, which also provided partial funding. §§ 415A–415D. The 
program provided for a one-time grant of up to $1,500 to be awarded on the basis of 
substantial financial need to undergraduates enrolled on a full-time basis. § 415A. The 
Supplemental Educational Opportunity grants were to be awarded to those enrolled in 
undergraduate programs who demonstrated evidence of “academic or creative 
promise and capability of maintaining good standing in this course of study” plus 
exceptional need. § 413C. These were in addition to the basic Educational 
Opportunity grant. See §§ 413A–413D. The amount of the Supplemental grant was 
the lesser of $1,500 or one-half of the total amount of financial aid awarded by the 
institution to the student. § 413B. The maximum amount of the Educational 
Opportunity grant (also referred to as the basic grant) in 1972 was $1,400 for a full-
time student, less the expected family contribution. § 411, 86 Stat. at 248–49. 
 95. See §1057(a), 86 Stat. at 320. 
 96. See S. REP. NO. 92-346, at 51 (1971). 
 97. Id. As a consequence of the reauthorization, the number of students 
enrolled in proprietary schools more than doubled between 1970 and 1975, while total 
college enrollment during this period increased only slightly over 31%. See NCES, 
supra note 70, at tbl.302.10. 
 98. See id. (explaining that despite the dramatic enrollment increase, only 
around 0.4% of students were enrolled in proprietary institutions in 1975 and this 
represented about 2% of all students enrolled in private institutions during this period). 
 99. Gladieux, supra note 5. 
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through aid to students, rather than to institutions.100 This was a pivotal 
point in federal financing of higher education because it established 
student loans, rather than institutional support, as the centerpiece of 
federal aid for higher education.101 
In 1973, the year after the HEA was reauthorized, there was an 
oil embargo. Although it lasted only a year, it had devastating effects 
on the economy, causing unemployment to reach its highest level 
since the Great Depression.102 Because of this economic downturn, 
states cut funding to higher education while schools were facing 
increased energy costs.103 This forced schools to raise their tuition rates 
out of necessity.104 
 
 100. See id. An underlying argument was that providing aid to students, rather 
than educational institutions, would be a means of ensuring higher quality education 
because students would “[vote] with their feet,” moving their aid to institutions that 
better met their needs, leaving the other institutions to flounder. Id. This theory was 
debunked later, but by then the die was cast. See id. According to Lawrence E. 
Gladieux, 
[t]he notion that having students vote with their feet would somehow assure 
quality in the postsecondary education marketplace was a dubious 
proposition from the start. More than a quarter century later, it is clear that 
the marketplace rationale begged important questions of institutional 
quality and accountability, as well as consumer information, awareness, and 
protection.  
Id.; Matthew B. Fuller, A History of Financial Aid to Students, 44 J. STUDENT FIN. 
AID 40, 54 (2014), https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=jsfa (“[S]cholars have generally 
acknowledged that the 1972 reauthorization cemented the ‘basic charter of today’s 
federal student aid system’ with students as the intermediaries of funds between the 
federal government and institutions.”). 
 101. See Fuller, supra note 100, at 42–43. 
 102. See David B. Sicilia, A Brief History of U.S. Unemployment, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 5, 2011), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/business/us-
unemployment-rate-history [https://perma.cc/UA5D-XZE8] (explaining 
unemployment reached a record high of over 8% during the 1970s). The maximum 
marginal tax rate during the Nixon/Ford Administrations was 70%. TAX FOUND., U.S. 
Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, 1862-2013 (Nominal and Inflation 
Adjusted Brackets) (Oct. 17, 2013), https://taxfoundation.org/us-federal-individual-
income-tax-rates-history-1913-2013-nominal-and-inflation-adjusted-brackets 
[https://perma.cc/CSE3-EXD4]. 
 103. See JOHN S. BRUBACHER & WILLIS RUDY, HIGHER EDUCATION IN 
TRANSITION, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 383 (4th ed. 
2004). 
 104. See id. at 383–84. 
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2. The Ford Administration (1974–1977) 
In 1974, Richard Nixon resigned from office in the wake of 
impeachment proceedings in the House and declining political 
support. At that time, there was growing concern over the predatory 
practices of proprietary schools and the increasing number of defaults 
on student loans, the majority of which were attributable to these 
schools.105 Shortly after Gerald Ford took office to serve the remainder 
of Nixon’s second term, Congress extended the GI Bill benefits to 
Vietnam veterans.106 This Act prohibited federal funding to any 
institution that “utilizes advertising, sales, or enrollment practices of 
any type which are erroneous, deceptive, or misleading either by 
actual statement, omission, or intimation.”107 Shortly after the 
enactment of that legislation, the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare proposed new transparency regulations requiring 
vocational schools to disclose to prospective students the employment 
prospects in their fields of study and the projected salaries in those 
fields.108 They also required these schools to provide a “fair and 
equitable refund” to students who decided not to attend after 
enrolling.109  
In 1976, there was a third reauthorization of the HEA, which 
extended the guaranteed student loan program through September 30, 
1981.110 As an incentive to encourage states to establish student loan 
guarantee programs, the federal government undertook to guarantee 
 
 105. See David Whitman, Vietnam Vets and a New Student Loan Program 
Bring New College Scams, CENTURY FOUND. 4–7 (Feb. 13, 2017), 
https://tcf.org/content/report/Vietnam-vets-new-student-loan-program-bring-new-
college-scams. 
 106. See generally Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 
1974, Pub L. No. 93-508, 88 Stat. 1578 (describing assistance available to Vietnam 
veterans). 
 107. § 212, 88 Stat. at 1586 (amending 38 U.S.C. §1796). 
 108. See Whitman, supra note 105, at 11–12. These regulations also subjected 
to additional scrutiny any school that enrolled more than 60% of students who were 
reliant on federal loans or that had a 10% or greater default rate or a 20% or greater 
withdrawal rate. Id. at 12. 
 109. Id. at 11. 
 110. See Education Amendments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127, 90 
Stat. 2081 (1976) (amending § 424 of the Higher Education Act of 1965). This 
limitation applied to new loans. See § 127, 90 Stat. at 2103–04 (amending Part B of 
Tit. IV of the HEA). However, loans could continue to be issued until September 30, 
1985, to enable students who had already obtained guaranteed loans to complete or 
continue their education. See § 127, 90 Stat. at 2103–04. 
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100% of the loans.111 Perhaps to protect the fisc to some extent, or 
perhaps to require students to pay for their “free ride,” there was a new 
provision that limited the ability of students to discharge insured loans 
in bankruptcy.112 Under this provision, student loans were not eligible 
for discharge until after five years of repayment or upon a showing of 
undue hardship.113 
Later, in 1976, Congress enacted the Veterans’ Education and 
Employment Assistance Act, which provided that a school would be 
ineligible to receive funds under the GI Bill if more than 85% of the 
students at that school received financial aid from the school, the 
Veterans’ Administration, or any other federal source.114 Afterward, 
there was a decline in student loan default rates.115 
3. The Carter Administration (1977–1981) 
When Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, the country was in a 
period of economic stagflation that had lingered at the end of the 
Vietnam War.116 In addition, media attention was focused on a report 
that SAT scores had steadily declined over the past fourteen years.117 
The combination of these factors caused the public to demand greater 
 
 111. See § 127, 90 Stat. at 2099. 
 112. See § 127, 90 Stat. at 2141. 
 113. See id. The term “undue hardship” was undefined under the legislation, 
and over the next ten to twelve years, courts struggled to define the term. § 127, 90 
Stat. at 2141. The result was that discharging a student loan debt in bankruptcy 
involved a lengthy, expensive legal process with a difficult burden of proving undue 
hardship. See B.J. Huey, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time Finally 
Arrived for Congress to Discharge Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 89, 91–92 (2002). 
 114. See Veterans’ Education and Employment Assistance Act of 1976, Pub. 
L. No. 94-502, § 205, 90 Stat. 2383, 2387 (1976). This provision was challenged as a 
violation of Due Process but was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cleland v. 
National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213, 221–22 (1978). 
 115. See Whitman, supra note 105, at 12. 
 116. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 40. 
 117. See id. at 41 (stating although a panel of experts from the College Board 
theorized that the decline was attributable to a greater number of minority and female 
test-takers, this theory was later debunked). At the same time, others theorized that 
because of the growth of compensatory education in the 1960s as a substitute for racial 
integration, the average high school dropout rate had fallen and thus a greater number 
of low-achieving students remained in school. See id. This fact plus the redirection of 
resources to compensatory, bilingual, and special education and away from high-
achieving, college-bound students was the real cause of the decline in SAT scores. 
See id.  
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accountability and efficiency in government spending.118 This led to 
state cuts in funding for education, producing a concomitant rise in 
tuition.119 Middle-income families, feeling the squeeze, began to 
complain that the federal government was neglecting them.120 Also 
during this time, there were proposals for tuition tax credits.121 To 
address the concerns of the middle class and to quash the proposals 
for tax credits, the Carter Administration and congressional 
Democrats responded by enacting the Middle Income Student 
Assistance Act of 1978.122 This Act eliminated the income restrictions 
on guaranteed student loans, allowing any student, regardless of 
income level, to obtain them.123 Thus, the federal focus shifted from 
lower-income students to middle-income students, resulting in a 
dramatic increase in the volume of student loans.124  
Also in 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act,125 
codifying into the Bankruptcy Code the provision enacted in 1976 that 
provided a five-year exception to discharge for guaranteed student 
 
 118. See id. at 40–41. 
 119. See id. at 44. 
 120. See Gladieux, supra note 5.  
 121. See id. 
 122. See generally Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-566, 92 Stat. 2402 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. and 42 
U.S.C.) (amending the Higher Education Act of 1965). 
 123. See generally 92 Stat. 2402 (explaining the Act also expanded eligibility 
for Educational Opportunity grants to allow an additional 1.5 million students from 
middle-income families to qualify). Under this expansion, families with incomes up 
to $250,000 were eligible for the grants. In determining the amount of expected family 
contribution (EFC), the Act provided that no more than 10.5% of a family’s 
discretionary income could be considered. § 2, 92 Stat. at 2402; Gerhard Peters & 
John T. Wooley, Jimmy Carter: Educational Amendments of 1978 and the Middle 
Income Student Assistance Act Remarks at the Billing Signing Ceremony., AM. 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 1, 1978), www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30087 
[https://perma.cc/X6HL-BLCT]. 
 124. See Impact of Admin.’s Proposed Fiscal Year 1983 Budget on Student 
Fin. Aid & Higher Educ. Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary 
Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor H.R., 97th Cong. 2, 596–97 (1982) (statement 
of Alice M. Rivlin, Director). Ms. Rivlin noted, 
Between 1978 and 1981, total available aid grew by 70 percent to $14.7 
billion. Almost half of all aid in 1981 was in the form of loans, up one-
quarter from 1978. The growth of the GSL program also meant that roughly 
20 percent of all aid in 1981 went to students from families with incomes 
over $30,000, whereas little aid had gone to comparable students before 
1978. 
Id. at 597.  
 125. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 
2549 (1978). 
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loans.126 This exception applied only to government loans made by 
nonprofit schools.127 The ostensible rationale for the exception was 
that it was necessary to ensure the viability of the student loan 
system.128 But there are reports that this action was based on anecdotal 
evidence of students obtaining a “free” education by declaring 
bankruptcy without making any payments on their loans and without 
demonstrating undue hardship.129 In 1977, however, only 0.3% of 
student loans had been discharged in bankruptcy,130 certainly not 
enough to cause any concern over the viability of the student loan 
system. Given the small number of discharges, this concern could have 
been addressed better through financial counseling and litigation, 
rather than through legislation.131 
Despite the complaints and controversies over funding for 
education that Carter faced, he was successful in establishing the 
Department of Education in 1979.132 The purpose of the new 
department was to focus the nation’s attention on education, make 
federal education programs more responsive and accountable, 
streamline the administration of federal aid to education, save tax 
dollars by eliminating current “bureaucratic layers,” and ensure that 
 
 126. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text. This was codified at 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
 127. See § 523, 92 Stat. at 2591. 
 128. See Preston Mueller, The Non-Dischargeability of Private Student 
Loans: A Looming Financial Crisis?, 32 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 229, 232 (2015). 
 129. See, e.g., id.; see also Rafael Pardo & Michelle R. Lacy, The Real Student 
Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 180 
(2009). One source states that this change was in response to a “handful of doctors 
and lawyers who attempted to fraudulently file for bankruptcy after graduation.” 
Jennifer Wadia, Student Loan Bankruptcy Reform, STUDENT DEBT RELIEF, 
https://www.studentdebtrelief.us/news/student-loan-bankruptcy-reform [https:// 
perma.cc/N7CX-3TPP] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). Instead of applying laws then in 
effect to a handful of ostensible wrongdoers, Congress chose to deny bankruptcy 
protection to most student loan borrowers for a minimum of five years after 
graduation. See id. 
 130. See Steven Palmer, The History of Student Loans and Bankruptcy 
Discharge (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/history-student-loans-
bankruptcy-discharge-steven-palmer [https://perma.cc/A3CY-NYQT].  
 131. See Timothy D. Naegele, The Guaranteed Student Loan Program: Do 
Lenders’ Risks Exceed Their Rewards?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 599, 602 (1983) (explaining 
that although Congress may have been too quick to codify the exception to discharge 
for student loans, the depressed economy of the late 1970s led to a much higher than 
anticipated student loan default rate). 
 132. See Department of Education Organization Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
88, §§ 102–103, 93 Stat. 669 (1979). The following year, the Department was elevated 
to a cabinet level department.  
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local communities retained control of their schools and educational 
programs.133 
But during the Carter Administration, the restrictions on 
proprietary schools were greatly weakened, allowing them to again 
proliferate amidst allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, and 
deception. The Middle Income Student Assistance Act provided that 
proprietary schools could admit students without a high school 
diploma and those students would remain eligible for federal student 
loans.134 The following year, a federal court struck down the 1974 
regulation requiring proprietary/vocational schools to refrain from 
engaging in unfair and abusive practices.135 The policy of the Ford 
Administration, to subject to additional scrutiny schools enrolling 
more than 60% of students with federal loans, those with a 10% or 
greater default rate, or those with a 20% or greater withdrawal rate,136 
was eliminated under new Department of Education guidelines.137 
From 1979 to 1980, enrollment in proprietary schools experienced one 
of the largest jumps in their history because of the proliferation in 
accreditation of these schools.138 
 
 133. Jimmy Carter: Department of Education Organization Act Statement on 
Signing S. 210 into Law., AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 17, 1979), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31543 [https://perma.cc/G6KJ-
ADVG].  
 134. See generally Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-566, 92 Stat. 2402 (1978) (allowing proprietary schools to admit students 
without a high school diploma and allowing those students to remain eligible for 
federal student loans). At this time, the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress, 
as well as the White House. Ironically, they were staunchly in favor of proprietary 
schools because these schools offered educational opportunities to nontraditional and 
lower-income students; Republicans were staunchly opposed to such schools. See 
David Whitman, The Closing of the Republican Mind on For-Profit Colleges, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/ 
archive/2017/03/the-closing-of-the-republican-mind-on-for-profit-colleges/520803 
[https://perma.cc/BX2R-4KNC]. Later, these parties would switch views. See id.  
 135. See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text; see also Katherine 
Gibbs Sch. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 658–59 (2d Cir. 1979) (striking regulation on 
grounds of lack of specificity). 
 136. See discussion supra note 108; see David Whitman, The Reagan 
Administration’s Campaign to Rein in Predatory For-Profit Colleges, CENTURY 
FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.tcf.org/content/report/reagan-administrations-
campaign-rein-predatory-profit-colleges. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See NCES, supra note 70, at 403 (showing a 56.56% increase in 
enrollment). 
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In 1980, the HEA was again reauthorized.139 This legislation 
provided new loans to parents of undergraduate students called PLUS 
loans (Parent Loans for Undergraduate Students)140 and provided a six-
month grace period after graduation before commencement of 
repayment of guaranteed student loans.141 An important, although 
“little-noticed,” provision of this reauthorization tied federal loan 
subsidies for lenders to Treasury bill rates, changing the previous 
system in which rates were set by government officials, subject to a 
cap.142 This increased the amount that lenders could receive on 
guaranteed student loans and caused an explosion in lender 
participation and consequently in student loan volume.143  
This expansion in the availability of student loans led to a 
stronger political base, which probably protected the anti-poverty 
education programs from what could have been more severe cutbacks 
during the Reagan era.144 But there was also an average increase of 
31% in tuition from 1977 to 1981.145 
C. Changing Direction in Federal Funding 
1. The Reagan Administration (1981–1989) 
Ronald Reagan ran for President on a platform of abolishing the 
Department of Education, calling it “President Carter’s new 
bureaucratic boondoggle.”146 As part of his “New Federalism” agenda 
to reduce the size of the government by “reduc[ing] the federal budget 
 
 139. See generally Education Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 
94 Stat. 1367 (1980) (reauthorizing the HEA).  
 140. See § 419, 94 Stat. at 1424–25.  
 141. See § 444(c), 94 Stat. at 1441 (amending § 464(c)(2)(A) of the HEA). 
 142. See § 420(a), 94 Stat. at 1425–26 (amending § 438 of the HEA); see also 
ROWENA OLEGARIO, THE ENGINE OF ENTERPRISE: CREDIT IN AMERICA 198–99 (2016). 
 143. See OLEGARIO, supra note 142, at 199. 
 144. See id.  
 145. NCES, supra note 70, at 579–81. This was an increase of 22% at public 
in-state institutions and 33% at private institutions. Id. 
 146. Neal McCluskey, Cutting Federal Aid for K-12 Education, Downsizing 
the Federal Government (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/ 
education/k-12-education-subsidies; see also Valerie Strauss, Ronald Reagan’s 
Impact on Education Today, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2011), 
http://www.voices.washingtonpost.com/answer-sheet/school/school-
turnaroundsreform/how-ronald-reagan-affected-tod.html. Reagan’s other ideas for 
reforming education included mandatory school prayer and tuition tax credits for 
private schools. Id. 
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deficit, . . . attack[ing] inflation, . . . cut[ting] taxes,147 and . . . 
decentraliz[ing] as well as deregulat[ing] a wide range of federal social 
welfare programs,”148 Reagan cut funding to education in his first year 
in office by more than 15% (which amounted to around $1 billion).149 
He also oversaw the Postsecondary Student Assistance Amendments 
Act of 1981,150 which rolled back some of the strides in higher 
education President Carter had made. This Act implemented a student 
loan origination fee, repealed the six-month loan repayment grace 
period, increased the annual repayment amount, repealed the 
increased guaranteed loan amounts for independent students, and 
increased the PLUS loan interest rate, although it expanded eligibility 
under the PLUS program to include independent undergraduate 
students and graduate/professional students.151 
The following year, Congress enacted the Student Financial 
Assistance Technical Amendments Act of 1982,152 which again 
amended the Higher Education Act of 1965. This Act restricted the 
amount of the Pell Grant that a student could receive in the academic 
year 1983–1984; revised the need-based criteria for supplemental 
educational opportunity grants, work-study grants, and direct loans; 
 
 147. Reagan wasted no time implementing his supply-side economics to 
stimulate the economy. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 
§ 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176 (1981). He lowered the income tax rates from a maximum of 
70% to 50%, where they remained for the next six years until he lowered them again 
in 1987 to a maximum rate of 38.5% in a complete overhaul of the tax code. Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101(h)(2), 100 Stat. 2098–99 (1986). At 
the beginning of 1983, unemployment reached a high of 10.8%, the highest since the 
Great Depression, but it had fallen to half that by the time Reagan left office. Sicilia, 
supra note 102.  
 148. A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 45. At that time, the Democrats 
controlled the House, but the Republicans controlled the Senate. 
 149. Id. He argued that many of the programs had not warranted their expense 
and that students should be paying a larger share of their own costs. See Gene I. 
Maeroff, After 20 Years, Educational Programs Are a Solid Legacy of Great Society, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/30/us/after-20-
years-educational-programs-are-a-solid-legacy-of-great-society.html [https:// 
perma.cc/39YZ-PJG8].  
 150. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 
531–40, 95 Stat. 357 (1981). This was part of Title V of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981. See §§ 531–40. 
 151. See §§ 534–37, 95 Stat. at 454–57.  
 152. See generally Student Financial Assistance Technical Amendments Act 
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-301, 96 Stat. 1400 (1982) (amending the HEA). 
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and terminated the authority of Sallie Mae to consolidate student loans 
as of August 1, 1983.153  
By 1984, there was growing concern over the student loan 
default rate.154 So that year, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, which included private 
student loans within the exception to bankruptcy discharge.155 Two 
years later, there was a more student-friendly reauthorization of the 
HEA.156 Under this legislation, the Supplemental Loan to Students 
(SLS) program was created to extend loans to graduate, professional, 
and independent students;157 authorize student loan consolidation;158 
and increase the loan limits for all guaranteed student loans.159 Also 
under this legislation, National Direct Student Loans were renamed 
Perkins Loans.160 But amid continuing concern over the large number 
of defaults, the legislation provided that any student in default would 
be ineligible for any subsequent government-guaranteed student 
loan.161  
 
 153. See § 2, 96 Stat. at 1400; §§ 10–11, 96 Stat. at 1403–04; § 14, 96 Stat. at 
1405. 
 154. See Student Loan Default Rate Soars in ‘85: Officials Forecast $1-Billion 
Problem, Worse Years to Come, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 29, 1985) [hereinafter Student Loan 
Default Rate Soars], https://www.articles.latimes.com/1985-08-29/news/mn-
237251default-rate [https://perma.cc/J6JA-3KAL]. 
 155. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-353, § 456, 98 Stat. 376 (1984); see also supra notes 112–113, 125–126 
and accompanying texts. 
 156. See generally Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
498, 100 Stat. 1268 (1986) (reauthorizing the HEA). This reauthorization bill was 
sponsored by Senator Robert Stafford of Vermont.  
 157. See § 428A, 100 Stat. at 1384–86.  
 158. See § 428C, 100 Stat. at 1388–91. This applied to Federal Family 
Education Loans (FFEL) under the Act. 
 159. See § 425, 100 Stat. at 1359. The limit was increased from $2,500 for all 
years of undergraduate study and $5,000 for graduate students, to $2,625 for freshmen 
and sophomores, $4,000 for juniors and seniors, and $7,500 for graduate students. § 
425, 100 Stat. at 1359. In this 99th Congress, the Democrats were in the majority in 
the House, but the Republicans were in the majority in the Senate. See HISTORY, ART 
& ARCHIVES, Congressional Profiles, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., https://history.house.gov/ 
Congressional-Overview/Profiles/99th [https://perma.cc/TCN2-CXY4] (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2019). 
 160. See § 461(a), 100 Stat. at 1439. The following year, in 1987, the 
guaranteed student loan program was renamed the Stafford Loan Program in honor of 
Vermont Democrat Robert Stafford, a long-time supporter of education. See Higher 
Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 100-369, § 8, 102 Stat. 835, 837. 
 161. See Pub. L. No. 99-498, § 484(a), 100 Stat. 1480. 
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Secretary of Education William Bennett had been sounding the 
alarm for some time over the rising student loan default rates.162 In late 
1987, he proposed regulations to terminate federal funding of schools 
with a default rate greater than 50% and to investigate schools with a 
default rate greater than 20% by the end of 1990.163 The Democrats, 
along with representatives of proprietary schools, objected that the 
regulations disproportionately affected proprietary schools, which in 
turn enrolled many underprivileged, lower-income students.164 But 
some leading Democrats, such as Senator Edward M. Kennedy, 
changed their views after the release of a Department of Education 
(DOE) study documenting fraud, misrepresentation, and student loan 
abuses at proprietary schools.165 However, the majority of Democrats 
remained staunchly opposed to the restrictions on proprietary 
schools,166 and with a presidential election looming, Bennett’s 
proposal was never implemented.  
By the end of Reagan’s term in office, not only had the issue of 
student loan defaults not been adequately addressed, but the cutbacks 
in education funding had taken their toll on higher education. Over 
Reagan’s two terms, college tuition and fees increased by 
approximately 82%.167  
2. The George H.W. Bush Administration (1989–1993)  
Bush began his presidency by proclaiming himself the 
“education president.”168 But during his time in office, the Democrats 
controlled both houses of Congress, and Bush found it difficult to 
overcome the political and ideological differences. Thus, his major 
education initiatives were never enacted.  
 
 162. In 1985, approximately one-third of federal funding for the guaranteed 
student loan program went toward servicing defaults. It was projected that by 1987 
almost half of the funding would go toward paying the defaults. See Whitman, supra 
note 105. 
 163. Id.  
 164. See id. The Democrats accused the Republicans of having “their heads 
buried in the sand.” Id.  
 165. See id. at 4. 
 166. See id. at 5; see discussion supra note 134. 
 167. See NCES, supra note 70, at 579. This affected student enrollment 
because while general enrollment in degree-granting institutions increased a little over 
9% during Reagan’s two terms in office, the percentage of students attending college 
part-time increased only 1% and enrollment in two-year programs increased only 
0.5%. Id. at 403. Students who were likely to have attended part-time or enrolled in 
two-year programs were also likely to have been lower-income students. 
 168. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 54.  
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The most momentous policy changes in federal funding for 
higher education during the Bush Administration occurred during 
1990 and 1992. In 1990, there was a change in the federal budget rules 
accounting for student loans that addressed the concern expressed by 
economists in the 1960s.169 No longer would outstanding student loans 
be recorded as deferred liabilities. Instead, by 1992, all government 
loan programs, whether guaranteed or direct, would be required to 
account for their full long-term expenses and income with a “subsidy 
cost” that would reflect the amount of money the government would 
need to cover the true cost of the loans.170  
This put direct loans and guaranteed loans on a more equal 
footing, which shifted the focus of congressional policy discussions 
directly to the cost of the loans. Studies showed that direct loans would 
cost the government far less than guaranteed loans and would be easier 
to administer.171  
The year 1990 also proved to be an inauspicious one for 
proprietary schools. Their student loan default rates reached an all-
time high of 41%, and there was widespread media coverage of fraud 
and abuse at these schools, as well as reports of school closures that 
left hapless students stranded and taxpayers stuck with the bill.172 To 
compound these problems, the largest guarantor of student loans, the 
Higher Education Assistance Foundation, suddenly collapsed under 
the weight of soaring defaults.173 The following year, the Senate 
 
 169. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
 170. See discussion infra notes 52937–542 and accompanying text. See 
generally Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.  
 171. See Deborah Lucas & Damien Moore, Guaranteed Versus Direct 
Lending: The Case of Student Loans, NAT’L. BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (Feb. 2010). It 
was estimated that direct loans would save the government around $2 billion a year 
because the government would no longer pay subsidies to lenders and administration 
fees to state guaranty agencies. See DELISLE, supra note 72, at 7–9. Colleges also were 
finding the guaranteed loan program cumbersome because they were having to deal 
with private lenders, guaranty agencies and the Department of Education. See id.  
 172. See generally David Whitman, When President George H. W. Bush 
“Cracked Down” on Abuses at For-Profit Colleges, CENTURY FOUND. (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://tcf.org/content/report/president-george-h-w-bush-cracked-abuses-profit-
colleges. Although the Bush Administration proposed “teachout” regulations to allow 
students to complete their studies in the wake of school closures, these regulations 
were never finalized. See id. In fact, student loan defaults in general reached an all-
time high of 22.4% in 1990. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FY 2011 2-Year National Student 
Loan Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/ 
defaultmanagement/defaultrates.html [https://perma.cc/7FTG-FJQB] (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2019). 
 173. See Whitman, supra note 172, at 6. This cost taxpayers $212 million. Id. 
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Subcommittee on Investigations held bipartisan hearings on problems 
relating to the guaranteed student loan program, in which multiple 
witnesses testified to abuses and fraud at proprietary schools.174 The 
result was a crackdown on these schools under the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990.175 This Act provided that any school with 
a cohort default rate equal to or greater than 35% in 1991 and 1992 
would be ineligible for federal funds.176 Thereafter, the cohort 
percentage threshold would be reduced to 30%.177 The Act further 
provided that any student admitted to a proprietary school without a 
high school diploma would be ineligible for a student loan unless that 
student passed an independently administered examination.178  
In 1992, there was another reauthorization of the HEA,179 
sponsored by Senator Claiborne Pell. In the discussions leading up to 
the enactment, some members of Congress urged a better balance 
between grants and loans by increasing the amount appropriated to 
grants and reducing reliance on student loans.180 However, the 
reauthorization drifted in the opposite direction. This Act created a 
direct loan pilot program,181 which made it easier for students to obtain 
loans. But at the same time, Congress also made it easier for lenders 
to collect on those loans by eliminating the statute of limitations on 
collection of federal student loans, thus putting them on a par with 
 
 174. See ABUSES IN FEDERAL STUDENT AID PROGRAMS, S. REP. NO. 102-58, at 
2 (1991). 
 175. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 
Stat. 1388 (1990).  
 176. § 3004. A cohort default rate is the rate of students at a particular 
institution who default in a given year on their federal student loans. See Michael 
Itzkowitz, Why the Cohort Default Rate Is Insufficient, THIRD WAY (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.thirdway.org/report/why-the-cohort-default-rate-is-insufficient 
[https://perma.cc/B5DV-76ZW]. It has been argued that this measure of eligibility (or 
continued eligibility) for federal funds is inadequate. See id.  
 177. § 3004. 
 178. § 3005. 
 179. See generally Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
325, 106 Stat. 448 (1992) (reauthorizing the HEA). This Act contained some new, 
innovative programs, such as grants to college students who tutored secondary school 
students, particularly in predominately low-income communities; grants to “Hispanic-
serving institutions,” defined as those institutions with an enrollment of at least 60% 
full-time Hispanic students; Presidential Access scholarships for low-income students 
who demonstrated academic achievement; and a national student savings program to 
encourage families to save for their children’s education. §§ 316, 406A, 106 Stat. at 
473, 497. In addition, the Act extended and expanded the Pell Grant Program. § 401, 
106 Stat. at 479–82. 
 180. See Gladieux, supra note 5. 
 181. See § 452, 106 Stat. at 569–76 (amending Part D of Tit. IV of the HEA). 
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fraud and further reflecting a congressional enmity toward student 
borrowers.182 The 1992 reauthorization also eliminated PLUS loan 
limits,183 introduced new unsubsidized Stafford loans unrestricted by 
need,184 and decreased the expected family contribution for need-based 
aid,185 thus increasing the eligibility of lower-income students.  
But there was no corresponding increase in funding to support 
the expansion in eligibility.186 In the two years following the 1992 
reauthorization, student loan volume increased by 50%.187 This 
resulted in a marked shift in federal focus from lower-income students 
to middle-income students but with fewer available aid dollars per 
student.188 
As part of a “Program Integrity Triad,” aimed primarily at 
proprietary schools, the 1992 reauthorization of the HEA created a 
new state postsecondary review program in partnership with the 
states.189 Under this program, each state would designate its own 
postsecondary review entity (SPRE) to conduct reviews of institutions 
that met certain requirements, such as a student loan default rate of 
25% or greater, or a default rate of 20% or greater at institutions where 
more than two-thirds of the students received federal aid or where two-
thirds or more of the institution’s expenditures were derived from 
federal funds.190 These reviews were to be funded by the federal 
government.191 Upon review, the SPREs were to consider several 
factors, including the relationship of the courses or programs to useful 
employment in the state and the relationship of the school’s tuition and 
fees to the remuneration that students could reasonably expect to 
receive.192 The program was delayed, however, because of strong 
criticism by education administrators.193 In an effort to prevent fraud 
 
 182. See Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
26, § 3, 105 Stat. 123, 124 (1991). 
 183. See § 418, 106 Stat. at 531–32 (amending § 428B of the HEA).  
 184. See § 422, 106 Stat. at 535–36 (adding new § 428H to HEA). 
 185. See §§ 473–77, 106 Stat. at 586–602 (amending Part F of Title IV of the 
HEA). 
 186. See id. 
 187. See Jacqueline E. King, Federal Student Loan Debt: 1993 to 2004, AM. 
COUNCIL ON EDUC. ISSUE BRIEF, 1 (June 2005).  
 188. See id. 
 189. Higher Education Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 
494C, 106 Stat. 638 (1992) (adding new subsection H, § 494C(b)). 
 190. § 494C, 106 Stat. at 638. 
 191. See §494B, 106 Stat. at 637 (adding new § 494B). 
 192. See §494C, 106 Stat. at 639 (adding new § 494C(d)).  
 193. See Gladieux, supra note 5; see also Thomas Harnisch et al., State-
Federal Partnerships in Postsecondary Education: Enhancing State Authorization: 
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and abuse at proprietary schools, the 1992 Act also provided an “85-
15” rule194 under which proprietary institutions were required to derive 
at least 15% of their revenues from sources other than federal student 
loans in order to become or remain eligible to receive federal funds.195 
This was probably the last time there was a truly bipartisan effort to 
curb abuses at proprietary institutions. 
During most of Bush’s presidency, the economy was 
lackluster,196 although federal spending on education increased by 
25%.197 But during this period, college tuition increased overall by 
nearly 20%.198 Not surprisingly, there was a widening of the 
enrollment gap between lower-income and higher-income students.199 
There was also increasing competition between traditional schools and 
proprietary schools for federal student aid dollars.200 It was suggested 
that Congress might establish separate funding for the two types of 
schools, but that was vigorously opposed by proprietary school 
associations, as well as by key Democratic committee members in the 
 
The Need for Action by States as Stewards of Higher Education Performance, EDUC. 
COMM’N OF THE STATES 7–8 (2016). Although the program originally had been 
directed toward proprietary institutions, the bill was amended to extend this oversight 
to all educational institutions. See id. This resulted in strong pushback on the 
legislation, primarily from the private nonprofit sector, because it gave states broad 
authority over the administration of these institutions. See id. at 8. 
 194. See Higher Education Amendment of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 
481(d), 106 Stat. 611 (1992) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1088); Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 3005, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-27–
28 (1990). Similar language was found in 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(d)(1) (using language 
under the Veterans’ Benefits Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-568, 106 Stat. 4320 (1992) 
and under the Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-550, 
66 Stat. 667, §226 (1952)). 
 195. § 481(d), 106 Stat. at 611. 
 196. There was a recession from 1990 to 1991, in which unemployment 
remained stagnant. See Sicilia, supra note 102. 
 197. See A Brief Synopsis, supra note 20, at 64. “In unadjusted dollars, federal 
aid to education had increased from $5.3 billion in 1965 to $23.3 billion in 1975 to 
$40.0 billion in 1985 to $71.7 billion in 1995.” Id.  
 198. See NCES, supra note 70, at 579. The Higher Education Amendments 
Act of 1992 provided for the establishment of a national commission to study the costs 
of higher education. See §1441, 106 Stat. at 827–831.  
 199. See NCES, supra note 70, at 395. In 1989, 48.1% of low-income recent 
high-school graduates enrolled in college, compared to 55.4% of middle-income 
graduates and 70.7% of graduates from high-income families. Id. In the fall of 1992, 
40.9% of low-income recent graduates enrolled in college, compared to 57.0% of 
middle-income students and 79.0% of high-income graduates. Id. However, the fall 
of 1993 marked the first time that more than 50% of low-income recent high-school 
graduates enrolled in college. Id. 
 200. See Whitman, supra note 172, at 12. 
916 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
House and Senate.201 Afterward, enrollment in proprietary institutions 
slowed, so that by the end of Bush’s term in office, it had increased 
only 0.37%.202 
3. The Clinton Administration (1993–2001) 
By 1992, when Clinton was elected President, the effects of the 
Reagan-era cuts in federal education spending were evident. Although 
college enrollment had been steadily increasing since the 1950s, the 
high-school dropout rate among sixteen- to twenty-four-year-old 
students in 1990 was slightly over 12%,203 with a higher rate among 
African Americans, Hispanics, and Native American, Alaska 
Natives.204 Test scores were falling, curricula were weak, and 
standards were low.205 Less than 80% of the nation’s most 
economically disadvantaged schools received Title I funds.206 There 
was grossly inadequate investment in technology207 and in recruitment 
and training of teachers.208 Class sizes were large and buildings were 
crumbling.209 The costs of higher education had spiraled, and less than 
half of low-income high-school graduates continued on to college.210 
 
 201. See id. 
 202. NCES, supra note 70, at 403. During Reagan’s two terms in office, 
enrollment in proprietary schools increased over 25%, although these schools enrolled 
only 1.5% of total student enrollment. Id. Interestingly, from 1989 to 1990, proprietary 
enrollment dropped 0.7%, while from 1990 to 1992, it increased 0.7%. Id. 
 203. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., The Condition of Education 2012, INSTITUTE OF 
EDUC. SCIS. 82 (2012). 
 204. See id. The rate was highest among Hispanics (32%) and then Blacks 
(13%). The lowest dropout rate was among Asian/Pacific Islanders. Id. 
 205. See The Clinton Presidency: Expanding Education Opportunity, WHITE 
HOUSE, https://clintonwhitehouse5.archives.gov/WH/Accomplishments/eightyears-
05.html [https://perma.cc/94DH-RD9T] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (explaining that 
in 1990, only 38% of those who graduated from high school had taken a core 
curriculum of four years of English and three years each of math, science, and social 
studies).  
 206. Id. Title I funds were created to aid schools with the highest poverty rates. 
See id.  
 207. See id. Only the most affluent schools had access to computers. See id. In 
1993, approximately 3% of classrooms had internet-connected computers. Id. By 
1994, only 35% of public schools had such access. Id.  
 208. Id. (explaining that in 1992, fewer than 80% of English and Math teachers 
had a college major or minor in their teaching field and in 1995 only 282 teachers 
nationwide were National Board certified). 
 209. See id.  
 210. Id. In 1993, for the first time, enrollment by recent high school graduates 
in the lower income bracket reached 50%. NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.302.30. 
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Clinton’s presidential campaign against Bush focused on a 
stronger federal role in education, and once elected he set out to 
deliver on that promise. During his first term, he focused chiefly on 
primary and secondary education. But in 1993, Congress enacted the 
Student Loan Reform Act,211 which expanded the 1992 direct loan 
pilot program and replaced the guaranteed Federal Family Education 
Loans (FFEL) with direct loans made by the federal government 
through the Department of Education.212 Studies showed that the FFEL 
loans benefitted private lenders at the expense of students and that 
direct loans were easier for schools to administer and much cheaper 
for students and taxpayers.213 This Act also reduced both borrower 
interest rates and the loan origination fee and added flexible repayment 
plans with income-contingent payments spread over a period of 
twenty-five years.214  
In 1994, the Republicans won control of both houses of Congress 
for the first time in forty years. Private lenders, many of whom had 
contributed to Republican campaigns, began to complain loudly about 
the direct loan program.215 The new congressional leadership vowed 
 
However, the enrollment rate thereafter dropped below 50%, and for the next three 
years the average enrollment rate by low-income students was around 43%. Id. 
 211. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub L. No. 103-66, § 
4011, 107 Stat. 312, 341 (1993). 
 212. § 4041. 
 213. See Lucas & Moore, supra note 171. Under the Bush pilot program, 5% 
of schools would participate in direct lending. Clinton’s plan extended that to 60% of 
schools over a five-year period. Id. The government paid substantial amounts to 
private lenders for interest subsidies and costs attributable to defaults. See id. It also 
paid substantial amounts to state and nonprofit guaranty agencies for a variety of 
services, including counseling to schools, students, and lenders. Students usually paid 
a loan origination fee on private loans, plus the interest rates on those loans were much 
higher than on government sponsored loans. Id.; see U.S. Dep’t of Educ., FISCAL 
YEAR 2011 BUDGET REQUEST, STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW, at T-4.  
 214. See §§ 4043, 4101–02. The Act directed that at least 60% of federal 
student loans would be transformed into direct loans over a five-year period. § 4021. 
However, income-contingent repayments applied only to government loans. See 
Philip G. Schrag, Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Interest 
Lawyers and Other Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 27, 33 (2007). If a student borrowed from a private lender, the 
student would be required to make both income-contingent payments to the 
government and non-income-contingent payments to the private lender. See id. 
 215. See, e.g., Joe Belew, New Direct Student Loan Program Can’t Live Up 
to Its Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 1994), www.nytimes.com/1994/09/25/opinion/l-
new-direct-student-loan-program-can-t-live-up-to-its-claims-350346.html?mcubz=1 
[https://perma.cc/U4KN-BUS2] (referencing an opinion by the President of the 
Consumer Bankers’ Association); see also Matthew Spalding, Time to End Costly 
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to eliminate the program but found this to be more difficult than 
anticipated because hundreds of colleges were then participating, and 
they had embraced the less cumbersome process of direct lending.216 
So instead, the Republicans attacked the legislation by criticizing the 
administration of the program.217 This led to an interdiction against the 
DOE to prevent it from encouraging or requiring schools to participate 
in the program.218 The result was that the DOE was effectively 
muzzled while guaranteed lenders were allowed to use their 
substantial resources to lure colleges, sometimes by unscrupulous 
means, into the FFEL program.219 Consequently, the direct loan 
program began to whither. 
In 1996, Sallie Mae was granted permission to privatize220 to 
allow it to become more competitive in a changing student loan market 
and economic environment.221 Because Sallie Mae was no longer 
constrained by its narrowly defined charter, after its reorganization the 
amount of federally insured student loans more than doubled over the 
 
Direct Student Loans, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 20, 1995), 
www.heritage.org/node/20706/print-display [https://perma.cc/XE46-NK3V]. 
 216. See Education Policy: Student Loan History, NEW AMERICA,  
https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/topics/higher-education-funding-and-
fionancial-aid/federal-student-aid/federal-student-loans/federal-student-loan-history 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2019).  
 217. See Spalding, supra note 215, at 4. 
 218. See DELISLE, supra note 72, at 8.  
 219. See Megan Barnett, Julian E. Barnes & Danielle Knight, Big Money on 
Campus: How Taxpayers Are Getting Scammed by Student Loans, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Oct. 27, 2003), http://ire.org/resource-center/stories/20900/4. The 
FFEL program was the guaranty program that originated under the HEA in 1965, 
originally intended to be a partnership between the federal and state governments. See 
supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. Later, it included Stafford loans, both 
subsidized and unsubsidized, PLUS loans, and consolidated loans. Direct loans are 
issued under the William D. Ford Direct Loan Program. See Direct Loans vs. the 
FFEL Program, FINAID, www.finaid.org/loans/dl-vs-ffel.phtml [https://perma.cc/ 
KQ3K-KCPW] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
 220. See Student Loan Marketing Association Reorganization Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, Tit. VI, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–275. Although the legislation was 
enacted in 1996, Sallie Mae did not become a private company until 2004 because of 
the complexities of relinquishing its status as a government sponsored enterprise. See 
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PRIVATIZATION OF SALLIE 
MAE 10–12 (2006). 
 221. See Michael J. Lea, Privatizing a Government Sponsored Enterprise: 
Lessons from the Sallie Mae Experience, NETWORKS FIN. INST., Apr. 2006, at 2–5. 
While the decline in Sallie Mae’s market shares attributable to the direct loan program 
was the principal reason for the privatization, Lea identifies other reasons as well. See 
generally id. (identifying reasons for Sallie Mae’s privatization). 
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next ten years.222 At the same time, the Debt Collection Improvement 
Act of 1996223 provided that Social Security benefits could be offset to 
repay defaulted federal education loans, both direct and guaranteed.224  
In the period from 1993 to 1997, during Clinton’s first term in 
office, college tuition increased over 9%225 and, not surprisingly, 
enrollment during this period was almost flat.226 So during his second 
term, Clinton sought to shift funding from direct support through 
grants, loans, and work-study assistance to indirect funding through 
the tax code.227 Portrayed as a tax cut, Republicans rallied around the 
shift, and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997228 was passed with 
bipartisan support.229 This Act added five new tax incentives230 and 
 
 222. Id. at 8. The amount invested in the government insured student loan 
market went from $24 billion in federal fiscal year (FFY) 1994 to $52 billion in FFY 
2003. Id.  
 223. See Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 
31001, 110 Stat. 1321-358. 
 224. § 31001, 110 Stat. at 1321–60. 
 225. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.330.10.  
 226. Id. The average annual increase in enrollment during Clinton’s first term 
was only 0.465%. Id. 
 227. There were, however, other education acts passed during Clinton’s 
second term. See Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-524, 98 Stat. 2435, 2437 (1984) (providing federal funding at the 
secondary and post-secondary levels to promote vocational education); see also 
Higher Education Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581, 1581–82 (1998) 
(addressing Pell grants, the FFEL Program, federal work-study programs, the William 
D. Ford Federal Direct Loan program, Perkins loans, and need analysis).  
 228. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1998). 
 229. See Marc J. Gerson, Technically Speaking: The Art of Tax Technical 
Corrections, TAX NOTES 927, 927, 932 (Mar. 5, 2007) (noting this Act was passed at 
the eleventh hour in August 1997, shortly before Congress was to recess.)  
 230. § 1. The new incentives were the Hope and Lifetime Learning credits 
under I.R.C. section 25A; a deduction for interest paid on student loans under new 
I.R.C. section 221; penalty-free withdrawals from IRAs for purposes of education, 
I.R.C. section 72(t); and savings for education trust accounts under I.R.C. section 530. 
§§ 201–03, 213. The Hope and Lifetime Learning credits were estimated to cost $31.6 
billion over five years and $76 billion over ten years. Patrick Fleenor, Bottom Line on 
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, TAX FOUND.: SPECIAL REP., Sept. 1997, at 1, 2. The 
total cost of the new education savings accounts and the expanded IRAs was estimated 
to be $7.1 billion for the first five years and $30.6 billion over the next five years. 
Brief Description of and Comments on the 1997 Tax Act, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUST. 
(Aug. 18, 1997), https://www.ctj.org/brief-description-of-and-comments-on-the-
1997-tax-act [https://perma.cc/PD9A-EKA2]. Citizens for Tax Justice was very 
critical of the Act, calling it “a disaster for the goal of fair, simple and adequate 
taxation.” Id. 
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modified others231 to encourage college attendance at an estimated cost 
to the federal government of $95 billion over five years and $275 
billion over ten years,232 although skeptics disputed these amounts as 
being much higher.233 The Act became effective on January 1, 1998.234 
Later in 1998, the HEA was again reauthorized.235 This Act 
reduced Stafford loan interest rates by about 0.8%,236 provided loan 
forgiveness for those who taught at the primary or secondary levels in 
low-income schools, and provided unsubsidized Stafford loans for any 
student.237 But it struck the provision allowing education loans to be 
discharged in bankruptcy after seven years in repayment,238 essentially 
making education loans nondischargeable.239 It also suspended 
 
 231. See § 1. Qualified tuition programs under I.R.C. section 529(e) were 
treated as tax-free investments. § 211. The exclusion for employer-provided 
educational assistance under I.R.C. section 127 was extended through 2000. § 221. 
Student loan forgiveness was excluded under certain designated circumstances under 
I.R.C. section 108(f). § 225.  
 232. Fleenor, supra note 230, at 1.  
 233. See CITIZENS FOR TAX JUST., supra note 230. One estimate was $400 
billion over 10 years. Id. 
 234. See § 1. 
 235. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 
1581 (1998). This Act also increased and extended Pell Grants through fiscal year 
2004, extended the Academic Achievement Incentive Scholarship Program for low-
income students, and authorized appropriations for Federal Supplemental Education 
Opportunity grants through 1999. §§ 401, 404, 406.  
 236. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The Higher Educ. 
Amendments of 1998: Five Victories for the Clinton-Gore Admin. (Oct. 7, 1998), 
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/news/100798.html [https://perma.cc/ 
X4QN-6ZF5]. Borrowers were given four months to refinance their loans at the new 
rate, although the Administration had proposed extending the refinancing period 
longer. See id. It was estimated that the four-month extension would save the average 
student borrower around $700 over a ten-year period. Id.  
 237. §§ 423(a), 424. Subsidized Stafford loans are based on need, and with 
these loans the government pays the interest while the student is in school and during 
periods of deferment. See Elyssa Kirkham, Everything You Need to Know About 
Federal Stafford Loans, STUDENT LOAN HERO (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.studentloanhero.com/featured/what-is-a-federal-stafford-loan [https:// 
perma.cc/CCE4-UQWT] Unsubsidized Stafford loans accrue interest as soon as the 
loan is taken out. See id. 
 238. See § 971, 112 Stat. at 1837. 
 239. See Louis DeNicola, The Truth About Student Loan Bankruptcy 
Discharge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., (May 2, 2018, 12:00 PM), 
https://loans.usnews.com/the-truth-about-student-loan-bankruptcy-discharge 
[https://perma.cc/M5Z9-DL88]. This applies to federal student loans, student loans 
funded by a nonprofit organization, such as a school, and qualified educational loans. 
See id. Qualified educational loans are those used to attend a qualified educational 
institution. See id. This is a Title IV-certified school. See id. In addition, the loan must 
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eligibility for any grant, loan, or work-study assistance for those 
convicted of any drug related offenses.240 Further, it loosened the 
eligibility restriction on proprietary institutions by providing that they 
must not derive more than 90% (rather than 85%) of their revenues 
from Title IV funds.241 With the more positive climate for proprietary 
institutions, enrollment in these institutions increased 90% during 
Clinton’s two terms in office.242 
In addition, the Act increased the length of time from 180 days 
to 270 days before a delinquent borrower was declared in default, and 
it eliminated any college with a default rate of 25% or greater for three 
consecutive years (or 40% or more in a single year) from participating 
in any federal student loan programs.243 This, plus the slash in interest 
rates, produced a steady decline in the national student loan default 
rates.244 However, college tuition continued to rise.245 
4. The George W. Bush Administration (2001–2009) 
In George W. Bush’s first term as President, the country was in 
the midst of a recession that had begun at the end of the Clinton 
Administration. In order to boost the economy, Bush proposed a series 
 
be spent on a qualified educational expense such as tuition, fees, books, room and 
board, and educational supplies. See id. The student must be attending on at least a 
half-time basis. See id. If these requirements are not met, the loan may not be 
considered a qualified educational loan and thus may be eligible for discharge in 
bankruptcy. See id. 
 240. § 483(f). For a possession offense, this suspension would last from the 
date of the conviction until one year from that date for a first offense, two years from 
the date of conviction for a second offense, and indefinite suspension for a third 
offense. Id. In the case of a conviction for the sale of a controlled substance, the 
suspension period would run from the date of conviction until two years from that 
date and would be indefinite for any subsequent conviction. Id.  
 241. See § 102(b), 112 Stat. at 1588; see also supra notes 194–195 and 
accompanying text. 
 242. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.303.10. The portion of the total student 
population enrolled in proprietary institutions nearly doubled during this period, 
jumping from 7.3% to 14.2%. 
 243. § 429.  
 244. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., National Student Loan Two-Year Default Rates, 
FED. STUDENT AID, https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/ 
defaultrates.html [https://perma.cc/3K89-R4ZS] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). The 
student loan default rate in 1997 was 8.8% (down from a high of 22.4% in 1990) then 
fell to 5.4% in 2001, 4.5% in 2003, and 4.6% in 2005 (down from 5.1% in 2004), after 
which the rate began to steadily increase. Id. 
 245. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.330.10 (demonstrating that college 
tuition during Clinton’s second term increased by about 13% in current dollars).  
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of tax cuts and incentives that were enacted as the Economic Growth 
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,246 also known as “the Bush 
tax cuts.”247 Among its myriad provisions was the elimination of the 
sixty-month limit on the deduction of student loan interest and an 
increase in eligibility for the deduction.248 Also in 2001, in conformity 
with the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, the DOE began 
offsetting up to 15% of Social Security, disability, and retirement 
benefits to repay defaulted federal education loans.249  
In 2002, Congress reauthorized the HEA and changed all 
education loan interest rates from variable to fixed for new federal 
loans issued after July 1, 2006.250 Congress passed the legislation in 
late 2001, and it was enacted in February 2002.251 The timing was 
significant because the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, had 
both short- and long-term negative effects on the economy. These 
attacks extended the 2001 recession, led to the wars in Afghanistan 
 
 246. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001). 
 247. Pub. L. No. 107-16, tits. I, II, III, and V (reduced income tax rates, 
eliminated the marriage penalty, increased the earned income tax credit, and repealed 
the estate and generation skipping taxes). It also increased the maximum annual 
contribution to educational savings accounts (renamed Coverdell accounts) from $500 
to $2,000, allowed eligible educational institutions to maintain qualified tuition 
programs, and extended the exclusion for employer-provided educational assistance 
to cover graduate level courses. Id. at tit. IV. It further extended an income exclusion 
to amounts received under certain scholarships. Id. Section 117(c) of the I.R.C. 
provides that any amounts received under an excludable scholarship or fellowship that 
“represents payment for teaching, research, or other services by the student required 
as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarship or qualified tuition reduction” 
shall be included in income and subject to tax. I.R.C. § 117(c) (2008). The 2001 Act 
provided an exception to such amounts received under a National Health Service 
Corps Scholarship Program or Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship and 
Financial Assistance program. Pub. L. No. 107-16,115 Stat. at 64 (amending I.R.C. § 
117(c)(2)).  
 248. § 412, 115 Stat. at 63–64. The income limitation was increased from a 
low of $40,000 for single taxpayers and $80,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly 
to $50,000 for single taxpayers and $100,000 for joint filers. Id. The high end of the 
limitation (at which the taxpayer would be ineligible to deduct student loan interest) 
was increased from $50,000 for single filers and $100,000 for joint filers to $65,000 
for single filers and $130,000 for joint filers. § 412(b), 115 Stat. at 64. 
 249. See supra notes 223–224 and accompanying text. 
 250. See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 107-139, 116 Stat. 8 
(amended 2002). These rates were 6.8% on Stafford loans (both subsidized and 
unsubsidized), 7.9% on PLUS loans, and 8.25% on consolidated loans. Id.  
 251. See id. 
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and Iraq, and deepened the national debt.252 The Federal Reserve cut 
interest rates several times in an effort to boost the economy.253 The 
end result was that the variable rates on student loans in effect before 
2006 were consistently lower than the fixed rate that became effective 
in 2006.254 In fact, student loan variable interest rates reached a historic 
low in 2005.255 
When the fixed rates became effective, Democrats blamed 
Republicans for the unfairness of the interest rate differential, and they 
launched a campaign promising to cut the rates by half.256 But they 
failed to deliver on this promise.257 Instead, they cut only the 
subsidized Stafford rate to six-percent for four years, after which the 
rate would revert to the fixed rate of 6.8%.258  
At the end of 2005, Congress cut $12.6 billion from student 
financial aid under the Deficit Reduction Act,259 which was enacted to 
control mandatory federal spending.260 While this Act increased the 
limits of FFEL loans (although it did not increase the cumulative 
limit),261 made PLUS loans available to graduate and professional 
 
 252. See Kimberly Amadeo, How the 9/11 Attacks Affect the Economy Today, 
THE BALANCE (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/how-the-9-11-attacks-
still-affect-the-economy-today-3305536 [https://perma.cc/KM25-BFSW]; see also 
Ed Grabianowski, What Was the Economic Impact of September 11?, HOW STUFF 
WORKS, www.money.howstuffworks.com/september-11-economic-impact.html (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/L777-A2NE]. 
 253. See Casey Bond, How the September 11 Attacks Destroyed U.S. Interest 
Rates, GO BANKING RATES (Sept. 11, 2013), https://gobankingrates.com/personal-
finance/september-11-attacks-destroyed-u-s-interest-rates [https://perma.cc/5VU7-
ALWS]. 
 254. See Stephen Vanderpool, Timeline: The History of Federal Student Loan 
Interest Rates, NERDWALLET (May 22, 2012), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/ 
loans/student-loans/federal-student-loan-interest-rate-timeline-events [https:// 
perma.cc/E955-3RYN].  
 255. The rate was 2.88% for an in-school lock-in on consolidated loans with a 
cap of 8.25%. An early repayment status loophole allowed current students to 
consolidate their loans. See Interest Rate Loophole, FINAID, 
www.finaid.org/loans./loophole.phtml [https://perma.cc/X9NX-D6T7] (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2019) 
 256. See Vanderpool, supra note 254. 
 257. See id. 
 258. Id. If the variable rate had been in effect, that rate would have been 2.5%. 
Id. 
 259. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 
(2006). 
 260. See 2005 Reauthorization: Deficit Reduction Act, FINAID, 
www.finaidorg/educators/reauthorization20051219s1932.txt [https://perma.cc/ 
79AY-YWR7] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
 261. § 8005. 
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students,262 and permitted consolidation of FFEL and direct loans to 
take advantage of income-contingent repayment plans,263 it also raised 
the fixed interest rate of PLUS loans and repealed consolidation of 
loans while students remained in school.264  
Also in 2005, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,265 which provided an 
exception from discharge for “qualified education loans.”266 This 
included most federal and private student loans.267 The added security 
of complete bankruptcy protection for private lenders, along with an 
unlimited statute of limitations, was not passed along to borrowers, 
however, by a reduction in the cost of the loans.268 
By 2007, the Democrats had regained control of both houses of 
Congress. Later that year, the College Cost Reduction and Access Act 
of 2007269 was enacted. This Act halved the interest rate over a four-
year period on FFEL loans and subsidized Stafford loans,270 provided 
loan forgiveness for public service employees,271 authorized income-
 
 262. Id. 
 263. § 8009, 120 Stat. at 163–64.  
 264. §§ 8006, 8009, 120 Stat. at 159–60, 163–64. It also lowered loan 
origination fees from 4% to 1%, but only for Stafford loans, and eliminated the ability 
of schools to originate PLUS and consolidation loans. Stafford loans also could not 
be originated at the school level, so these loans had to be made by other lenders. § 
8011, 120 Stat. at 165. 
 265. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.  
 266. § 220, 119 Stat. at 59 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)). The term 
“qualified education loan” is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 to include any debt incurred “solely to pay qualified higher education 
expenses” of the borrower, the borrower’s spouse, or any dependent of the borrower 
at the time the debt is incurred. I.R.C. § 221(d)(1). Qualified education loans also 
include debt used to refinance qualified education loans. See id. Qualified higher 
education expenses include the cost of attendance at a college or university that is 
eligible for Title IV federal student aid, minus scholarships, employer-paid tuition 
assistance, and other education tax benefits. See id. The regulations at 26 C.F.R. 
1.221-1 indicate that qualified education loans do not include mixed-use loans, such 
as credit card debt. 26 C.F.R. § 1.221-1 (2018). 
 267. § 220, 119 Stat. at 59. 
 268. See Xiaoling Ang & Dalié Jiménez, Private Student Loans and BAPCPA: 
Did Four-Year Undergraduates Benefit from the Increased Collectability of Student 
Loans, EDUC. POL’Y INITIATIVE (Sept. 29, 2013).  
 269. College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 
784 (2007).  
 270. § 201, 121 Stat. at 790–91. This was a ratable reduction from 6.8% in 
2006–2008 to 3.4% in 2011–2012. Id. 
 271. § 401, 121 Stat. at 800–01. 
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based repayment,272 and increased support for working students by 
increasing the income protection allowance for both dependent and 
independent students.273 A simplified means test, under which the 
expected family contribution (EFC) threshold was increased from 
$20,000 to $30,000 in 2009–2010,274 added some much needed 
simplification to the federal student loan application form.275  
The bill was funded from money saved by cutting payments to 
private lenders and guarantee agencies under the FFEL program.276 In 
2006, direct loans represented a relatively small portion of federally 
guaranteed loans,277 but that changed with the global financial crisis 
that began in 2008. This crisis produced a credit freeze during which 
many private educational lenders had difficulty covering their student 
loan obligations.278 Since these loans were guaranteed by the federal 
government, Congress was forced to act to avert a crisis in the FFEL 
program.279 Under the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans 
Act of 2008,280 the DOE was temporarily authorized to purchase 
unsubsidized Stafford and PLUS loans disbursed from October 1, 
1993, to September 30, 2009.281 It ultimately financed approximately 
88% of FFEL loans made in 2008–2009.282 This resulted in a hybrid 
 
 272. § 203, 121 Stat. at 792. 
 273. 121 Stat. at 801–04. The income protection allowance is the amount a 
student may earn and remain eligible for financial aid. See id. The allowance was 
almost doubled for dependent students from 2009–2010 to 2012–2013. § 601, 121 
Stat. at 801. For independent students without dependents other than a spouse, where 
both were enrolled, the increase was less dramatic—$7,000 from 2009–2010 to 
$9,330 from 2012–2013. Id. For married students where only one of the spouses was 
enrolled, the increase was $11,220 from 2009–2010 to $14,960 from 2012–2013. § 
601, 121 Stat. at 802. There was a sharper increase for married students with one or 
more dependents, with the increase contingent on the number of dependents. § 601, 
121 Stat. at 802–03.  
 274. § 602,121 Stat. at 804–05. 
 275. See id. Also, lender subsidy rates on PLUS loans were made more 
competitive through a pilot auction, effective July 1, 2009. § 701, 121 Stat. at 808.  
 276. §§ 301–05, 121 Stat. at 796–800; see also supra notes 211–214 and 
accompanying text. 
 277. See SFGATE, Feds Take Over Student Loan Program from Banks (Mar. 
30, 2010, 4:00 AM), www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/Feds-take-over-
student-loan-program-from-banks-3193888.php [https://perma.cc/LYN2-3CWN]. In 
specific, they represented about 20% of federally guaranteed loans. Id.  
 278. See DELISLE, supra note 72, at 9. 
 279. See id. 
 280. Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-227, 122 Stat. 740.  
 281. § 459A, 122 Stat. at 746–48. 
 282. CONG. BUDGET OFF., COSTS AND POL’Y OPTIONS FOR FED. STUDENT LOAN 
PROGRAMS, VIII (2010). 
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program in which the federal government supplied capital to private 
lenders.283 The Act also increased the limits (both annual and 
aggregate) on unsubsidized Stafford loans, allowed parents to defer 
repayment on PLUS loans while students were in school, and provided 
a repayment grace period of up to six months after students left 
school.284 
In 2007, Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York launched an 
investigation into unethical practices of some of the largest student 
loan lenders.285 He discovered that these lenders were engaging in 
deceptive practices, such as selling student loans to third parties 
without the borrowers’ knowledge, so that the benefits the borrowers 
had been promised by the original lender were no longer honored.286 
Also, some lenders established call centers in which students or 
parents thought they were calling a school’s financial aid office but 
were actually directed straight to the lender.287 The largest of these 
lenders, Sallie Mae (now SLM Corporation), settled by agreeing to a 
code of ethics proposed by Cuomo and by paying a fine of $2 million 
to a fund to help educate students and parents about the student loan 
industry.288 
In 2008, the HEA was again reauthorized to make college costs 
more transparent by requiring participating colleges to prominently 
disclose their costs and by requiring the DOE to display on its website 
a list of the 5% most expensive and the 10% least expensive 
colleges.289 It also provided loan forgiveness for civil legal assistance 
 
 283. See Education Policy: Student Loan History, supra note 216. Ironically, 
the federal government was assuming the role that the then-privatized Sallie Mae had 
filled when it was a government sponsored enterprise. 
 284. See §§ 2–4, 122 Stat. at 740, 740–43.  
 285. See Amanda Ernst, Sallie Mae Settles Student Loan Kickback Charges, 
LAW360 (Apr. 11, 2007), https://www.law360.com/articles/22415/sallie-mae-settles-
student-loan-kickback-charges [https://perma.cc/UKL5-GUGF]. 
 286. See id. 
 287. See id. 
 288. Id. Citibank, another student loan lender under investigation, also agreed 
to Cuomo’s code of ethics. Id. Cuomo was scathing on the poor job that the DOE and 
federal regulators had done in overseeing these lenders. See Marcy Gordon, NY AG 
Faults Oversight of College Loans, WASH. POST (June 6, 2007, 9:04 PM), 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/06/AR2007060601818 
_pf.html [https://perma.cc/Q3BA-XZYY]. These regulators are the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Treasury Department’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Id.  
 289. Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078, 
3099 (2008). 
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attorneys,290 teachers employed by educational service agencies,291 and 
in cases of disability or death of the borrower.292 It extended the 
Perkins Loan Program as a campus-based aid program,293 
implemented a program to promote early awareness of eligibility for 
federal aid,294 and increased the reporting requirements of 
postsecondary institutions by requiring them to report the repayment 
status of student loans to consumer credit agencies.295  
Because of the sudden closure of some proprietary schools, the 
Act further required institutions to prepare “teach out” plans to provide 
for the “equitable treatment of students” in the event that the 
institution should cease to exist before all students had completed their 
degrees.296 It also provided that any proprietary institution that failed 
to meet the 90/10 rule297 for two consecutive institutional fiscal years 
would be ineligible to participate in federal aid programs for at least 
two more consecutive fiscal years, until it demonstrated compliance 
with the eligibility and certification requirements.298 However, during 
the two fiscal years following the year of disqualification, the 
disqualification could be made provisional.299 
During Bush’s eight years in office, there was a 57% general 
increase in college tuition,300 although there was a significant increase 
in overall college enrollment by recent high school graduates.301 This 
enrollment increase, particularly for lower- and middle-income 
students, was attributable to two factors: (1) the financial crisis of 
2008, in which many recent high school graduates had difficulty 
finding work and opted to use federal aid to enroll in postsecondary 
 
 290. § 431, 122 Stat. at 3242. These are attorneys employed by nonprofit 
organizations that provide free legal assistance to the underprivileged. Id. 
 291. § 429, 122 Stat. at 3236.  
 292. § 437, 122 Stat. at 3257–58. 
 293. § 466, 122 Stat. at 3269. 
 294. § 490, 122 Stat. at 3305–07. 
 295. § 432, 122 Stat. at 3245–46. 
 296. § 493, 122 Stat. at 3316.  
 297. § 493, 122 Stat. at 3308 (amending § 487(a)(24) of the Higher Education 
Act of 1965 and providing that proprietary schools may receive no more than 90% of 
their funding from Title IV federal student aid); see also supra note 241 and 
accompanying text. 
 298. § 493, 122 Stat. at 3312.  
 299. Id.  
 300. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.330.10. This was in current dollars 
(2001–2009). Id. 
 301. Id. at tbl.302.30 This was an 8.3% increase from 2001, with an increase 
of 10% for both low- and middle-income students. Id.  
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institutions,302 and (2) an increase in eligibility and size of Pell 
grants.303 These factors caused enrollment in proprietary institutions to 
increase 178% during Bush’s two terms in office.304 
5. The Obama Administration (2009–2017) 
During the first two years of Barack Obama’s presidency, the 
Democrats controlled both houses of Congress. The steep recession of 
2008 continued, and this focused the new administration’s attention 
initially on economic recovery as well as health care reform.305 But in 
2010, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, passed along 
party lines, eliminated the FFEL program and provided that all new 
federal education loans would be made through the Direct Loan 
program.306 Under this program, there would be a change from private 
lending back to 100% federal lending. Since this eliminated private 
banks as “middlemen,” the federal government estimated that it would 
save about $68 billion over eleven years.307  
This Act also cut the monthly income-based student loan 
repayment by one-third308 and accelerated loan forgiveness from 
twenty-five years to twenty years for borrowers of new federal loans 
 
 302. See, e.g., Bridget Terry Long, The Financial Crisis and College 
Enrollment: How Have Students and Their Families Responded?, NAT’L BUREAU OF 
ECON. RES., at 229–31 (2015); see also Clifton B. Parker, The Great Recession 
Spurred Student Interest in Higher Education, Stanford Expert Says, STANFORD NEWS 
(Mar. 6, 2015), https://news.stanford.edu/2015/03/06/higher-ed-hoxby-030615 
[https://perma.cc/YP9T-M2HG].  
 303. See Pell Grant Funding and History, NEW AMERICA, 
https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/policy-explainers/higher-ed-
workforce/federal-student-aid/federal-pell-grants/pell-grant-funding [https:// 
perma.cc/UVR9-JPB9] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
 304. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.303.10. The percentage of students 
enrolled in proprietary institutions more than doubled from 3.3% in 2001, during 
Bush’s first year in office, to 7.7% during his last year. See id. 
 305. See generally Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (noting the passage of this bill focused on health 
care). 
 306. § 2201, 124 Stat. at 1074–75.  
 307. See Peter Baker & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Signs Overhaul of 
Student Loan Program, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2010), www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/03/31/us/politics/31obama.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/G2B2-UBJL]. 
Much of this savings was redirected to the Pell program, making the increased 
maximum amount of the grant permanent. § 2101, 124 Stat. at 1071. 
 308. § 2213, 124 Stat. at 1081. This repayment went from 15% of 
discretionary income to 10% of discretionary income. Id. 
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made on or after July 1, 2014.309 However, none of these programs 
addressed private student loans, which constituted approximately 
$168 billion or 20% of total student loan debt.310 
But the 2008 recession, combined with the increase in federal 
spending, precipitated a decrease in state spending for education, 
causing tuition and fees to continue to rise.311 In 2010, for the first time 
total outstanding student loan debt exceeded credit card debt.312 
In fall 2010, the Republicans won the majority of seats in the 
House, while the Democrats continued to control the Senate. This 
marked the beginning of a period of political polarization and gridlock 
that continued throughout the remainder of the Obama 
Administration. 
The following year, the Budget Control Act of 2011313 was 
passed after a bitter partisan battle. This Act ended the debt-ceiling 
crisis that was threatening to result in a sovereign default.314 In addition 
to the balanced budget provisions, this Act increased funding for Pell 
grants,315 but it also provided that graduate and professional students 
would no longer be eligible for subsidized Stafford loans.316 Further, it 
eliminated repayment incentives effective July 1, 2012,317 and 
 
 309. Id.  
 310. See Mark Kantrowitz, Total College Debt Now Exceeds Total Credit 
Card Debt, FASTWEB (Aug. 11, 2010), https://www.fastweb.com/financial-
aid/articles/total-college-debt-now-exceeds-total-credit-card-debt [https://perma.cc/ 
N8FP-PQ33]. 
 311. See, e.g., Michael Leachman et al., Most States Have Cut School 
Funding, and Some Continue Cutting, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 25, 
2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budgert-and-tax/most-states-have-cut-
school-funding-and-some-continue-cutting [https://perma.cc/UJR5-8DP5]; see also 
Lauren Camera, States Are Slacking on Higher Ed Spending, U.S. News & World 
Rep. (Jan. 7, 2016, 6:01 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/ 
2016/01/07/states-spending-less-today-on-higher-education-than-before-recession 
[https://perma.cc/A9PM-FN46].  
 312. See Jennifer Wadia, Rising Tuition Costs and the History of Student 
Loans, STUDENT DEBT RELIEF (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.studentdebtrelief.us/news/rising-tuition-costs-and-the-history-of-
student-loans [https://perma.cc/ZET2-HPT8]. Total student debt in 2010 was $830 
billion, while total credit card debt was $825 billion. See id.; see also Kantrowitz, 
supra note 310.  
 313. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 239 (2011). 
 314. See Suzy Khimm, The Sequester, Explained, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/09/14/the-sequester-
explained/?utm_term=.58678d85406d [https://perma.cc/YAT2-D5QA]. 
 315. § 501, 125 Stat. at 266. 
 316. § 502.  
 317. § 503, 125 Stat. at 266–67. 
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implemented sequestration, a system of automatic cuts to the federal 
budget of $1.2 trillion over ten years, plus additional caps on spending 
if Congress should fail to agree on a budget.318 This meant that if 
Congress failed to pass a budget, $109.3 billion would be cut from the 
federal budget each year until 2021.319 
In 2011, outstanding federal student loan debt for the first time 
exceeded auto loan debt.320 The following year, total outstanding 
student loan debt (both federal and private) exceeded one trillion 
dollars.321 
In fall 2012, the President and Congress failed to agree on a 
budget, triggering sequestration, which ultimately led to an increase in 
fees on Stafford and PLUS loans.322  
The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 eliminated 
subsidized interest on Stafford loans during the six-month grace 
period for new loans made from July 1, 2012, to June 30, 2014.323 In 
mid-2012, however, interest rates on subsidized student loans 
threatened to double. To prevent that, Congress enacted the Moving 
Ahead For Progress in the 21st Century Act, which extended for an 
additional year the 3.4% interest rate on subsidized Stafford loans to 
undergraduate students.324 
Proprietary schools did not fare well under the Obama 
Administration. The General Accountability Office (GAO) had issued 
a report in 2009 concluding that students at proprietary schools were 
 
 318. §251, 125 Stat. at 241–45.  
 319. See Grant A. Driessen & Marc Labonte, The Budget Control Act of 2011 
as Amended: Budgetary Effects, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 4 (2015). There would be an 
equal cut from defense and non-defense spending. Id. This would amount to a total 
reduction of $2 trillion over the nine-year period. Id. at 1.  
 320. See Kantrowitz, supra note 6. 
 321. See Stacy Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, DeVos Halts Obama-Era 
Plan to Revamp Student Loan Management, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/business/dealbook/education-department-
federal-student-loan-program.html [https://perma.cc/NY3X-9B58]; A Record One-
In-Five Households Now Owe Student Loan Debt, PEW RES. CT. (Sept. 26, 2012), 
https://www.pewsocialtrrends.org/2012/09/26/a-record-one-in-five-households-now-
owe-student-loan-debt. 
 322. See History of Student Loans, EDVISORS, https://www.edvisors.com/ 
college-loans/federal/history [https://perma.cc/SN6L-98UG] (last visited Oct. 28, 
2019). 
 323. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, tit. 
III, 125 Stat. 786, 1101 (2012). 
 324. See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-141, § 100301 126 Stat. 405, 979 (2012). 
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more likely to default on their loans.325 The following year, it issued 
another report accusing these schools of fraud and misrepresentation 
in recruitment and admissions.326 In addition, there were several other 
reports that chronicled the abysmal performance of proprietary 
schools.327 In 2012, Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) released a scathing 
report on behalf of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions that attributed the sector’s high drop-out rates to 
underspending on instruction and overspending on marketing and 
profit-sharing.328  
In the wake of the negative reports, the DOE finalized a “gainful 
employment” regulation in 2011 to protect students and taxpayers 
alike.329 This regulation was based on language in the HEA providing 
that to be eligible to receive federal funds under Title IV, an 
educational institution must “prepare students for gainful employment 
in a recognized occupation.”330 This regulation was intended to 
monitor schools to ensure that their borrowers met a minimum debt to 
earnings ratio.331 
 
 325. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY 
SCHOOLS: STRONGER DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO HELP 
ENSURE ONLY ELIGIBLE STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID 28 (2009). 
 326. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT 
COLLEGES, UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND 
ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 7 (2010). 
 327. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, BENEFITTING 
WHOM? FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION COMPANIES AND THE GROWTH OF MILITARY 
EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS 4, 8 (2010) (questioning whether for-profit schools were 
targeting the military and delivering substandard product); see also David J. Deming, 
Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The For-Profit Postsecondary School Sector: 
Nimble Critters or Agile Predators? 4, 22 (CAPSEE, Working Paper 2012) (finding 
that while there are some positives associated with for-profit schools, such as the fact 
that they educate more minority, disadvantaged, and older students, their students 
have higher unemployment rates, lower earnings, higher debt, and higher rates of 
default). 
 328. See S. REP. NO. 112-37, at 92. 
 329. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OBAMA ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCES NEW 
STEPS TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM INEFFECTIVE CAREER COLLEGE PROGRAMS (2011), 
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/obama-administration-announces-new-
steps-protect-students-ineffective-career-college-programs [https://perma.cc/267V-
6D8P]. 
 330. See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 461, 79 Stat. 
1219, 1251 (1965) (amending § 103(b) of the National Defense of Education Act of 
1958). 
 331. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 329 (reporting that under the new 
DOE regulation, a school would remain eligible to receive federal funds if at least 
35% of its borrowers were repaying their loans and the estimated loan payments did 
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The peak year for enrollment in proprietary schools was the 
academic year 2010.332 In the wake of the negative publicity, however, 
there was a steady decline in enrollment in these institutions from 
2011 throughout the remainder of the Obama Administration and into 
the Trump Administration.333 
President Obama’s 2013 budget proposed a 4.6% increase over 
the 2012 level in spending for higher education with an increase of 
2.5% in the budget of the DOE.334 The fierce battle over this budget 
resulted in a government shutdown that lasted sixteen days, resulting 
in the budget not being approved. Instead, Congress passed a series of 
continuing resolutions to fund the government through September 30, 
2013.335 
The Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013 changed the 
interest rates for new Stafford and PLUS loans for undergraduates 
originating on or after July 1, 2013.336 The new rate would be fixed but 
would be determined on the preceding June 1st and would be equal to 
the lesser of (1) the rate of the high-yield federal note auctioned at the 
 
not exceed 30% of the borrowers’ discretionary income or 12% of their total 
earnings). 
 332. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.303.10 (indicating that during that year, 
there were 2,022,785 students enrolled in proprietary schools, representing 9.6% of 
total student enrollment). 
 333. See id. (indicating from 2010 through 2016, when data was last available, 
there was a decline of almost 42% in enrollment and in 2016 enrollment in proprietary 
schools was only 5.9% of total enrollment). It should be noted, however, that overall 
enrollment in postsecondary educational institutions declined during this period. See 
id. In 2017, there was an approximate 7% decline in enrollment from 2016. See Maria 
Danilova & Richard Lardner, For-Profit Colleges Struggle Despite Assist from 
DeVos, AP NEWS (Apr. 7, 2018), https://apnews.com/ 
5e8fa04c469b4a5daa6640ee79584c4d [https://perma.cc/53EF-HWZA]. 
 334. See Cameron Brenchley, 2013 Education Budget: What It Means for You, 
WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM (Feb. 13, 2012, 7:02 PM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/02/13/2013-education-budget-
what-it-means-you [https://perma.cc/R6ML-EQVC] (stating that this was an increase 
to $69.8 billion in discretionary appropriations). In this budget, President Obama 
proposed doubling the number of work-study jobs and increasing by $7.5 billion the 
available funding for Perkins Loans. See id.; see also Willliam C. Smith, The Second 
Term: Higher Education and the Obama Administration, FORUM OF AMERICAN J. OF 
ED. (Jan. 21, 2013), www.ajeforum.com/the-second-term-higher-education-and-the-
obama-administration-by-william-c-smith. 
 335. See Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-175, 
126 Stat. 1313, 1315 (2013) (authorizing funding through March 27, 2013). See 
generally Consolidated and Further Continuing Resolutions Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 
113-6, 127 Stat. 198 (2013) (authorizing funding through end of fiscal year 2013). 
 336. See Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013, Pub L. No. 113-28, 
127 Stat. 505, 506 (2013). 
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final auction held prior to that June 1, plus 2.05% or (2) 8.25%.337 For 
graduate and professional students, the interest rate on unsubsidized 
Stafford loans was higher.338  
In 2014, Obama signed a memorandum directing the DOE to 
propose regulations allowing students to cap their loan repayments at 
10% of their income.339 He also proposed that the federal government 
partner with the states in making the first two years of community 
college free for all students, whether they intended to complete their 
bachelor degrees or go on to the workforce.340 The Perkins Loan 
Program, established in 1958 as a need-based loan program,341 was 
allowed to lapse in September 2015. However, it was extended in 
December of that year for another two years,342 although this was too 
late to affect the decisions of those entering college that fall.  
In 2014, the Department of Education found for-profit 
Corinthian Colleges guilty of fraud in deceptive marketing and lying 
to the government about its graduation and job placement rates.343 In 
the wake of this finding, the DOE prohibited Corinthian from 
receiving any further federal funding.344 In 2015, the school filed 
bankruptcy and ceased its operations.345 
 
 337. See id. 
 338. See 127 Stat. at 507 (stating that, for these students, the rate of interest on 
unsubsidized Stafford loans was the lesser of the rate of the high-yield Treasury note 
plus 3.6% or 9.5%). Consolidation loans would have an interest rate equal to the 
weighted average of the loans, rounded to the nearest one-eighth of one percent. Id. 
 339. See Making College Affordable, WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/higher-education/making-college-
affordable [https://perma.cc/V6ZS-JWZF] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
 340. See Higher Education, WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM (Dec. 10, 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/issues/education/higher-
education [https://perma.cc/HV6N-URUM]. Obama reiterated this in his State of the 
Union Address on January 21, 2015. See Obama’s State of the Union 2015 Transcript 
(Full Text and Video), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/01/21/us/politics/obamas-state-of-the-union-2015-address.html?mcubz=1 
[https://perma.cc/NSX6-KZQK]. 
 341. See supra notes 49–50, 160–161, 293 and accompanying text. 
 342. See Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 
114-105, 129 Stat. 2219, 2221 (stating that this legislation was not approved until 
December 18, 2015). 
 343. See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Feds Found Widespread Fraud at 
Corinthian Colleges. Why Are Students Still Paying the Price?, WASH. POST (Sept. 
29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/09/29/feds-
found-widespread-fraud-at-corinthian-colleges-why-are-students-still-paying-the-
price [https://perma.cc/5ZN8-RYJB]. 
 344. See id. 
 345. See Alia Wong, The Meltdown of a For-Profit College Behemoth, THE 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/ 
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After the Corinthian closure, the Obama Administration 
announced a “borrower defense” regulation that would provide 
automatic relief from indebtedness in the event of a school closure 
after November 1, 2013, if the borrower had not enrolled in another 
Title IV-eligible institution within three years.346 Unfortunately, this 
regulation was not effective until July 1, 2017, after Obama left 
office.347 
In 2016, the DOE predicted an alarming increase in student loan 
defaults, despite a rosy economic forecast, an increase in the 
maximum Pell grant, lower interest rates, and income-based loan 
repayment.348 This prediction proved true. According to the DOE’s 
findings released in late 2017, there was a 12% increase in student 
loan defaults from a year earlier.349 One commentator placed much of 
the blame on contractors hired by the government to service student 
 
2015/04/the-meltdown-of-a-for-profit-college-behemoth/391925 [https://perma.cc/ 
S4R4-3YZR]. 
 346. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., U.S. Department of Education Announces Final 
Regulations to Protect Students and Taxpayers from Predatory Institutions (Oct. 28, 
2016), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-announces-
final-regulations-protect-students-and-taxpayers-predatory-institutions [https:// 
perma.cc/VR82-PHRU]. There were other protections in this regulation, such as 
requiring schools with poor loan repayment records to provide warning to students, 
banning arbitration agreements under which students waived their right to go to court 
or bring class action suits in a borrower defense claim, and providing notice to 
borrowers of their rights in the event of a school closure. See id. 
 347. See id. 
 348. See Jason Delisle, Obama Budget Sees Rising Student Loan Defaults, 
FORBES (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasondelisle/2015/ 
02/03/obama-student-loan-defaults/#4f9a98b446d [https://perma.cc/LU6U-UV3K] 
(projecting that there would be an increase in default with every type of student loan). 
The most dramatic projected increase was a 25.3% default rate in undergraduate 
Stafford loans (an increase of 2.5% from 2015). See id. 
 349. See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, The Number of People Defaulting on 
Federal Student Loans Is Climbing, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/09/28/the-number-of-
people-defaulting-on-federal-student-loans-is-climbing [https://perma.cc/EAD3-
7ZE8]. These figures were not based on the cohort default rate but on a more 
comprehensive view of defaults that showed as of June 2017, there were millions of 
student loan debtors who had made no payments on $144 billion in federal student 
loans in the past nine months. See id. 
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loans.350 These contractors have been accused of driving borrowers 
into default by creating obstacles to repayment.351 
6. The Trump Administration (2017– ) 
Trump’s actions on education have been controversial. In his 
first budget request, FY 2018, he proposed to cut the budget of the 
DOE by $10.6 billion, with a redirection of funds away from higher 
education to his primary and secondary school choice agenda.352 
Congress ultimately rejected this proposal.353 His nominee for 
 
 350. See Teddy Nykiel, Navient Lawsuits: What Student Loan Borrowers 
Need to Know, NERDWALLET (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/ 
navient-lawsuits-what-student-loan-borrowers-need-to-know-cm855944 [https:// 
perma.cc/NRQ5-7F2X]. 
 351. See id. Navient Corp., a spin-off of Sallie Mae and once the largest of the 
student loan servicers, is facing lawsuits filed by the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau and the attorneys general of five states—Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York, 
Washington, and California—alleging fraud, predatory practices, and violations of the 
consumer protection laws in its dealings with borrowers. See Michelle Singletary, 
How the Lawsuits Against Student Loan Servicer Navient Could Affect You, WASH. 
POST (July 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-
there/wp/2018/07/05/how-the-lawsuits-against-student-loan-servicer-navient-could-
affect-you [https://perma.cc/TY8R-AW5C]; see also Shahien Nasiripour, Why This 
State’s Navient Lawsuit Could Affect Your Student Loans, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-05/why-pennsylvania-s-navient-
suit-may-impact-your-student-loans [https://perma.cc/N8AH-RGUC]; Nykiel, supra 
note 350. Although Navient tried to get the suits dismissed, a federal judge in 
Pennsylvania ruled that the suit could proceed. See Judge Allows Lawsuit Against 
Student Loan Servicer Navient, DEL. ONLINE (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/2018/12/18/lawsuit-alleging-abuse-
wilmington-based-navient-can-go-ahead-judge-says/2348657002 [https://perma.cc/ 
Y9VQ-WP9T]. 
 352. See Valerie Strauss, Five Startling Things Betsy DeVos Just Told 
Congress, WASH. POST (May 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
answer-sheet/wp/2017/05/24/five-startling-things-betsy-devos-just-told-
congress/?utm_term=.846 d5cd7d22e [https://perma.cc/HU4X-RQPW]; Danielle 
Douglas-Gabriel, Betsy DeVos Undoes Obama’s Student Loan Protections, CHI. TRIB. 
(Apr. 11, 2017, 9:47 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-betsy-devos-
student-loan-protections-20170411-story.html [https://perma.cc/3QBA-NPPZ]. The 
budget proposal would have redirected $1.4 billion to school choice. Emma Brown, 
DeVos Promises “the Most Ambitious Expansion of Education Choice in Our 
Nation’s History” But Offers No Details, WASH. POST (May 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/betsy-devos-promises-the-most-
ambitious-expansion-of-education-choice-in-our-nations-history--but-offers-no-
details/2017/05/22/ae90f55e-3f03-11e7-8c25-44d09ff5a4a8_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/F9NP-TUP3]. 
 353. See Andrew Ujifusa, Trump Fails in Bid to Slash Education Budget, ED. 
WEEK (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/ articles/2018/04/11/trump-fails-
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Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos, was the former chairwoman of 
the Michigan Republican Party with no prior experience in education 
policy.354 On February 7, 2017, she was confirmed with the closest 
vote of any Cabinet nominee in history after the Vice-President cast 
the deciding vote.355 The controversy surrounding her confirmation 
has continued as she has worked to repeal many of the policies and 
safeguards for student loan borrowers implemented by President 
Obama.356  
One of these safeguards was the borrower defense to repayment 
regulation, which was due to become effective on July 1, 2017.357 
However, DeVos delayed the implementation, ostensibly to allow the 
DOE to “review[] the rule.”358 She ultimately proposed rules that would 
have been effective in July 2019 that would have made it much more 
 
in-bid-to-slash-education.html [https://perma.cc/Y543-X7SB] (stating that the FY18 
education budget was actually increased $2.6 billion over the fiscal year 2017 level). 
 354. See Greg Toppo, What You Need to Know About Betsy DeVos, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 7, 2017, 4:21 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/ 
02/07/facts-about-education-secretary-betsy-devos/97605238 [https://perma.cc/ 
LZL4-4HY5]. 
 355. Emmarie Huetteman & Yamiche Alcindor, Betsy DeVos Confirmed as 
Education Secretary; Pence Breaks Tie, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/politics/betsy-devos-education-secretary-
confirmed.html [https://perma.cc/2SCB-RWPB] (reporting that this vote (51-50) was 
along party lines with two Republicans voting against, and that these two noted that 
“Ms. DeVos was unqualified because of a lack of familiarity with public schools and 
with laws meant to protect students”). 
 356. See, e.g., Dustin Hornbeck, Betsy Devos’ 6-Month Report Card: More 
Undoing Than Doing, CONVERSATION (Aug. 10, 2017, 8:59 PM), 
http://theconversation.com/betsy-devos-6-month-report-card-more-undoing-than-
doing-81793 [https://perma.cc/4WMM-YJQC]; see also Lauren Camera, 18 States 
Sue Betsy DeVos for Killing Student Loan Protections, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(July 6, 2017, 11:52 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/education-
news/articles/2017-07-06/18-states-sue-education-secrertary-betsy-devos-for-nixing-
student-loan-protections [https://perma.cc/WWR6-D5NQ]. 
 357. See supra notes 346–347 and accompanying text. 
 358. Katie Lobosco, Betsy DeVos Limits Debt Relief for Defrauded Students, 
CNN MONEY (Dec. 21, 2017, 2:57 PM), www.money.cnn.com/2017/12/21/ 
pf/college/devos-borrower-defense-debt-relief/index.html [https://perma.cc/3C92-
JV32]. DeVos eventually argued that relief should be granted based on “damages 
incurred,” which would involve a consideration of the earnings of the borrower. Id. 
Critics counterargued that this was unfair because many borrowers never completed 
their degrees in the wake of the closure of a proprietary institution. See id.; see also 
Andrew Josuweit, 4 Ways Betsy DeVos Plans to Make It Harder for Ripped-Off 
Students to Get Loan Forgiveness, FORBES (Jan. 5, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewjosuweit/2018/01/05/4-ways-betsy-devos-
plans-to-make-it-harder-for-ripped-off-students-get-loan-forgiveness/2/# [https:// 
perma.cc/BP3E-GKGY]. 
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difficult for defrauded students to obtain relief,359 and for those who 
might have managed to overcome the myriad roadblocks, the relief 
would have been based on the borrowers’ earnings, determined 
through the use of Social Security data.360  
 
 359. See Andrew Kreighbaum, DeVos Rule Would Cut Billions in Student 
Loan Relief, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/07/26/devos-proposes-tougher-
standard-borrowers-who-seek-student-loan-relief [https://perma.cc/4XZ7-WZU9] 
(allowing relief only for those borrowers in default). Default, however, carries severe 
consequences for borrowers, including wage garnishment, tax refund and social 
security benefit garnishment, and negative effects on credit that could affect 
employment and approval for housing and car loans. See id. They also would have 
eliminated the Obama-era ban on forced arbitration, although they would have 
required institutions to plainly notify student borrowers that they enforced such a 
provision. See id. For those borrowers who might have managed to get to court, 
DeVos’ rules forbade class action suits, resulting in borrowers having to bring suit 
individually. See id. This would have greatly increased the cost to borrowers in having 
their claims addressed. See id. These rules also would have required borrowers to bear 
the burden of proving that their institutions knowingly defrauded them by making 
false statements in advertising or recruitment or in making promises with a reckless 
disregard for the truth. See id. They finally would have ended the Obama-era 
automatic loan discharge for borrowers who had not enrolled elsewhere within three 
years of a school closure. See id. These borrowers instead would have had to seek 
proactive relief. See id. 
 360. See Michael Stratford, Trump and DeVos Fuel a For-Profit College 
Comeback, POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2017, 4:58 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/ 
2017/08/31/devos-trump-forprofit-college-education-242193 [https://perma.cc/ 
MN3E-H2T9]. Under the Borrower Defense to Repayment regulation, students 
defrauded by for-profit schools could apply to have their loans forgiven. See id. 
During the Obama Administration, $550 million in student loan debt was extinguished 
under this regulation. See id. As of the first of November 2017, none of the 87,000 
claims submitted since DeVos took office had been addressed, including 10,000 
claims that previously had been recommended for approval. See Shannon Insler, Betsy 
DeVos Considering New Limits on Loan Forgiveness for Defrauded Students, 
STUDENT LOAN HERO (Oct. 30, 2017), https://studentloanhero.com/news/betsy-devos-
delays-closed-for-profit-colleges-student-loan-forgiveness [https://perma.cc/83CQ-
BWPZ]. In December 2017, DeVos unveiled her plan to provide ‘tiered relief’ to 
defrauded students. See id. This plan would provide only partial forgiveness based on 
debt to earnings data that compared average earnings and debt of students in similar 
programs and schools. See id. This plan has been criticized severely by Democrats 
and consumer advocates. See id. As of April 2018, the DOE had approved 8,809 
claims (with 99,000 more claims pending) with awarded relief of $13.4 million. Id. 
However, these borrowers would have been entitled to $70.3 million if they had 
received full discharge of their loans. See Michael Stratford, A Look at Student Fraud 
Claims Under New DeVos Policy, POLITICO (Apr. 16, 2008, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-education/2018/04/16/a-look-at-
student-fraud-claims-under-new-devos-policy-170324 [https://perma.cc/V4QT-
VDWZ]. Meanwhile, under DeVos’ rules, those who had been defrauded by closed 
for-profit schools would have had to continue to pay their debt, ostensibly until July 
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This prompted a number of lawsuits in 2017 by the attorneys 
general of eighteen states, plus the District of Columbia.361 In May 
2018, a California federal district court held that the DOE’s use of 
Social Security data to determine borrowers’ earnings violated privacy 
laws, and it issued a preliminary injunction both against the use of this 
data and against collection on the loans.362 The following September, 
a U.S. District Court judge held in favor of the states, concluding that 
DeVos’ delay of the borrower defense rule was “arbitrary and 
capricious” and that the Department’s legal rationale “lacked any 
meaningful analysis.”363  
In a separate suit filed by the Harvard Legal Services Center 
Project on Predatory Student Lending, the court concluded that the 
DOE’s delay in implementing the borrower defense regulation was 
 
1, 2019, according to the DOE’s Federal Register expiration date for the consideration 
of new regulations. See id. 
 361. See Andrew Kreighbaum, Democratic AGs Sue DeVos on Borrower 
Defense, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://insidehighered.com/ 
quicktakes/2017/12/15/democratic-ags-sue-devos-borrower-defense [https:// 
perma.cc/GP9Y-7WXU]. These states were California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and 
Washington. Id.; see also Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Betsy DeVos Takes Action on 
Backlog of Student Debt Relief Claims, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2017, 6:25 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/12/20/betsy-devos-
takes-action-on-backlog-of-student-debt-relief-claims [https://perma.cc/Z8JZ-
JF5W]. The suit also consolidated other suits by two aggrieved borrowers filed by the 
consumer advocacy group, Public Citizen. See Andrew M. Harris & Daniel Flatley, 
Betsy DeVos Loses Student Loan Lawsuit Brought By 19 States, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 
12, 2018, 5:42 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-12/devos-
loses-states-suit-over-borrower-defense-rule-delay [https://perma.cc/RP3F-R38D]. 
 362. See Scott Jaschik, Court: Education Department Must Resume Debt 
Relief, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (May 29, 2018), https://insidehighered.com/quicktakes/ 
2018/05/29/court-education-department-must-resume-debt-relief [https://perma.cc/ 
RJ22-UE2Y]. 
 363. See Katie Lobosco, Betsy DeVos Loses Lawsuit After Delaying Student 
Loan Protection Rule, CNN (Sept. 13, 2018, 12:51 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/13/politics/betsy-devos-loses-lawsuit/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/2MFU-NTPP]. The judge, however, did not require the rule to be 
reinstated. See id. Instead, there will be a hearing to discuss remedies. See id. 
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illegal.364 It gave the DOE thirty days to resolve problems inherent in 
the repeal of the regulation.365 
DeVos’s actions belie any concern for student borrowers. 
Rather, her real concern is for lenders and institutions, particularly 
proprietary institutions, which does not bode well for borrowers.366 In 
June 2017, she announced that the DOE would reconsider the Obama 
Administration’s gainful employment rule with the aim of creating or 
“resetting” a new rule.367 This again prompted lawsuits by the attorneys 
general of eighteen states plus the District of Columbia to compel 
implementation of the old rule on the ground that it had already 
undergone “extensive input and analysis, negotiated rulemaking, and 
public comment.”368 In October 2018, the court gave the DOE thirty 
days to resolve problems with repeal.369 
Meanwhile, the DOE announced in October 2018 that it would 
not be able to meet the November deadline to resolve the problems 
 
 364. See Sara Garcia, The Lawsuits Challenging DeVos’ Anti-Student Higher 
Education Agenda, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 2, 2018, 9:03 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2018/ 
10/02/458814/lawsuits-challenging-devos-anti-student-higher-education-agenda 
[https://perma.cc/859X-JUQK]. 
 365. See id. 
 366. See, e.g., Michael Stratford, DeVos Escalates Fights with States Over 
Student Loan Companies, POLITICO (Sept. 7, 2018, 4:29 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/07/devos-student-loan-companies-774599 
[https://perma.cc/Q3FT-H9MU]. 
 367. See Paul Fain, AGs Sue DeVos Over Gainful Employment Rule, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/10/18/ags-
sue-devos-over-gainful-employment-rule [https://perma.cc/3UK7-B8JD]. 
 368. See Dozens of Organizations Come Out in Support of Gainful 
Employment, Borrower Defense Rules, CONSUMER REPS. (May 4, 2018), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/dozens-of-organizations-come-out-
in-support-of-gainful-employment-borrower-defense-rules [https://perma.cc/H7CA-
L67L]. 
 369. See Garcia, supra note 364; see also Andrew Kreighbaum, Agencies at 
Loggerheads Over Gainful-Employment Data, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/12/06/education-department-says-data-
dispute-behind-failure-enforce-gainful-employment [https://perma.cc/D4U8-QAS3]. 
Also pending is a suit filed in August 2018 by the National Student Legal Defense 
Network representing the National Education Association and the California Teachers 
Association against DeVos and the DOE to halt the illegal delay of rules designed to 
protect students enrolled in online education programs. See id. The rules at issue 
require online educational institutions to notify students if the programs in which they 
are enrolled or plan to be enrolled fail to meet state licensing standards or are in danger 
of “fac[ing] adverse actions from the state or accreditor.” Educators, Students File 
Lawsuit Against Education Department, DeVos, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N. (Aug. 23, 
2018), www.nea.org/home/73914.htm [https://perma.cc/D82Y-SJRT]. 
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with the repeal of the borrower defense and gainful employment 
regulations.370 This means that the earliest implementation date will be 
July 2020, a year after the DOE had estimated.371 Advocates called this 
a win for student borrowers.372 
In 2016, the Obama Administration considered replacing the 
complex labyrinth that is the system of obtaining information about 
student loans with the creation of a single web portal administered by 
the DOE through which students could obtain this information.373 In 
April 2017, DeVos proposed to take that simplification plan a step 
further and award the student loan vendor contract to a single company 
instead of the then nine loan servicers.374 She also proposed to 
disregard the Obama Administration’s policy of considering a loan 
company’s track record of servicing loans in awarding loan vendor 
contracts.375 This would have placed student borrowers at the mercy of 
a single predatory loan servicer, without any feasible choices.376 
 
 370. See Garcia, supra note 364; see also Andrew Kreighbaum, Missed 
Deadline Stalls DeVos Agenda, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/04/education-department-misses-
deadline-its-overhaul-student-loan-rules [https://perma.cc/XG65-ATK9]. 
 371. See Kreighbaum, supra note 370. 
 372. See id. 
 373. See Stacy Cowley, DeVos Abandons Plan to Allow One Company to 
Service Federal Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/business/dealbook/devos-student-loan-
payment-system.html [https://perma.cc/8MAR-2QSC]. 
 374. See id. Her rationale was that this would be more efficient because the 
present system is “cumbersome and confusing—with shifting deadlines [and] 
changing requirements.” Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump Administration Cancels 
Controversial Contract Bid for a New Student Loan Servicer, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/08/01/senators-
combat-devoss-reset-on-student-loan-servicing-contracts [https://perma.cc/P2WR-
CQGM]. The DOE had estimated that switching to a single loan servicer would save 
more than $130 million in the first five years. See id.; see also Roger Yu & Kevin 
McCoy, Trump to Grant Student Loan Servicing Work to Just One Company, USA 
TODAY (May 22, 2017, 5:31 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/ 
2017/05/22/trump-grant-student-loan-servicing-work-just-one-company/102004374 
[https://perma.cc/6T5X-UT3M]. 
 375. See Cowley & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 321. 
 376. See Gretchen Morgenson, At Student Loan Giant Navient, Troubled Past 
Was Prologue, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/ 
business/navient-sallie-mae-student-loans.html [https://perma.cc/5DRD-YQM2]. 
The largest federal loan servicer, Navient, formerly Sallie Mae, is currently facing a 
lawsuit filed by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau accusing it of shoddy 
service and deception. See id. The company denies these allegations, but in 2014, the 
company was investigated by the Department of Justice and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation for wrongdoing in overcharging military families for almost 
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DeVos withdrew these proposals only after they received vociferous 
objections from consumer advocates and members of Congress 
concerned about both the quality of service and creating a “too big to 
fail” student loan servicing monopoly.377 In its FY 2018 appropriations 
bill, Congress forbade the DOE from awarding the contract to service 
student loans to a single servicer.378 It also required the DOE to 
consider the performance record of any company receiving a DOE 
loan servicing contract.379 
DeVos has made no secret of her desire to decrease the federal 
government’s role in education.380 She has shrunk the number of 
positions in the DOE to the point that there is concern about the ability 
of the Department to perform its key functions, such as “aiding debt-
burdened students defrauded by for-profit colleges” and addressing 
the thousands of applications for student debt relief.381 When she 
 
ten years. See id. Navient settled the suit, paying $60 million. See id.; see also Nykiel, 
supra note 350. 
 377. See Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 374. 
 378. See Consolidated Appropriations Act 2018, H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 115th Cong., Rules Comm. Print 115-66, 992-994 (Mar. 21, 2018); 
Andrew Kreighbaum, New Boost for Student Aid and Research, INSIDE HIGHER ED. 
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/03/22/omnibus-
spending-package-boosts-student-aid-while-restricting-devos-priorities. 
 379. See Consolidations Appropriation Act, supra note 378, at 992–994. 
 380. See, e.g., Moriah Balingit & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Inside Betsy 
DeVos’s Efforts to Shrink the Education Department, WASH. POST. (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/inside-betsy-devoss-efforts-to-
shrink-the-education-department/2017/11/08/fc03884c-ba64-11e7-be94-
fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html [https://perma.cc/5M8U-QRAT]; see also Danielle 
Douglas-Gabriel, DeVos Offers Buyouts to Shrink Education Department Workforce, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-
point/wp/2017/10/27/devos-offers-buyouts-to-shrink-education-department-
workforce [https://perma.cc/MC79-SQGZ]. 
 381. See Balingit & Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 380. Previously, there were 
87,000 such applications that were being reviewed by just fourteen staff members. Id. 
Recently, however, DeVos has announced that the DOE will implement part of the 
borrower defense rule and will automatically cancel $150 million in student loan debt 
of around 15,000 borrowers who attended colleges that closed between November 
2013 and December 2018. Andrew Kreighbaum, DeVos to Cancel $150 Million in 
Student Loan Debt, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Dec. 14, 2018), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2018/12/14/devos-cancel-150-million-
student-loan-debt [https://perma.cc/A57R-B62E]. However, in November 2019, the 
DOE announced that it would cancel almost $11 million in federal loans provided to 
students defrauded by four defunct for-profit Art Institutes which falsely claimed to 
be accredited. Evidence establishes that the DOE knew the institutions were not 
accredited but continued issuing the loans. See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, DeVos 
Cancels Nearly $11 Million in Student Loans that the Education Dept. Sent to 
Unaccredited For-Profit Colleges, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2019, 3:14 pm), 
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sought to dismantle the DOE’s Central Budget Office and the Office 
for Civil Rights, she again was rebuked by Congress with specific 
language in the 2018 appropriations bill that forbade her from making 
fundamental changes to the Department.382 
Her support of student loan servicers has been unapologetic, 
despite numerous complaints about these entities. In 2017, she ended 
the DOE’s relationship with the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB), the government regulator of student loan servicers 
and for-profit institutions.383 The DOE abruptly announced that it 
would no longer honor two memoranda of understanding between it 
and the CFPB to share information on abusive practices of student 
loan servicers, along with supervisory oversight of student loan 
lenders and for-profit schools.384 
DeVos has gone even further in attempting to curtail oversight 
and regulation of student loan servicers by the states as well. In early 
2018, she issued a memorandum arguing that federal law preempts 
state efforts to regulate student loan servicers.385 Although the states 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/11/08/devos-cancels-nearly-
million-student-loans-that-education-dept-sent-unaccredited-for-profit-colleges. 
 382. See Valerie Strauss, Congress Rebukes DeVos Over Her Plans to 
Reorganize the Education Department, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2018, 2:19 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2018/03/22/congress-
rebukes-devos-over-her-plans-to-reorganize-the-education-department [https:// 
perma.cc/Z74H-A6FU]. However, DeVos also has staffed the DOE with for-profit 
industry insiders. See David Halperin, DeVos Embrace of Predatory For-Profit 
Colleges Is Breathtaking, HUFFPOST (Sept. 6, 2017, 6:03 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/devos-embrace-of-predatory-for-profit-
colleges-is-breathtaking_us_59b0705ee4b0d0c16bb529d0 [https://perma.cc/236N-
S8UU]. 
 383. See Andrew Kreighbaum, Education Dept. Ends Partnership with CFPB, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/ 
2017/09/05/education-dept-rebukes-cfpb-overreach-kills-information-sharing-
agreement [https://perma.cc/4PBN-S4MJ]. 
 384. See id. In the 2018 Appropriations Act, however, Congress required the 
DOE to provide reports on a quarterly basis on borrower defense to repayment claims. 
See Andrew Kreighbaum, New Boost for Student Aid and Research, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/03/22/omnibus-
spending-package-boosts-student-aid-while-restricting-devos-priorities 
[https://perma.cc/X9UY-266T]. 
 385. See, e.g., Cory Turner, Education Department Wants to Protect Student 
Loan Debt Collectors, NPR (Feb. 27, 2018, 10:40 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/02/27/588943959/education-department-
wants-to-protect-student-loan-debt-collectors [https://perma.cc/CXZ8-89L3]. States 
have implemented measures to regulate this industry, such as passing a “student loan 
bill of rights,” creating a student loan ombudsman position to assist borrowers with 
complaints, and requiring licenses to operate within the state. Id.; see Kaitlin Mulhere, 
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have vowed to continue their efforts to regulate the servicers,386 there 
is no indication that DeVos plans to withdraw the memo or reduce her 
efforts to aid the student loan servicing industry. While the memo is 
not law, nevertheless the fear is that the industry will seize upon it to 
bolster their argument that they are bound only by federal law and are 
not subject to state laws aimed at protecting borrowers.387 DeVos 
stated in this memo that there are federal safeguards in place to “ensure 
that borrowers receive exemplary customer service and are protected 
from substandard practices.”388 The reality, however, does not support 
this statement. 
Trump has supported DeVos’s actions. In both his FY 2018 and 
FY 2019 budget proposals, Trump called for cuts to higher 
education.389 In 2018, he proposed cutting $143 billion from federal 
student loans by allowing the Perkins loan program to expire, phasing 
out subsidized Stafford loans, ending public service loan forgiveness 
(PSLF), reducing funding for the federal work-study program by half, 
cutting the surplus in the Pell grant program, eliminating SEOG 
grants, and revamping the income-based repayment program.390 
However, he was rebuked when Congress increased the 2018 budget 
of the DOE by $3.9 billion to provide additional funding to the SEOG 
 
Betsy DeVos Is Telling States to Stop Cracking Down on Student Loan Companies, 
MONEY (Mar. 9, 2018), http://time.com/money/5193456/devos-student-loan-
servicers-state-regulations [https://perma.cc/3ZNU-642Q]. 
 386. See Jillian Berman, States to DeVos: We’ll Keep Cracking Down on 
Student-Loan Companies, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 3, 2018, 1:34 PM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/states-to-devos-well-keep-cracking-down-on-
student-loan-companies-2018-03-02 [https://perma.cc/AQB2-2BW9]. 
 387. See Mulhere, supra note 385. There is a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) lawsuit currently pending to compel the DOE to release documents to 
determine whether loan servicers illegally participated in the DOE’s attempt to restrict 
states’ role in regulating loan servicers. See Garcia, supra note 364 (discussing other 
lawsuits pending against DeVos and the DOE); see also National Consumer Law 
Center Files FOIA Lawsuit Against U.S. Department of Education, NAT’L. CONSUMER 
LAW CTR. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.nclc.org/media-center/national-consumer-
law-center-files-foia-lawsuit-against-u-s-department-of-education.html [https:// 
perma.cc/948M-UW64].  
 388. See Mulhere, supra note 385. 
 389. See FISCAL YEAR 2018 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION, 26–28. 
 390. Id. at 25–29; Andrew Kreighbaum, Trump Budget Would Slash Student 
Aid and Research, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (May 24, 2017), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/05/24/white-house-budget-includes-
tens-billions-cuts-student-aid-and-research [https://perma.cc/NC9S-YCMX]. 
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program, the PSLF program,391 the work-study program, and the Pell 
grant program.392 
In Trump’s FY 2018 budget proposal, there was a cryptic 
statement that the Administration “looks forward to working with 
Congress” to address the issue of “Higher Education Accountability” 
by not allowing students to “take on debt they cannot afford to 
repay.”393 Given the Trump Administration’s partiality to predatory 
institutions and the fact that it has worked to dismantle the Obama era 
“gainful employment” rule,394 this probably means that instead of 
holding underperforming schools accountable, and instead of working 
to hold rising tuition costs in check, students will be held accountable 
with a limitation on the amount of federal loan money they can obtain, 
while tuition continues to rise. This will force students to turn to more 
expensive private loans. 
In his FY 2019 budget proposal, Trump again requested cuts to 
education, including the elimination of the PSLF program and 
subsidized student loans.395 He also requested a reform of the student 
loan repayment system, so that students in an income-driven 
repayment plan would have to make larger monthly payments of 
 
 391. See What the 2018 Spending Bill Means for Education and the 
Humanities, MLA ACTION NETWORK (Apr. 6, 2018), https://action.mla.org/policy-
what-the-2018-spending-bill-means-for-education-and-the-humanities [https:// 
perma.cc/F4AC-XYSV] (explaining the additional funding to the PSLF program was 
intended to fix the problem of loan servicers’ failure to inform borrowers that either 
their loans or their repayment plans or both did not qualify for forgiveness). Thus, the 
years of payments that borrowers had made thinking they would soon qualify for 
forgiveness would not count, and they would have to start over making payments for 
another ten years to qualify for forgiveness. See id. This prompted a number of 
lawsuits, which the 2018 appropriation was intended to address. See id. However, this 
funding is on a one-time, first-come-first-served basis and will not be renewed. See 
id. There are concerns that the current appropriation will be insufficient to adequately 
service the number of claimants who were misled by their loan servicers. See id. 
 392. See FISCAL YEAR 2018 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION, supra note 389, at 24. 
 393. Id. at 25. 
 394. See supra notes 329–331, 367–368 and accompanying text. This rule 
prohibits schools from receiving federal funding if a certain percentage of their 
graduates are unable to secure jobs or “have high levels of debt compared [to] their 
incomes.” Ben Miller, 6 Things Betsy DeVos Has Done on Higher Ed, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (June 29, 2017, 2:40 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ 
education-postsecondary/news/2017/06/29/435273/6-things-betsy-devos-done-
higher-ed [https://perma.cc/L5D6-GW5J]. 
 395. See Preston Cooper, President Trump’s Proposed Higher Education 
Budget (Round 2), FORBES (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
prestoncooper2/2018/02/13/president-trumps-proposed-higher-education-budget-
round-2/#2ad58af759b9 [https://perma.cc/Z3QM-5K3D]. 
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12.5% of their income instead of the current 10%.396 The trade-off 
would be loan forgiveness for any remaining balance at the end of 
fifteen years, instead of the current twenty years.397 This would apply 
only to undergraduate borrowers; graduate borrowers would not 
receive forgiveness until the end of thirty years.398 Trump’s proposal 
claims that these changes would save $203 billion over the next ten 
years,399 although this amount has been disputed.400 
While there is an obvious advantage in lowering interest costs to 
students because they would pay off their loans earlier, nevertheless 
this proposal would hit borrowers hardest (forcing them to make larger 
payments) at the beginning of their careers when they are most 
vulnerable financially. 
II. HOW WE GOT HERE: MISTAKES, INACTIONS, AND ANIMOSITY 
One of the major problems facing the American economy today 
is the sheer size of student loan debt, surpassed only by home 
mortgage debt.401 Unlike home mortgage debt, though, student loan 
debt is unsecured. For that reason, as this huge bubble continues to 
enlarge, if it should burst it will be more disastrous than the 2008 
financial crisis.402 
 
 396. Id. 
 397. Miller, supra note 394. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Cooper, supra note 395. 
 400. See id. (stating the CBO estimates that the figure is “closer to $100 
billion”). 
 401. See Weingarten, supra note 6 (noting that student loan debt reached $1.5 
trillion last summer which exceeds auto loan debt, credit card debt, and home equity 
revolving debt); see also A Record One-In-Five Households Now Owe Student Loan 
Debt, supra note 321; Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit 2018: Q2, 
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Aug. 2018). Women owe the vast majority of this amount, 
$890 billion, nearly twice as much as men, and black women owe more than white 
women. Jonathan Berr, Who Shoulders Most of Nation’s $1.4 Trillion in Student 
Debt? Women, CBS NEWS (July 9, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
women-shoulder-most-of-the-nations-1-4-trillion-in-student-debt [https://perma.cc/ 
V2Y9-899H]. 
 402. See Susan Soederberg, The Student Loan Crisis and the Debtfare State, 
DOLLARS & SENSE (May/June 2015), www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/ 
2015/0515soederberg.html [https://perma.cc/46EA-GRTM]. Student loan debt bears 
some similarities to the sub-prime mortgage debt that caused the 2008 financial crisis. 
See id. For instance, student loan debt, like sub-prime mortgage debt, is bundled and 
sold into the secondary market. See id. This bundle is called SLABS, an acronym for 
Student Loan Asset Backed Securities, and it is purchased by hedge funds, large 
pension plans, and other institutional investors. See id. It is the means through which 
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Student loan debt is part of a vicious circle because college 
students today face spiraling costs of tuition and fees. For many 
students, higher education is unobtainable without incurring 
burdensome debt to pay for it. For others, the fear of this crippling 
burden and its consequences dissuades them from pursing higher 
education at all.  
The equity in student loan debt lies in the value of the education 
obtained and the ability of the borrower to find a job that enables him 
or her not only to feasibly pay off the debt but also to become a 
contributing member of society. In some cases, however, the degrees 
these students obtain may be worthless or partially worthless, or their 
schools may close suddenly, leaving them with massive debt and no 
degree.403 Once the debt is incurred, students may be at the mercy of 
predatory lenders who may make it more difficult for these students 
to repay their loans.404 For those who are struggling to repay, there are 
dire consequences of default, in addition to the fact that this debt is 
almost impossible to discharge in bankruptcy.405 
The problems of spiraling tuition, crisis-level student loan debt, 
predatory for-profit institutions, unfair laws relating to student 
borrowers, and predatory lenders and loan servicers can all be laid at 
the collective feet of Congress. Some of these problems have been the 
result of well-intended but mistaken congressional actions, some have 
been the result of congressional inactions, and some have been the 
result of outright enmity or disregard for student borrowers.  
Whatever the origin, these problems can and should be fixed. 
Since the HEA is past due for reauthorization, which is likely to occur 
 
funds are raised for student loans. See id. The risk of this investment depends upon 
borrowers’ ability to repay the loans. See id. There is much concern that “the value of 
the debt [will] outstrip the value of the asset itself.” Eric Reed, Should You Invest in 
Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities?, THE STREET (May 20, 2017), 
https://www.thestreet.com/personal-finance/should-you-invest-in-student-loan-asset-
backed-securities-14142296; see also Ellen Messer-Davidow, Investing in College 
Education: Debtors, Bettors, Lenders, Brokers, MDPI (2017). However, not everyone 
shares this alarm. See, e.g., Akin Oyedele, Goldman Sachs: There’s an Attractive Way 
to Profit From the $1.3 Trillion Student Loan Bubble, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2017, 
7:05 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/student-loan-bubble-investment-is-
private-abs-goldman-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/7FDK-N4G3]. 
 403. See, e.g., supra notes 343–345 and accompanying text. 
 404. See, e.g., supra notes 287–288, 349–351, 383–387 and accompanying 
text. 
 405. See supra note 359 and accompanying text (outlining the consequences 
of default); see also supra notes 154–155, 238–239, 265–266 and accompanying text 
(explaining student loan debt is difficult to discharge in bankruptcy). 
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in the near future, now is the time to carefully consider the federal role 
in higher education and to learn from the mistakes of the past. 
A. Student Loan Policy and The Garden Path 
The “golden years” of federal funding policy for higher 
education during the 1950s and 1960s were due to four factors: first, 
the Presidents themselves were keenly attuned to promoting education 
and access to education; second, the economy was strong during this 
period; third, the political climate throughout this period was 
consistently inclined toward the promotion of education; and fourth, 
there was bipartisanship with a spirit of compromise in the national 
interest. Nevertheless, there were some missed opportunities, such as 
the congressional leaning toward loans, as opposed to scholarships, in 
the National Defense Education Act of 1958.406 No doubt this made 
federal funding for higher education more palatable because loans 
were cheaper for the government than grants and scholarships. But the 
“no free rides for students” attitude that partially led to that decision 
was ironic considering the tremendous efforts of Congress in the 
1960s to increase access to education for low-income students plus the 
fact that the Democrats solidly controlled both houses of Congress at 
the time.407 
The public’s attitude toward education began to change during 
the 1970s, however, with the decline in the economy and the 
increasing distrust of the government over the Vietnam War. The 
demand for greater accountability in education spending and concern 
over growing student loan defaults, the majority of which were 
attributable to borrowers from proprietary institutions, were probably 
factors in the first congressional encroachment on student borrowers’ 
rights in the bankruptcy process in the third reauthorization of the 
 
 406. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 407. See 85th United States Congress, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/85th_United_States_Congress [https://perma.cc/ 
6KXQ-JKP4] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (explaining that in the 85th Congress (1957–
1959), Democrats controlled 65% of the voting shares in the Senate and 53.3% of the 
voting shares in the House). The members of Congress who thought that students 
should not be given a “free ride” may have felt emboldened by the fact that 
Eisenhower had a very strong work ethic, developed after having grown up in a poor 
but very religious family in a very small town in Kansas. See Obituary, Dwight David 
Eisenhower: A Leader in War and Peace, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 1969), 
http://movies2.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/1014.html [https:// 
perma.cc/3CNF-CT6T]. 
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HEA in 1976.408 But instead of addressing the problem of defaults in a 
rational manner by imposing additional restrictions on proprietary 
institutions, which were responsible for the largest number of defaults, 
Congress instead chose to “punish” student borrowers by limiting their 
ability to discharge federally insured student loans in bankruptcy.409 At 
the same time, it provided an unlimited statute of limitations on 
collection of these loans.410 
The “no free rides” mentality persisted and caused Congress to 
decide at several points to forego the route of scholarships and grants 
for students and support to educational institutions, in favor of student 
loans.411 The die was cast by the HEA’s initial shift of support from 
educational institutions to students and from government lenders to 
government-guaranteed private lenders. This was the root of today’s 
student loan debt crisis. At the time the HEA was enacted, however, 
these shifts probably made the legislation more palatable politically 
and thus increased its chance of enactment,412 even though at the time, 
there was concern over the rising costs of higher education.413 
While there are numerous factors that have contributed to the 
high cost of post-secondary education, the biggest factor has been the 
decrease in state support, particularly during periods of economic 
downturns, which has forced colleges to raise tuition.414 But in the 
initial enactment of the HEA, as well as in subsequent 
reauthorizations, Congress relinquished any significant role in 
moderating the spiraling costs of higher education by focusing on aid 
to students, rather than aid to educational institutions.415  
 
 408. See supra notes 110–113 and accompanying text. 
 409. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text. 
 410. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 411. See supra notes 99–101, 179–181 and accompanying text. 
 412. See 89th United States Congress, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/89th_United_States_Congress [https://perma.cc/XLL2-
G4YR] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (noting that Democratic control over Congress 
during the 89th Congress (1965–1967) was at an all-time high of 67% of the voting 
shares in the Senate and 68% of the voting shares in the House). However, it was also 
a period in which there was a spirit of bipartisanship. See id. 
 413. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 414. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Selingo, Who Is to Blame for Rising Tuition Prices at 
Public Colleges?, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2017, 9:55 PM), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/10/20/who-is-to-blame-for-
rising-tuition-prices-at-public-colleges/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e396e06fe219 
[https://perma.cc/AVE8-4H6S]; see also UTAH SYS. HIGHER ED., New Report 
Analyzes Factors for Rising Tuition (May 5, 2015), https://ushe.edu/new-report-
analyzes-factors-for-rising-tuition [https://perma.cc/B8CU-DX7Z]. 
 415. See supra notes 50, 70–74, 99–101, 179–185 and accompanying text. 
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This problem was compounded in 1978 with the enactment of 
the Middle Income Student Assistance Act because this Act greatly 
expanded the federal student loan program by making federal loans 
available to any student, regardless of need.416 So instead of a 
Democratic-controlled Congress and a Democratic President taking 
advantage of the moment to rethink federal education policy, they 
simply reacted to the immediate problem, which was the outcry from 
the middle class for relief from spiraling tuition costs. The immediate 
“price” for this “free ride” was the codification of the limitation from 
bankruptcy discharge for federally guaranteed loans from nonprofit 
institutions, even though there was no evidence to justify such a 
limitation.417 The longer-term cost was an across-the-board tuition 
increase and the largest enrollment increase in proprietary institutions 
up to that point because of the elimination of restrictions on these 
institutions.418 At the same time, however, there was inadequate 
regulation of these institutions. 
Reagan’s emphasis on smaller government resulted in education 
policy becoming less reactive and more focused on neoliberalism, 
with resulting cuts in government spending across the board,419 leading 
to steep increases in college tuition in the 1980s.420 Despite these 
tuition increases, however, in the 1992 HEA reauthorization, a 
Democratic-controlled Congress chose to disregard the suggestion of 
providing more grants, thereby reducing reliance on loans.421 This 
decision resulted in an increase of 50% in student loan volume.422 But 
this Congress did implement a pilot program of direct loans instead of 
using banks and other lenders as middlemen after studies showed that 
direct loans were cheaper for students, easier for schools to administer, 
 
 416. See supra notes 122–124 and accompanying text. 
 417. Sees supra notes 125–131 and accompanying text. 
 418. See supra notes 134–138 and accompanying text. 
 419. See Messer-Davidow, supra note 402, at 7–8. 
 420. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 421. See supra notes 179–185 and accompanying text. 
 422. King, supra note 187. 
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and more economical for the federal government.423 Thus, this change 
was a win for everyone—except private lenders.424  
The Republicans’ 1994 victory in gaining control of both houses 
of Congress was an important turning point in the student loan 
program because the congressional spirit of bipartisanship began to 
seriously wane and, with it, the focus on the promotion of education. 
Instead, the country entered a period of politicization of education, 
which has continued. This has had detrimental effects on both student 
borrowers and taxpayers.425 For instance, immediately after gaining 
control of Congress, the newly elected Republicans bowed to pressure 
from private lenders and gave them an open field to use whatever 
means were available to persuade financial aid officers to enlist in the 
FFEL guaranteed loan program,426 despite the fact that this program 
benefitted no one—not the schools, not the students, and not the 
American taxpayers—except the private lenders.427 
But a consequence of the direct loan program was the 
privatization of Sallie Mae in 1996.428 It was entirely foreseeable that 
the volume of student loans would greatly increase by allowing Sallie 
Mae to become a private company, no longer restricted by its narrow 
government charter but boosted by its reputation as a former GSE with 
the imprimatur of a federal guarantee.429 Thus, Sallie Mae had a 
significant advantage in the private sector. 
Despite the increase in number of outstanding student loans, 
however, in 1998 Congress again expanded the student loan program 
by making unsubsidized loans under the Stafford loan program 
available to all students.430 But in keeping with the enmity toward 
student borrowers that it had displayed in the past, the “price” of this 
 
 423. See supra note 171 and accompanying text; see also Federal Versus 
Private Loans, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/federal-
vs-private [https://perma.cc/QEA7-45BH] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (providing that 
government loans provide lower interest rates and fees than private loans, and they 
offer benefits like forgiveness and forbearance that private loans do not). Educational 
institutions find it much simpler to deal with a single government lender, rather than 
numerous private lenders. See id. 
 424. See supra notes 211–213 and accompanying text. In 1993, the direct loan 
pilot program was expanded in the Student Loan Reform Act. See Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub L. No. 103-66, § 4011, 107 Stat. 312, 341 (1993). 
 425. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 426. See supra notes 215–219 and accompanying text. 
 427. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 428. See supra notes 220 and accompanying text. 
 429. See supra note 220–222 and accompanying text (explaining the number 
of student loans doubled within ten years after Sallie Mae’s privatization). 
 430. See supra notes 235–237 and accompanying text. 
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expansion exacted by Congress was that education loans, both federal 
and private, were made essentially non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.431 
Yet this significant advantage to lenders was not passed on to 
borrowers in the way of lower interest rates or fees. 
In 2002, Congress raised the interest rate on federal student loans 
when it changed the rate from variable to fixed, and the fixed rate, 
which became effective in 2006, was much higher than the variable 
rate.432 It then took Congress six years to alleviate this unfairness, and 
even then it acted only in response to an outcry when the fixed interest 
rate threatened to double.433 
In 2005, when the Republicans gained control of both Congress 
and the White House, there was a significant cut in student financial 
aid.434 While PLUS loans were extended to graduate and professional 
students, the “price” for this largesse was that these students would 
have to pay a higher interest rate,435 and the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 essentially ensured 
that all student loans would be non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.436 
Shortly after the Democrats regained control of Congress in the 
following year, there was a marked change in education policy. The 
wasteful payments to private lenders under the FFEL program were 
cut, and the savings were directed into student-friendly changes to 
financial aid.437 The financial crisis of 2008 had highlighted the 
inadequacies of the FFEL program when the federal government was 
forced to lend large amounts of money to private lenders who 
exercised the federal guarantee on their loans.438 In 2010, with the 
Democrats still in control of both Congress and the White House, the 
FFEL program was terminated, and there were further student-friendly 
provisions enacted, such as a decrease in borrowers’ required monthly 
payments.439 
But in the fall 2010 elections, the Democrats lost control of the 
House and their control of the Senate was weakened. When the 
Republicans took over the House, they rolled back much of the 
 
 431. See supra notes 238–239 and accompanying text. 
 432. See supra notes 250–255 and accompanying text. 
 433. See supra notes 323–324 and accompanying text. 
 434. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. The amount of the cut was 
$12.6 billion. Id. 
 435. See supra notes 262–264 and accompanying text. 
 436. See supra notes 264–267 and accompanying text. 
 437. See supra notes 269–276 and accompanying text. 
 438. See supra notes 277–283 and accompanying text. 
 439. See supra notes 306–309 and accompanying text. 
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previous student-friendly legislation, thus increasing the cost of 
student loans.440 In 2013, the Republicans gained control of the Senate, 
giving them control of both houses of Congress. In 2017, with the 
Republicans still in control of Congress, there was a 12% increase in 
student loan defaults over 2016.441 
The consequences of defaulting on student loans are dire. The 
Debt Collection Improvement Act, enacted in 1996 and implemented 
in 2001, permits lenders to reach Social Security, retirement, and 
disability benefits to offset defaults.442 In addition, many states impose 
additional draconian sanctions on borrowers who default of their 
student loans.443 For instance, in twenty states a default on a student 
loan can result in the denial, loss, or suspension of a state-issued 
professional license, and in two states such a default can result in the 
loss of a driver’s license.444 The stunning counter-productiveness of 
these sanctions has led to an across-the-aisle effort, spearheaded by 
Senators Marco Rubio and Elizabeth Warren, to introduce legislation 
to prevent their further enforcement.445 
 
 440. See supra notes 313–319 and accompanying text (explaining graduate 
and professional students were no longer eligible for subsidized Stafford loans and 
the sequester led to fee increases in both Stafford and PLUS loans). 
 441. See supra note 349 and accompanying text. 
 442. See supra notes 223–224, 249 and accompanying text. 
 443. Christy Rakoczy, Facing Student Loan Default? You Could Lose Your 
License in These States, STUDENT LOAN HERO, https://studentloanhero.com/featured/ 
unpaid-student-loans-facing-default-lose-license-states [https://perma.cc/C3Z2-
66GD] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (noting that some states impose sanctions for 
defaulting on student loans, including the loss of ability to choose a payment plan, 
damage to credit, wage garnishment, and loss of a professional license). 
 444. See Natalie Kitroeff, Rubio and Warren Seek to Protect Licenses of 
Student-Loan Debtors, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
06/14/business/rubio-warren-student-loans.html [https://perma.cc/M68B-3P6Y] 
(noting that “a November report by The New York Times revealed that 20 states had 
laws allowing government agencies to seize licenses from residents who had defaulted 
on their education debts”); Rakoczy, supra note 443 (noting that there are four states 
in which a default on a student loan will result in suspension of a professional license); 
Jessica Siver-Greenberg, Stacy Cowley & Natalie Kitroeff, When Unpaid Student 
Loan Bills Mean You Can No Longer Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/business/student-loans-licenses.html [https:// 
perma.cc/FK8A-6MLV] (stating that “critics . . . say the laws shove some borrowers 
off a financial cliff”). 
 445. See Kitroeff, supra note 444; see also Silver-Greenberg, Cowley & 
Kitroeff, supra note 444. 
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B. Predatory Lending Institutions 
Predatory lending institutions and loan servicers have been 
blamed for fomenting student loan defaults.446 While a direct loan 
program may not have entirely avoided this result, nevertheless it 
would have allowed the government greater oversight over these 
lenders, and it would have afforded more advantages to students, such 
as lower interest rates. As it is, these predatory lending institutions are 
“monsters” of the government’s making because of the choices the 
government has made.  
The HEA, from its inception, provided for loans by private 
lenders with an anticipated guarantee by the states,447 again, probably 
to make the legislation more palatable politically. However, when the 
states failed to assume their role,448 the federal government was forced 
to increase its role in funding higher education in order to encourage 
private lenders to participate.449 This role has continued to expand.  
In 1980, the fourth reauthorization of the HEA under the Carter 
Administration significantly extended the student loan program to 
include PLUS loans for parents of college students.450 It also provided 
a large increase in the federal subsidies for private lenders as an 
additional incentive to participate in the program.451 But with the 
election of Ronald Reagan later in 1980, the political differences in 
funding policy for higher education became more pronounced. Shortly 
after the Carter Administration’s 1980 expansion of the student loan 
 
 446. See supra notes 349–351 and accompanying text; see also Bill Fay, 
Predatory Lending: Laws and Unfair Credit Practices, DEBT.ORG, 
https://www.debt.org/credit/predatory-lending [https://perma.cc/Y75G-Q97Y] (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2019) (defining predatory lending practices as including “a failure to 
disclose information or disclosing false information, risk-based pricing and inflated 
charges and fees”). 
 447. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 448. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 449. See supra notes 82–84 and 90 and accompanying text. Initially, the 
government increased its funding role by agreeing to guarantee 80% of the loans. See 
supra note 82 and accompanying text. In the second reauthorization of the HEA in 
1972, Sallie Mae was created as a government-sponsored enterprise to provide 
liquidity for the loans. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. In the third 
reauthorization of the HEA in 1976, the federal government finally stepped in and 
agreed to guarantee 100% of student loans. See supra note 111 and accompanying 
text. 
 450. See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text. 
 451. See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text. 
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program, the Reagan Administration pulled the rug out from under 
student borrowers by making government loans more expensive.452 
The sixth reauthorization of the HEA in 1992, under the George 
H.W. Bush Administration, was friendlier to student borrowers 
because both houses of Congress at that time were under the control 
of the Democrats. This reauthorization created a direct loan pilot 
program that would reduce the role of private lenders.453 The following 
year, with the Democrats still in control of Congress, this program was 
expanded under the Clinton Administration.454  
In 1994, however, the Republicans won control of both houses 
of Congress, and they immediately bowed to pressure from the private 
lending industry to jettison the direct loan program, despite studies 
showing that direct loans are more cost effective for the government.455 
This resulted in the guaranteed loan program once again gaining 
traction.456 Later, private loans also may have received a boost from 
the debacle over the fixed versus variable student loan interest rates,457 
which may have persuaded some borrowers to forego government 
loans in favor of private loans. Nevertheless, in the midterm elections 
in 1994, the Republicans won a major victory, regaining control of 
both chambers of Congress and completing the political polarization 
of education funding policy.458  
In 1996, in the wake of its declining stock value, Congress 
approved Sallie Mae’s request for privatization, which was completed 
in 2004.459 It then became the largest student loan lender in the 
country,460 although its track record in servicing student loans has been 
abysmal. 
Navient Solutions, the spin-off student loan servicer of Sallie 
Mae, has been the subject of more complaints than any other student 
loan lender.461 It is currently facing lawsuits by the attorneys general 
 
 452. See supra notes 149–151 and accompanying text. 
 453. See supra notes 179–181 and accompanying text. 
 454. See supra notes 211–212 and accompanying text. 
 455. See supra notes 171, 215–219 and accompanying text. 
 456. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 457. See supra notes 250–257 and accompanying text. 
 458. See supra notes 215–219 and accompanying text. 
 459. See supra notes 220–221 and accompanying text. 
 460. See Largest Education Lenders, FIN. AID, www.finaid.org/loans/ 
biglenders.phtml [https://perma.cc/KE28-Y46E] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
 461. See Zack Friedman, Navient Ranks Highest for Student Loan Complaints, 
FORBES (Jan. 14, 2019, 8:32 am), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
zackfriedman/2019/01/14/navient-complaints-student-loans/#6f4b0fe35152; Dieter 
Holger, Most Complaints About Student Loan Debt are About These Five Issues, 
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of three states plus the CFPB for violations of the consumer protection 
laws.462 In 2015, the Department of Justice announced that nearly 
78,000 military service members and disabled borrowers would begin 
receiving nearly $60 million in compensation for being charged excess 
interest on their student loans and having their credit ruined by 
Navient.463 
Navient’s abysmal record did not dissuade Secretary DeVos in 
2017 from contemplating the award of the then $1.3 trillion in student 
loan contracts to a single vendor, of which Navient was one of four 
contenders.464 She abandoned that plan only when forced after 
receiving strong backlash from consumer advocates and members of 
Congress.465  
The stock of Navient, however, soared in the wake of DeVos’s 
actions.466 Despite the complaints and lawsuits against it, the Trump 
Administration has shown no concern for Navient’s bad behavior or 
for the plight of student borrowers, many of whom are at the mercy of 
predatory lenders like Navient. In fact, Secretary DeVos has 
hamstrung the CFPB by prohibiting the DOE from sharing 
information on its then $1.3 trillion in student loans with the Bureau.467 
 
QUARTZ (Feb. 28, 2018), https://qz.com/1217456/most-complaints-about-student-
debt-are-about-these-five-issues [https://perma.cc/2BZT-F32A].  
 462. See Nykiel, supra note 350. Among the myriad charges against Navient 
is that it cheated borrowers by steering them away from repayment options that could 
lower their monthly payments. See id. In some cases, borrowers have charged that 
because of misrepresentations by Navient and other lenders, loans on which they had 
been paying for years and which they thought were eligible for the PSLF Program are 
actually not eligible and the years of payments that they had made on these loans will 
not count toward forgiveness. See Weingarten, supra note 6. Thus, they will have to 
start over repaying the loans for ten additional years in order to obtain forgiveness. 
See id. As of 2017, only 96 borrowers out of 28,000 who sought relief under the PSLF 
program had actually had their loans discharged. Id.  
 463. See Nearly 78,000 Service Members to Begin Receiving $60 Million 
Under Department of Justice Settlement with Navient for Overcharging on Student 
Loans, U.S. DEP’T. JUSTICE (May 28, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nearly-
78000-service-members-begin-receiving-60-million-under-department-justice-
settlement [https://perma.cc/X7ZX-VG63]; see also Morgenson, supra note 376. 
 464. See supra notes 374–376 and accompanying text. 
 465. See supra note 377 and accompanying text. 
 466. See Shahien Nasiripour, DeVos Undoes Obama Student Loan 
Protections, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.timesunion.com/business/ 
article/DeVos-Undoes-Obama-Student-Loan-Protections-11066031.php [https:// 
perma.cc/D4PA-ZJAG]. 
 467. Shahien Nasiripour, DeVos Tells CFPB to Back Off On Student Loans, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2017, 2:05 PM), https://www.timesunion.com/business/ 
article/DeVos-tells-CFPB-to-back-off-on-student-loans-12183394.php [https:// 
perma.cc/87NA-G3PM]; see supra notes 383–384 and accompanying text.  
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Navient, as one of the largest lenders, stands to benefit from this 
action. 
There has been a sea change in higher education policy from the 
Obama Administration to the Trump Administration. The policy of the 
Obama Administration was to focus on protections for student loan 
borrowers. So far, the Trump Administration seems intent on undoing 
these protections and instead favoring loan servicers by eliminating 
further regulation or restrictions on those servicers. This is a policy 
that makes no sense because not only are student loans likely to be 
more expensive,468 creating serious problems in access to higher 
education, but the bad behavior of the most notorious student loan 
lenders, like Navient, will be encouraged. The plight of hapless 
student borrowers then will be worsened, the outstanding amount of 
student loan debt will be increased, and taxpayers will be more at risk 
of having to pay the ultimate bill. 
C. Proprietary Educational Institutions 
In 1952, when the original GI Bill was nearing its end, Congress 
decided, with bipartisan support, to extend its benefits to veterans of 
the Korean War.469 At that time, there were numerous reports of abuses 
by proprietary schools that included targeting veterans for their 
benefits while offering them worthless degrees.470 To curb this abuse, 
Congress made the decision to award these benefits directly to 
students rather than to educational institutions.471 This brought the 
 
 468. For example, among the Obama-era borrower protections that DeVos has 
eliminated is the sixty-day grace period for borrowers in default who formerly could 
avoid a fee of 16% of their loan balance. See Donna Rosato, Complaints About Student 
Loan Servicers Mount as Protections Erode, CONSUMER REPS. (Apr. 28, 2017), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/student-loans/student-loan-servicers-complaints-
mount-as-protections-erode [https://perma.cc/KWZ7-MD75]. 
 469. See generally Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, Pub. L. 
No. 82-550, 66 Stat. 663 (extending benefits to veterans of the Korean war). 
 470. See generally David Whitman, Truman, Eisenhower, and the First GI 
Bill Scandal, CENTURY FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://tcf.org/content/report/truman-
eisenhower-first-gi-bill-scandal (discussing reports by the VA, Congress, and the 
General Accounting Office). 
 471. See id. The 1952 GI Bill also included an “85-15” rule to address abuses 
by proprietary institutions. See id. Under this rule, a school could receive no federal 
funds if more than 85% of its students were veterans using federal funds for their 
education. See Pub. L. No. 82-550, § 226, 66 Stat. at 667. The Bill also provided that 
only an accredited school could receive federal funds. See § 242. The U.S. Department 
of Education was tasked with publishing a list of reliable accrediting agencies. See §§ 
241–45.  
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expansion of proprietary schools to an immediate halt,472 at least for 
the time being.  
Although proprietary schools were not included under either the 
original 1965 HEA legislation or the federal guaranteed student loan 
program, they were covered under a smaller program for vocational 
schools for better oversight.473 However, in the first reauthorization of 
the HEA in 1968, the decision was made to merge the two programs474 
even though Congress was fully aware of the problems with these 
schools.475 This decision led to the opening of the floodgates that have 
allowed proprietary schools to flourish.476 
In 1972, during the second reauthorization of the HEA, Congress 
chose to continue to award federal aid to students rather than to 
educational institutions.477 This was a momentous decision because it 
affected not only veterans but all lower-income and lower-middle-
income students, and it applied to students at all schools—public, 
private, nonprofit, for-profit, and vocational—even though concern 
was expressed at the time about extending federal aid to proprietary 
institutions.478 This concern, however, was not heeded, and the result 
was another proliferation of proprietary schools.479  
The concern over the predatory practices of proprietary 
institutions and the growing number of student loan defaults, most of 
which were attributable to these institutions, worsened during the 
early 1970s.480 There were restrictions placed on these schools at that 
time to address the same problems we continue to see today. In 1976, 
an 85-15 restriction was placed on proprietary institutions in an 
attempt to curb the abuse of targeting veterans and other students for 
their federal aid dollars.481 This restriction resulted in a decline in 
student loan default rates.482 Despite that decline and despite 
complaints of fraud, misrepresentation, and deception by these 
institutions, the for-profit lobby prevailed, and the restriction was 
 
 472. See Whitman, supra note 470. 
 473. See Protopsaltis & Masiuk, supra note 76. 
 474. See id. 
 475. See id. 
 476. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.303.10. 
 477. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 478. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 479. See NCES, supra note 70, at 403 tbl.303.10 (showing an enrollment 
increase of over 62% from 1972 to 1973 at proprietary schools). 
 480. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 481. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 482. See Whitman, supra note 105, at 12. 
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weakened during the Carter Administration.483 From 1979 to 1980, 
enrollment in these institutions experienced one of the greatest 
increases in their history.484 Not surprisingly, there also was an 
increase in the student loan default rate.485 But instead of addressing 
the real problem, Congress chose to “punish” students by including 
private student loans within the exception to nondischargeability in 
bankruptcy.486 
Meanwhile, concern continued to be expressed into the 1980s 
about the high default rate of these institutions,487 but further 
restrictions were opposed by the Democrats, who saw these 
institutions as opportunities for low-income, underprivileged 
students.488 Thus, there were no noteworthy actions taken in the 1980s 
to curb the default rate of these institutions.489  
Consequently, in 1990, default rates at proprietary institutions 
reached an all-time high, and Congress was then forced to act by 
placing restrictions on these institutions.490 These restrictions reduced 
the student loan default rate at these schools.491 
During the Clinton Administration, a Republican-controlled 
Congress loosened the eligibility restrictions on proprietary 
institutions, yet afterward there was a decline in default rates.492 This 
 
 483. See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text. 
 484. See supra note 138. 
 485. See Student Loan Default Rate Soars, supra note 154. 
 486. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. Government loans had been 
nondischargeable since 1976. See supra notes 125–127 and accompanying text. 
 487. See Student Loan Default Rate Soars, supra note 154. 
 488. See supra notes 162 166 and accompanying text. 
 489. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 490. See Education Policy: Debt, Default and Collections, NEW AMERICA, 
https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/topics/higher-education-funding-and-
financial-aid/federal-student-aid/federal-student-loans/debt-default-and-collections  
(last visited Dec. 6, 2019). The result was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 
which provided that any school with a cohort default rate equal to or greater than 35% 
in the following two years would be ineligible for federal loans. See supra notes 175–
176 and accompanying text. Afterward, the rate would drop to 30%. See supra note 
177 and accompanying text. 
 491. The five-year default rate at for-profit institutions fell from 62% in 1988–
1989 to 29% in 1998–1999. See Trends in Higher Education, Five Year Federal 
Student Loan Default Rates by Institution Type Over Time, COLL. BD., 
https://trends.collegeboard.org/student-aid/figures-tables/five-year-federal-student-
loan-default-rates-institution-type-over-time [https://perma.cc/SB5J-AX6K] (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
 492. See supra notes 243–244 and accompanying text. The eligibility 
restrictions on proprietary institutions were loosened when the 85/15 rule that had 
been implemented in 1992 was changed to a 90/10 rule so that these institutions could 
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decline was attributable to the sixth reauthorization of the HEA that 
slashed student loan interest rates and restricted any college with a 
default rate of 25% or greater for three consecutive years (40% or 
more in a single year) from participating in any federal student loan 
program.493  
During the George W. Bush Administration, there was a 
significant enrollment increase in proprietary schools, despite the 
publicity surrounding the sudden closure of some of these 
institutions.494 This increase was attributable primarily to the financial 
crisis of 2008 plus an increase in eligibility and size of Pell grants.495 
During the Obama Administration, a government study 
concluded that students at proprietary institutions were more likely to 
default on their loans.496 Another study by the same government body 
concluded that these schools were continuing to engage in fraud and 
misrepresentation.497 This prompted the Administration to issue the 
“gainful employment” regulation and later the “defense to borrower 
repayment” regulation to provide protections to students.498 In 2016, 
however, the Republicans gained control of both Congress and the 
White House, and newly appointed Secretary of Education, Betsy 
DeVos, decided to delay the implementation of the Obama 
regulations, making it more difficult for students to obtain relief from 
predatory institutions.499 Moreover, her action in severing ties between 
the DOE and the CFPB500 is a clear message that the Trump 
 
derive no more than 90%, instead of 85%, of their revenues from Title IV funds. See 
supra note 241 and accompanying text. Another contributing factor to the decline in 
default rates was the increase in the period of nonpayment or underpayment from 180 
days to 270 days before a delinquent borrower was considered in default. See supra 
note 243 and accompanying text. The three most common factors leading to default 
are lack of postsecondary degree, lack of an adequately paying job, and an increase in 
interest rates. See Common Reasons for Student Loan Default and How You Can 
Avoid It, COLL. RAPTOR https://www.collegeraptor.com/paying-for-
college/articles/student-loans/common-reasons-student-loan-default-can-avoid 
[https://perma.cc/A9Y8-F2S8] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).  
 493. See supra notes 243–244. 
 494. See NCES, supra note 70, at tbl.302.30. 
 495. See supra notes 301 304 and accompanying text. 
 496. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-600, supra note 325 and 
accompanying text. 
 497. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-948T, supra note 326 
and accompanying text. 
 498. See supra notes 329, 346 and accompanying text. 
 499. See supra notes 357 359 and accompanying text.  
 500. See Kreighbaum, supra note 383.  
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Administration favors predatory proprietary institutions, as opposed 
to safeguarding students.501  
The problems of abuse, waste, incompetence, fraud, and 
misrepresentation at proprietary schools have not only continued since 
the 1970s; they have significantly worsened.502 The restrictions that 
Congress has imposed to curb some of these problems have waxed and 
waned over the years. In the years in which the restrictions have been 
more lax, there has been an uptick in student loan defaults;503 and 
conversely, when the restrictions have been tighter, there has been a 
corresponding decline in student loan defaults.504 
So with such a tangible link between the relaxation of 
restrictions on these institutions and student loan defaults, why does 
the government not impose strict requirements on these institutions to 
prevent these defaults, protect students, and prevent waste of taxpayer 
money? There are several reasons for this phenomenon. First, these 
organizations have very effective lobbyists, and they contribute 
generously to congressional campaigns of both political parties.505 
Second, these schools exist in every congressional district, making it 
difficult for Representatives and Senators to criticize their 
constituents. Third, these schools have bipartisan appeal: to 
Republicans they are businesses that have existed for generations; for 
Democrats they represent access to education for lower-income 
students.506 Thus, a political solution to this problem does not appear 
to be on the horizon. However, enrollment in these institutions has 
declined because of a stronger economy and declining public 
 
 501. See For-Profit Colleges Struggle Despite Assist from DeVos, NBC NEWS 
(Apr. 7, 2018, 9:43 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/education/profit-colleges-
struggle-despite-assist-betsy-devos-n863641 [https://perma.cc/352V-DKBX] 
(indicating the Trump Administration favors for-profit institutions through the fact 
that DeVos has staffed the DOE with for-profit industry insiders and has halted further 
investigation into proprietary schools). 
 502. See supra notes 296–299, 325–333, 343–345 and accompanying text. 
 503. See supra notes 162–165, 172 and accompanying text; see also U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-600, supra note 325 (CAO report showing 
that students at proprietary institutions were more likely to default on their loans). 
 504. See supra notes 114 115, 243 244 and accompanying text. 
 505. See Polis, supra note 12. 
 506. See Whitman, supra note 172, at 8. 
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confidence.507 For this reason, some for-profit institutions are seeking 
non-profit status.508 
III. PENDING LEGISLATION TO REAUTHORIZE THE HEA: WILL IT 
HELP OR HURT? 
In the 115th session of Congress, congressional leaders indicated 
an interest in reauthorizing the HEA.509 To begin the process, the 
parties each drafted bills: the Republican’s “Promoting Real 
Opportunity, Success, and Prosperity through Education Reform” 
(PROSPER) Act and the Democrat’s Aim Higher Act.510 These bills, 
however, are polar opposites. The question is whether and how each 
bill addresses the salient problems facing students (and taxpayers) in 
higher education: the spiraling costs of tuition, crippling student loan 
debt, defaults, predatory lenders, and unscrupulous proprietary 
institutions.  
A. The PROSPER Act 
The PROSPER Act was reported out of the House Committee 
on Education and the Workforce during the 115th Congress on a 
 
 507.  See Doug Lederman, For-Profit Free Fall Continues, U.S. Data Show, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED. (June 6, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/ 
quicktakes/2018/06/06/profit-free-fall-continues-us-data-show. 
 508. See Michelle Hackman, After Obama-Era Crackdown, For-Profit 
Colleges Seek Nonprofit Status, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-obama-era-crackdown-for-profit-colleges-seek-
nonprofit-status-1527681600. In addition, some unscrupulous schools are claiming 
non-profit status “without adopting non-profit financial controls”; such “covert” 
status is undertaken to dupe students and keep an income stream flowing to the 
owners. See Robert Shireman, These Colleges Say They Are Nonprofit—But Are 
They?, CENTURY FOUND. (Sept. 5, 2019), https://tcf.org/ 
content/commentary/colleges-say-theyre-nonprofit. 
 509. See Teri Lyn Hinds, PROSPER Act: The House Higher Education Act 
Reauthorization Bill, NASPA (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.naspa.org/blog/prosper-
act-the-house-higher-education-act-reauthorization-bill [https://perma.cc/MM7H-
D7ZG]. The HEA has been reauthorized eight times. See supra note 68 and 
accompanying text. So, if enacted, it will be the ninth reauthorization. See 
Reauthroization of the Higher Education Act of 1965, FinAid, https://www.finaid.org/ 
educators/reauthorization.phtml (last visited Dec. 6, 2019). The provisions of the last 
reauthorization expired in 2013 but have been extended each year. See Hinds, supra. 
The next reauthorization originally was scheduled for 2014, but it is currently more 
than five years behind schedule. See id. 
 510. See id.  
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partisan vote and was awaiting consideration by the House.511 Since 
the Democrats took control of the House in the 2018 elections, there 
is virtually no chance this bill will pass in its current form.512 
Nevertheless, the bill is important because it is indicative of the Trump 
Administration’s policy on higher education. It is also an attempt to 
secure Trump’s spurned budgetary requests through legislation.513 
The PROSPER Act does nothing to address the most important 
problem facing students in higher education, which is the spiraling 
cost of tuition and fees,514 most of which is attributable to the decline 
in state support for higher education.515 This problem affects access 
and completion rates, particularly of minorities and lower-income 
individuals.516  
Despite its title, this bill significantly cuts funding to higher 
education, making student loans more expensive, which would 
particularly affect the neediest students.517 In the interest of 
“simplifying” and “streamlining” financial aid, the bill eliminates the 
SEOG grant, the academic competitiveness grants, and the federal 
 
 511. H.R. 4508, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018). There has been concern 
expressed about the process through which this bill was pushed through the 
committee. See Hinds, supra note 509. Teri Lyn Hinds, writing for NASPA–Student 
Affairs Administrators in Higher Education, explained,  
For legislation of such magnitude, the unusually fast pace with which it was 
pushed through the Ed and Workforce Committee is both concerning and 
problematic . . . . [T]he bill was prepared behind closed doors with little to 
no opportunity for association input, and then rushed almost immediately to 
mark-up, preventing legislators from seeking or providing input on key 
provisions prior to having to vote on the legislation. 
Id. 
 512. See Andrew Kreighbaum, Seeking Votes on PROSPER, GOP Appears to 
Come Up Short, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (June 14, 2018), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/06/14/no-movement-prosper-act-after-
gop-vote-count [https://perma.cc/PGX2-HZZZ]. The bill also had little support from 
Republicans after strong criticism from various groups, including veteran’s 
representatives. See id. 
 513. See supra notes 352–353 and accompanying text. 
 514. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, What You Need to Know About 
the House Higher Education Bill, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 3 (Dec. 7, 2017, 1:33 PM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2017/12/ 
07/443915/need-know-house-higher-education-act-bill [https://perma.cc/T8TZ-
V7DD]. The costs of undergraduate education, according to one source, have risen 
20% since the last HEA reauthorization in 2008. Id. 
 515. See supra notes 103, 119, 311 and accompanying text. 
 516. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514. 
 517. See id. 
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PSLF program, among others.518 It provides one loan and one grant—
the Pell grant.519 While it eliminates loan origination fees, it 
consolidates subsidized Stafford and PLUS loans into a single 
unsubsidized federal ONE loan.520 Thus, under this bill, student loans 
will begin to accrue interest immediately, making them more costly, 
particularly for the neediest students who otherwise would have 
qualified for federally subsidized loans.521 Further, there is a proposed 
cap on the amount that can be borrowed under the ONE loan.522 
Despite its name, the loan amount varies according to the borrower’s 
status as dependent student, independent student, graduate student, or 
parent.523 This will force more borrowers to turn to private loans, 
which will mean not only that the loans will cost more,524 but these 
borrowers will be at the mercy of predatory private lenders.525  
 
 518. See H.R. 4508, 115th Cong. § 406(b) (2d Sess. 2018) (repealing SEOG); 
§§ 423–425 (outlining loan forgiveness for teachers, for those who serve in areas of 
national need, and for civil legal assistance attorneys). It also eliminates the academic 
competitiveness grants, the Leveraging Educational Assistance Partnership program, 
and the Robert C. Byrd Honors Scholarship program, and it allows the TEACH grants 
to expire. See §§ 406–407. The SEOG grant currently provides $732 million in aid to 
1.6 million students each year. CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514. 
 519. See H.R. 4508, at 291 (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1087). In an effort to 
encourage earlier completion, the bill provides an additional $300 bonus for Pell Grant 
recipients who take extra courses each term. See id. at 163–64. However, the bill 
eliminates the current annual increases in the grant tied to inflation. This means that 
the value of the grant will erode even faster over time. In an earlier article, I predicted 
this problem and suggested a solution to it. See Camilla E. Watson, The Future of 
Lower Income Students in Higher Education: Rethinking the Pell Program and 
Federal Tax Incentives, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1107, 1152 (2018). 
 520. See H.R. 4508, at 321 (noting that interest begins to accrue on day loan 
is disbursed). An exception is provided in which no interest will accrue for active duty 
service members. Id. at 319. 
 521. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514. This proposed 
provision is estimated to affect six million borrowers and to cost students $27 billion 
over the next decade. Id. By one estimate, a student who borrows $19,000 over four 
years and makes timely payments will realize a 44% increase in the cost of the loan. 
See Hinds, supra note 509. 
 522. See H.R. 4508, at 303–07.  
 523. See id. For undergraduates, the amount increases in each year of the first 
three years of instruction. Id. at 303–05. 
 524. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514 (stating that the 
interest rate generally is higher on private loans than on government loans). In 
addition, there is no subsidized interest, no six-month grace period before repayment, 
no forbearance or deferral, generally no income-based repayments, and no loan 
forgiveness with private loans. See Federal Versus Private Loans, supra note 423. In 
contrast, federal loans, unlike many private loans, do not require repayment until the 
student graduates, drops out, or enrolls on a less than half-time basis. See id. 
 525. See supra Section II.B. 
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This bill also would have a particularly detrimental effect on 
graduate students. It would place a lifetime cap on the amount they 
would be able to borrow under the ONE loan program,526 it would 
forbid them from participating in the federal work-study program,527 
and the immediate accrual of interest would make their combined 
undergraduate and graduate loans much more expensive.528 
The bill offers borrowers two repayment plans: a standard 
repayment plan with equal payments stretched over ten years and an 
income-based plan based on 15% of the borrower’s discretionary 
income over an indefinite period, with no real forgiveness of 
principal.529 For those borrowers who may be struggling financially, 
there is forgiveness only after they have paid an amount equal to what 
they would have paid under the standard plan.530 Thus, some borrowers 
may never reach forgiveness. In addition, current income-based plans 
generally provide for payments of 10% of the borrower’s discretionary 
income.531 While a higher percentage payment will result in lower 
interest charges because the loan ideally would be paid off faster, 
nevertheless these higher payments come at a time when the borrower 
has just graduated and is starting out in the world.532 Thus, borrowers 
would make higher payments when they are most vulnerable 
financially. 
While the elimination of loan origination fees is a positive aspect 
of the bill, the amount the government will save under the bill through 
 
 526. See H.R. 4508, at 306.  
 527. See id. at 250. 
 528. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514. 
 529. H.R. 4508, at 325–26. It allows for limited payment deferral in the event 
of economic hardship, unemployment, or illness. See id. at 373, 375, 377. 
 530. See id. at 331–32. 
 531. Income-Driven Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/ 
repay-loans/understand/plans/income-driven [https://perma.cc/V28F-BBBL] (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2019). There currently are four income-based repayment plans: 
REPAYE, PAYE, IBR and ICR. See id. These are based on percentages of 
discretionary income, which differ with each plan and in cases of low income and 
larger family size may require no payment at all. See id. REPAYE and PAYE plans 
require a payment of 10% of discretionary income but not above the ten-year standard 
repayment amount; IBR plans also require a 10% payment limited by the standard 
repayment amount if the recipient is a new borrower on or after July 1, 2014. See id. 
A new borrower is someone who has no outstanding balance under the William D. 
Ford Direct Loan Program on or after July 1, 2014. See id. Under the ICR plan, the 
repayment amount is the lesser of 20% of discretionary income or the amount that 
would be paid under a fixed repayment plan over twelve years. See id. 
 532. See Federal Versus Private Loans, supra note 423. 
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cuts to student benefits would be greater than the costs.533 Critics have 
expressed concern that the cost of cuts in areas that are profitable for 
the government, such as graduate and parent loans, may be driving 
proposed cuts to subsidized loans and restrictions in borrowing under 
this bill.534 
Among conservatives, there has been resistance to any 
expansion of the government student loan program because of its 
cost.535 But the cost of the program is a matter of debate because it 
depends on the accounting method used.536 In 1990, Congress enacted 
the Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA),537 which changed the 
accounting method of the federal student loan program to more 
accurately reflect its cost.538 The current debate centers on whether the 
FCRA or the fair value accounting method is the most accurate cost 
indicator of the program.539 The fair value method, unlike the FCRA, 
takes into account the risk that the projected budget estimates under 
the FCRA will be wrong.540 This is known as a market value discount 
rate.541 Examples of such risks include a downturn in the economy, an 
increase in defaults, or an increase in administrative costs of the 
program. The difference in projected cost between the two methods 
can be significant. For instance, in 2017 the FRCA predicted a profit 
 
 533. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514. 
 534. See id. 
 535. See, e.g., Jason Delisle, The Spiraling Costs of a Student Loan Relief 
Program, POLITICO (July 21, 2017, 5:33 AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/ 
story/2017/07/21/public-service-loan-forgiveness-cost-double-000478 [https:// 
perma.cc/RB74-JA8K]; see also Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, It’s Going to Cost 
Taxpayers $108 Billion to Help Student Loan Borrowers, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2016, 
4:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/11/30/its-
going-to-cost-taxpayers-108-billion-to-help-student-loan-borrowers/ 
?utm_term=.f5e99 [https://perma.cc/59TU-NWLS].  
 536. See Preston Cooper, Why Government Doesn’t Profit from Student 
Loans, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2017, 11:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
prestoncooper2/2017/08/04/why-government-doesnt-profit-from-student-
loans/#b68308ceb630 [https://perma.cc/VS4U-PRBZ]. 
 537. Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 
(1990). 
 538. See Jason D. Delisle, Costs and Risks in the Federal Student Loan 
Program: How Accountability Policies Can Protect Taxpayers, AM. ENTER. INST. 7 
(Jan. 30, 2018). 
 539. See, e.g., id.; see also Matthew Yglesias, Fair Value Accounting 
Overestimates Lending Costs, SLATE (Apr. 10, 2012, 8:26 PM), 
https://slate.com/business/2012/04/fair-value-accounting-overestimates-lending-
costs.html [https://perma.cc/SWF2-7H2Z]. 
 540. See Yglesias, supra note 539. 
 541. See id. 
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of $28 billion in the federal student loan program over the next ten 
years, while fair value accounting predicted that taxpayers would 
suffer a loss of $183 billion over that same time period.542 Both of these 
methods have been criticized as inaccurate.543 
The current student loan program can be reformed to avoid the 
issue of whether it results in too much profit or loss. Matthew M. 
Chingos of the Brookings Institute proposed in 2015 that the risk be 
shifted from the government to borrowers through a “guarantee fund” 
in which borrowers would pay a fee that would be escrowed in a trust 
fund to cover the losses the government would suffer through loan 
defaults.544 Under this proposal, students who successfully repay their 
loans would receive a refund, with interest, at the end of their 
repayment period of any money remaining in the fund for their cohort 
of borrowers.545  
The beauty of a guarantee system is that it functions as a self-
insured plan in which borrowers would self-insure against the risk that 
others would default.546 Thus, the government would not profit off 
student loans and would only suffer a loss if the defaults were so 
unexpectedly high as to exhaust the guarantee fund.547 The guarantee 
fee could be covered through a small loan origination fee, with the 
remainder prorated over the life of the loan and added to the principal 
amount.548 Since the government currently charges interest at a rate 
equal to around two-percentage points above the ten-year Treasury 
rate, it would have no need to charge a higher interest rate to cover its 
 
 542. See Cooper, supra note 536. 
 543. See Donald B. Marron, The $300 Billion Question: How Should We 
Budget for Federal Lending Programs?, URBAN INST. (Sept. 2014) (discussing the 
methods and proposing an “expected returns” method to combine “the best of FRCA 
and fair value”). 
 544. See Matthew M. Chingos, End Government Profits on Student Loans: 
Shift Risk and Lower Interest Rates, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 30, 2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/end-government-profits-on-student-loans-shift-
risk-and-lower-interest-rates [https://perma.cc/2C4Q-653D]. Chingos based his 
proposal on a similar trial plan undertaken in the 1920s by the Harmon Foundation, a 
philanthropic entity. See id. 
 545. See id. 
 546. See id. 
 547. See id. 
 548. See id. (noting that federal student loan borrowers currently pay a loan 
origination fee). The PROSPER Act proposes to eliminate this loan origination fee. 
See supra note 520 and accompanying text. Chingos suggests retaining that fee, set at 
a level to cover administrative costs, and further suggests that both the loan origination 
fee and the guarantee fee “could be rolled into the balance of the loan.” See Chingos, 
supra note 544, at n.5. 
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anticipated losses.549 Thus, borrowers’ interest rate on the loans would 
be lower (i.e., equal to the government’s borrowing rate).550 Instead of 
a refund with interest, as Chingos proposes, during the last year of the 
loan borrowers could reduce their payments to reflect the payment 
record of their cohort.551 As Chingos acknowledges, the guarantee fee 
and any potential refund could entail increased administrative costs.552 
However, those could be factored into the amount of the loan 
origination fee,553 as could the costs of forebearance and the PSLF 
program. 
A 100% government loan program still would require private 
companies to service the loans. Thus, there would have to be adequate 
oversight over these companies to ensure that borrowers, both current 
and future, are treated fairly by these companies. Under the Trump 
Administration, however, there has been no real oversight over student 
loan lenders and servicers,554 and there is no indication that would 
change under the PROSPER Act. 
While the PROSPER bill purports to “give our students the 
opportunity to prosper,”555 it primarily gives proprietary institutions 
the opportunity to prosper by paving the way for greater Title IV 
federal aid access for these schools. The bill does this in two ways. 
First, it would blur the distinction between private institutions and 
proprietary institutions by providing a single definition of an 
“institution of higher education.”556 Second, it would measure 
academic legitimacy based on demonstrated mastery of subject matter, 
instead of number of credit hours completed.557 This could open the 
 
 549. See Chingos, supra note 544, at n.5. 
 550. See id. 
 551. See id. 
 552. See id. 
 553. See id.  
 554. See supra notes 366–368, 374–379, 459–467 and accompanying text. 
 555. From Staff Reports, Giving Students the Opportunity to Prosper, 
LAGRANGE DAILY NEWS (Dec. 8, 2017, 6:27 PM), www.lagrangenews.com/ 
2017/12/08/giving-students-the-opportunity-to-prosper [https://perma.cc/2EJP-
YMEJ]. 
 556. H.R. 4508, 115th Cong. §101 (2d Sess. 2018) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 
1001). The bill requires a proprietary institution or nonprofit or public institution that 
offers only non-degree programs to have been in existence for at least two years in 
order to meet the definition. See § 101(b). Also, proprietary institutions would be 
ineligible for Titles III and V funds for minority-serving institutions. See id. 
 557. §§ 103(e), 104(a)(1)(A). The PROSPER bill refers to this as 
“Competency-based education.” § 103(e) (amending 20 U.S.C. §1003); see also § 
104(a)(1)(A) (repealing definition of “credit hour”). 
968 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
floodgates to Title IV funds not only to vocational schools, but to 
proprietary schools as well.  
In addition to this proposed funding boost to proprietary schools, 
the bill would eliminate the 90/10 rule,558 the strongest incentive for 
proprietary institutions to do a better job of serving students. This 
would open the door for proprietary schools to receive full federal 
funding.559 The bill also would eliminate the gainful employment and 
borrower defense regulations,560 and it would remove the 
postsecondary institution performance rating system,561 thereby 
protecting the worst performing schools. Further, it would eliminate 
the requirement that online schools acquire state authorization before 
enrolling students in that state.562 
The PROSPER bill would fundamentally change the oversight 
role of both the DOE and the CFPB, while reducing the accountability 
of predatory for-profit institutions.563 The bill would limit state efforts 
to oversee schools (especially proprietary schools) and loan servicers 
and would limit the DOE’s ability to conduct oversight.564 It would add 
a new seven-person advisory board to oversee the Office of Federal 
Student Aid.565 This office oversees thousands of educational 
 
 558. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514. 
 559. See id. 
 560. See §§ 104(a)(1)(B)–(C); see also supra notes 329–331, 346–347 and 
accompanying text. The elimination of the borrower defense regulations will mean 
that there will be a reversion to the prior rule on borrower defense to repayment, in 
which defrauded students had to file separate actions within a narrow time frame 
(three years from the date of any fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of contract) and 
the case had to be heard by an administrative law judge or through arbitration, rather 
than by allowing borrowers their day in court. See supra note 346 and accompanying 
text. 
 561. See § 104(b)(3). This elimination is in the guise of providing “regulatory 
relief.” The Postsecondary Institution Rating System (PIRS) was a proposal of the 
DOE during the Obama Administration to increase transparency and accountability. 
See Tim Harmon & Anna Cielinski, Transparency and Accountability: Implementing 
a Postsecondary Institution Rating System that Empowers Students while Avoiding 
Unintended Consequences, CTR. FOR POSTSECONDARY & ECON. SUCCESS 1, 3 (Nov. 
2014). It proposed specifically to help disadvantaged students by providing 
information on which schools might offer them the most in terms of resources. See id. 
While the system did not seek to rank schools overall, it did rank schools according 
to improvement in performance. See id. President Obama had proposed to use the 
system in allocating student aid. See id. 
 562. See § 495(b). 
 563. See §§ 495–497. 
 564. See id. (noting the repeal and prohibition on state authorization 
regulations; limitation on authority of DOE). 
 565. See § 131(f). 
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institutions and is responsible for eradicating waste, fraud, and abuse 
in the federal financial aid programs. While an advisory board may be 
a positive addition, the role of this board is solely to oversee the 
distribution of federal aid and the office’s management of its loan 
portfolio.566 This narrow role is a concern in light of the Secretary’s 
efforts to undermine the CFPB, the other major regulator of higher 
education financial aid.567 
The bill further deliberately cripples the ability of the DOE to 
issue new regulations by providing mandated periods of 
Congressional comment prior to the issuance of new regulations.568 
The chicanery of this is evident in the fact that Congress already has 
the ability to comment on rules through the legislative process. 
Providing an additional period for comment will favor lobbyists, 
political action committees, and others with enough resources to pay 
for congressional access. This means that proprietary institutions, in 
particular, will be advantaged at the expense of students.569  
The bill eliminates the cohort default rate that requires schools 
to keep their student loan default rates below a certain threshold in 
order to receive federal funds.570 Instead, it substitutes a new measure 
assessed at the program level.571 Under this new measure, schools 
would remain eligible for federal funds only if at least 45% of their 
borrowers have not defaulted and are less than ninety-days delinquent 
at the end of the third fiscal year in repayment.572 While the cohort 
default rate eliminated very few schools from eligibility for federal 
funds, this new measure is an unknown, so it remains to be seen 
whether it will be a better gauge of eligibility and whether it will hold 
the worst performing schools accountable.573 
 
 566. See § 131(f)(3). 
 567. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514. 
 568. See § 492. This is a nebulous period that is “10 days after the Secretary—
(I) receives and addresses all comments from the authorizing committees; and (II) 
responds to the authorizing committees in writing with an explanation of how such 
comments have been addressed.” Id. In addition, the bill prohibits the Secretary from 
promulgating “any rule or regulation that exceeds the scope of the explicit authority 
granted to the Secretary under this Act.” § 117 (amending Part B, Title I, 20 U.S.C. § 
1011 et seq.). 
 569. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514. 
 570. See § 426. 
 571. See § 481B. 
 572. Id. 
 573. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514 (noting that 
there were only ten schools affected by the cohort default rate). 
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The bill provides that schools with few resources and those 
supporting minority students which receive funding under Titles III 
and V of the HEA remain eligible for federal funding only if they have 
a combined completion and transfer rate of 25% or greater.574 While 
an accountability measure is to be applauded, nevertheless it is 
troubling that the bill applies the requirement only to underfunded 
schools serving low-income students, while relaxing the 
accountability requirements for proprietary schools.575 
The bill provides questionable oversight because it allows 
accreditors to waive out of its requirements if they deem it necessary 
to encourage innovation, improve the delivery of services to students, 
or reduce the administrative burden to schools.576 While that in itself 
is not necessarily bad, the bill contains no process to evaluate these 
waivers to ensure that they achieve their goals, and it provides no 
safeguards, such as loan forgiveness, for students who may be harmed 
by the waivers.577 
The bill further significantly changes funding and accountability 
for teacher preparedness.578 It eliminates Title II of the HEA and 
substitutes a so-called “In-Demand Apprenticeships” program to 
provide a closer link between higher education and the marketplace.579 
While that, in itself, may be an admirable goal, nevertheless the bill 
provides inadequate standards and reporting requirements for this 
program.580 Since students in this program will have access to little 
training and accountability, they may be unaware that they are 
registered in a low-quality program that will not train them properly 
to pass the licensure and certification requirements to enable them to 
begin a teaching career.581 
 
 574. See § 301 (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1057 et seq.). 
 575. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514. 
 576. See § 496(q). 
 577. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514. 
 578. See id. 
 579. See §§ 201–202 (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.). According to the 
bill, the purpose of this change is to “expand student access to, and participation in, 
new industry-led earn-and-learn programs leading to high-wage, high-skill, and high-
demand careers.” Id.; see also § 407 (providing for the sunset of TEACH grants). 
 580. See CAP Postsecondary Education Team, supra note 514. 
 581. See id.  
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B. The Aim Higher Act 
There is a world of difference between the PROSPER Act and 
the Aim Higher Act (AHA).582 Unlike the PROSPER Act, the AHA 
focuses on and attempts to address the problems of equal access, 
affordability, completion rates, and fairness in funding of higher 
education.583 
The AHA addresses the problem of access to higher education 
in several different ways. First, it encourages high school students to 
earn college credits and at little to no cost.584 It does this by creating a 
matching grant program to encourage postsecondary institutions to 
partner with K-12 school districts to promote “dual enrollment and 
early college high schools.”585 Second, unlike the PROSPER Act, the 
AHA would provide federal aid to foster and homeless students, 
undocumented students, Native Americans, students in U.S. 
territories, and incarcerated individuals to enable them to obtain access 
to higher education.586 Third, the AHA would strengthen programs 
designed to identify and assist students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds to enroll in higher education.587 Fourth, it would simplify 
the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and would 
provide automatic Pell grants to those students with the lowest 
incomes who received means-tested federal benefits in the previous 
two years.588 Fifth, it would provide improved data on postsecondary 
institutions to allow students to make more informed decisions.589 
Sixth, in stark contrast to the PROSPER Act, the AHA would 
strengthen institutional accountability and quality by requiring the 
DOE, rather than state accreditors, to conduct Title IV compliance 
checks and by allowing the DOE to veto accreditor-set standards it 
deems too low.590 It also would establish multiple thresholds to require 
institutions to improve their cohort default rate metric.591 Finally, 
 
 582. See H.R. 6543, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018). 
 583. See §§ 2002–2003. 
 584. See EDUC. & LABOR COMM., Aim Higher Act, H.R. 6543 Bill Summary 2 
(July 26, 2018). 
 585. Id. The Bill would invest $250 million in the first year to provide funding 
to the states for this partnership. Id. 
 586. See id. at 2–3. 
 587. See id. at 4. 
 588. See id. 
 589. See id. 
 590. See id. at 4–5. 
 591. See id. at 5. Currently, institutions can “game” the system by staying just 
under the mandated threshold to avoid improvement. The AHA encourages 
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instead of opening the federal coffers to proprietary schools, as the 
PROSPER Act does, the AHA protects students by raising the 90/10 
rule to 85/15,592 and by closing the loophole that allows these 
institutions to obtain funding from other federal programs without 
penalty.593 It further prohibits schools that spend less than half their 
tuition revenue on instruction from “using federal funds for marketing, 
advertising, recruiting or lobbying.”594 It also would maintain the 
“gainful employment” requirement and would further protect students 
who have been defrauded by their institutions by providing them full 
relief and allowing them their day in court.595 
The AHA addresses college affordability in several different 
ways. First, instead of eliminating the SEOG and TEACH grants, as 
the PROSPER Act does, it strengths these grants596 and permanently 
indexes the Pell grant to inflation to maintain its purchasing power.597 
It also extends Pell grant eligibility to quality short-term programs “to 
strengthen the workforce.”598 Second, instead of narrowing the federal 
work-study program to eliminate participation by graduate students, 
the AHA maintains graduate student participation and changes the 
funding allocation formula from one based on length of participation 
in the program to one based on number of low-income students plus 
unmet need at that institution.599 
Unlike the PROSPER Act, which would cut funding to student 
aid programs and push students into more expensive private loans, the 
AHA simplifies the repayment process and helps borrowers manage 
their repayments to avoid default. It does this by reviving the expired 
Perkins loan program for needy undergraduate and graduate students 
and providing better loan counseling to apprise students of the 
 
improvement by providing technical and financial support with a high adjusted cohort 
default rate. Id. 
 592. See supra notes 114, 194–195, 241–242 and accompanying text. 
 593. See EDUC. & LABOR COMM., supra note 584, at 5. 
 594. Id. 
 595. Id. at 5–6. 
 596. See id. at 6–7. The AHA does this by changing the formula for federal 
funding of the SEOG by allocating federal funds based on the level of unmet need 
plus the number of low-income students at that school, instead of the current 
allocation based on length of time the school has been participating in the program. 
See id. at 7. The AHA further protects recipients of the TEACH grants from their 
grants being inadvertently converted to loans, and it retains the teacher loan 
forgiveness programs, both of which are eliminated under the PROSPER Act. See id. 
 597. See id. at 7. 
 598. Id. 
 599. See id. at 8. In addition, the AHA provides a bonus funding allocation for 
institutions in the top “20% in serving and graduating Pell students.” Id. 
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amounts they have borrowed and what their repayments will be.600 
Similar to the PROSPER Act, the AHA eliminates the loan origination 
fee.601 But unlike the PROSPER Act, the AHA allows borrowers to 
refinance their debt at the prevailing interest rates offered to new 
borrowers.602 It also maintains the PSLF program and expands it to 
include farmers and those who work for Veteran Service 
Organizations.603 It simplifies repayment by replacing the current four 
repayment plans with one fixed-payment plan and one income-based 
repayment (IBR) plan.604 The IBR plan provides more generous 
repayment terms for low- and middle-income borrowers, and for those 
earning below 250% of the federal poverty level, no repayment would 
be required until their earnings rise above that level.605 It further 
provides for automatic recertification of income for those borrowers 
enrolled in IBR,606 which would eliminate the need for annual re-
enrollment that is currently required. Moreover, it extends eligibility 
for an IBR plan to parent PLUS loans and consolidated loans that 
repay PLUS loans, and it extends disability forgiveness to PLUS loans 
if the student should become totally and permanently disabled.607 
Borrowers who are more than 120 days delinquent on their loans will 
be automatically enrolled in the IBR plan.608 Borrowers who 
consolidate their student loans with those of their spouses will be 
allowed to separate their remaining balance and be liable only for their 
particular portions, instead of the entire amount.609 The AHA stipulates 
that states have the right “to enact, regulate, and enforce consumer 
protection laws that protect their residents.”610 
The AHA also operates to make higher education more 
affordable in general by providing incentive grants to states to increase 
education funding.611 These grants would be provided to states that 
 
 600. See id.  
 601. See id. 
 602. See id. 
 603. See id. at 9. These include the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign 
Wars (VFW). Id. The expansion also includes doctors employed by non-profit 
hospitals or other health care facilities “in states that prohibit the direct hiring of these 
individuals, such as California and Texas.” Id. 
 604. See id. 
 605. Id. 
 606. See id. 
 607. See id. 
 608. Id. 
 609. See id. 
 610. Id. 
 611. See id. at 6. 
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make tuition more affordable and to those that strive to make public 
two-year colleges free to every student.612  
The AHA would support lower-income students by providing 
additional funding to community colleges, particularly those that are 
underfunded and with high levels of low-income and minority 
students.613 This funding is intended to encourage these institutions to 
develop “high quality career and technical education programs,”614 
improve remedial education, and provide financial advising, as well 
as financial assistance, to offset costs that otherwise may lead to delay 
in degree completion.615 
In contrast to the PROSPER Act, the AHA would strengthen 
Title II of the HEA to provide support for programs to recruit, retain, 
and support teachers and school leaders.616 It would further provide 
graduate fellowships for students pursuing careers in underserved 
areas such as special education, English-language instruction, STEM 
courses, and computer science.617 
The primary drawback to the AHA, however, is its cost, an issue 
that the bill does not purport to address. The provisions of the AHA 
will require a considerable increase in education funding, which may 
be offset to some extent by a partnership with the states and with the 
alleviation of much fraud and abuse through increased regulation.618 
Another potential cost offset, albeit more long-term, is the increase in 
tax revenue from the stimulation of the economy by a more educated 
 
 612. See id. at 10. The AHA also provides grants to “low-income students who 
transfer from a community college to a Minority-Serving Institution (MSI) for the 
remainder of their degree.” Id. In addition, the bill provides for grants to schools that 
expand the use of open textbooks to help cut students’ costs. See id. 
 613. See id. The AHA also provides support for students with disabilities, in 
addition to the support for foster and homeless students. See id. at 12. 
 614. Id. at 11. 
 615. See id at 11–12. The bill also requires evaluation of program 
effectiveness to determine which programs are more likely to lead to degree 
completion. Id. In addition to other costs, the AHA would increase funding to 
CCAMPIS (Child Care Access Means Parents in School) and for programs to prevent 
and treat substance abuse. See id. at 12–13. It also would increase funding for veterans 
to address their discrete needs, such as coordination of benefits and development of a 
national website to allow institutions to share information on how best to support 
completion by veterans. See id. at 13. 
 616. See id. at 14. 
 617. See id. 
 618. See Delece Smith-Barrow, With the New “Aim Higher Act,” House 
Democrats Want States to Make Community College Free, HECHINGER REP. (July 27, 
2018) https://hechingerreport.org/with-the-new-aim-higher-act-house-democrats-
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workforce. In the shorter term, perhaps the reinstatement of the loan 
origination fee could be used to defray some of the costs.619 
CONCLUSION 
Over the years, politics have had a profound effect on federal 
education financing. The problems of higher education today—
spiraling costs, unequal access, burgeoning debt, unscrupulous for-
profit institutions, and predatory student loan lenders—are all 
problems that should have been addressed in a meaningful way by 
Congress years ago. But since the late 1950s, federal education 
financial aid policy has been used to advance political agendas.620 This 
has become more problematic over time as political discourse has 
become increasingly polarized, rather than focused on a clearly 
reasoned educational aid policy. 
Unfortunately, the problems of higher education will have 
tangible effects on the national economy, not only because of the huge 
amount of outstanding student loans but also because these problems 
will negatively affect the supply of educated, skilled workers and 
professionals, unless they are adequately addressed. In addition, they 
will affect the ability of current and future borrowers to contribute in 
a meaningful way to the economy through new home, car, and other 
major purchases, and they will negatively affect the creation of new 
businesses.621  
Unless there is a change in congressional attitude from regarding 
federal funding for higher education as a “free ride” or a “handout” to 
viewing it as an investment in the future of this country, the spiraling 
amount of student loan debt will remain on a collision course with the 
economy. The federal government, in partnership with the states, must 
act to remedy the situation by providing affordable education and by 
adequately regulating unscrupulous proprietary institutions and 
student loan lenders.622 It also must act to ensure that there is equal and 
fair access to higher education by lower-income individuals and that 
student loan borrowers are treated fairly.  
When Congress addresses the next reauthorization of the HEA, 
it must give meaningful consideration to the direction in which the 
government should be heading in funding for higher education. This 
 
 619. See supra notes 544–553 and accompanying text. 
 620. See supra Part I. 
 621. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 622. See supra Sections II.B–C (discussing the government’s limited 
regulation of student loan lenders and proprietary institutions, respectively). 
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should not be a political issue; such a meaningful discussion cannot 
occur if lobbyists control the process and there is no bipartisan 
discussion and cooperation.623 The two bills currently pending to 
reauthorize the HEA indicate the polarity of congressional opinion on 
education funding policy.624 The salient issue is the focal point at 
which the problems should be addressed. The resolution of this issue 
will determine the outcome of federal education policy for generations 
to come. For instance, if the focal point is on protecting large lenders 
and servicers and proprietary institutions, then the next reauthorization 
of the HEA will do nothing to solve the problems of access, high cost 
of tuition, and crisis level student loan debt. In fact, these problems 
may be exacerbated through decreased access, more expensive student 
loans, and increasing defaults.625 But if the focal point is on the needs 
of students, both undergraduate and graduate, and on what is best for 
the country in the long run, then Congress will have taken an important 
step toward addressing these critical problems. 
Congress should learn from the mistakes of the past. There 
should be less focus on loans and more focus on grants, the federal 
work-study program, and aid from both state and federal levels to 
educational institutions. Those who have borrowed and will borrow in 
the future to fund their education should be treated fairly. It is 
fundamental that these borrowers obtain value for their investment—
a degree that will allow them to comfortably repay their loans and lead 
productive lives. This will not happen, however, if the government 
does not strictly regulate certain educational institutions. Proprietary 
educational institutions have a place in higher education because some 
offer a valuable education and provide access to lower-income and 
nontraditional students, particularly those with an interest in 
vocational education. But many of these institutions target students for 
their federal aid dollars while offering them worthless degrees.626 If 
these institutions are not strictly regulated, the government will 
continue to waste taxpayers’ money on them. These institutions must 
 
 623. See, e.g., Polis, supra note 12 (complaining that Republicans are shutting 
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 624. See H.R. 4508, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) (the PROSPER Act proposed 
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be strictly regulated, and the gainful employment regulation should be 
reinstated to determine eligibility for federal funding of these 
institutions.  
Students who have been defrauded by educational institutions or 
have been unable to complete their course of study because of school 
closure should be able to discharge their debts. The fact that they are 
suffering this hardship means that the government has not done a 
thorough job of regulating and overseeing these institutions. Since 
these institutions operate with a substantial amount of government 
funding,627 it is to be expected that the government would exert strong 
oversight as a responsible steward of taxpayers’ money. If it fails to 
do that, the government, not the students, should suffer the 
consequence. 
If these problems are not resolved, they will only worsen over 
time with devastating consequences to borrowers, to taxpayers, and to 
the economy. The time to act is now, with a thoughtful and meaningful 
reauthorization of the HEA, and the stakes could not be higher. 
  
 
 627. See Stuart Shepard and James Agresti, Government Spending on 
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